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[The following is a translation of the Russian-language bimonthly journal SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA published in Moscow by the Institute of Sociological Research of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Refer to the table of contents for a listing of any articles not translated]

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Public Opinion on Cooperatives

18060004a Moscow *SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA* in Russian No 6, Nov-Dec 88
(signed to press 7 Dec 88) pp 3-11

[Article by Yevgeniy Grigoryevich Antosenkov, doctor of economic sciences, professor, and director of Scientific Research Institute of Labor of the State Committee of the USSR for Labor and Social Problems; Grigoriy Pavlovich Degtyarev, candidate of philosophical sciences and sector head in the institute's division of the social problems of labor; and Yevgeniy Danilovich Katul'skiy, candidate of economic sciences and deputy director of the institute]

[Text] The cooperative movement has undergone an extremely complex evolution, full of inner drama. During the years of "military communism" the cooperatives were castigated for their petty bourgeois spirit and mercenary mentality. Descriptions were more restrained and even respectful in the NEP [New Economic Policy (1921-1936)] years.

In 1921 V.I. Lenin began his active departure from the "direct line" of military communism, from the concept of socialism as a single nationwide syndicate or a big national factory, and from the ideas of direct product exchange and distribution. It became obvious that decrees from above could not lead to the establishment of effective social and economic relationships in industry, not to mention agriculture. The largely indigenous Russian habit of radical theorizing became "uncommonly onesided" and led to "leftist recklessness"[2]. Post-revolutionary feelings of intoxication and fervor were the reason for the desire to expropriate and nationalize everything in sight as quickly as possible, to nationalize even the cooperatives. "Leftwing" ideas became an obsession with many people—from the upper echelon to local agencies of government. Just before the 9th RKP(b) [Russian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)—(1918-1925)] Congress, for example, V.P. Milyutin, the head of the cooperative division of VSNKh [Supreme Council of the National Economy (1917-1932)], proposed the "liquidation" of the "parallel existence of state and cooperative enterprises" (quoted in [7, p 51]). The urge and spirit of liquidationism, like a phoenix, were constantly being reborn and, what is most regrettable, were acted upon.

Lenin's well-known article "On Cooperatives" was of decisive importance in the ideological "rehabilitation" of the cooperative movement. The modification of "the entire view of socialism"[3, p 376], which is possible only in the presence of radical changes in social thinking, never took place. The ideas of utopian socialism, which had deep historical roots in the Russian soil and had made their way into the depths of the public mind, prevailed. To a considerable extent, they are still feeding the social environment today. This is why it is important to analyze the roots and content of various stereotypes and biases of utopian thinking.

For example, there is still the common conviction that economic motives are among the most primitive motives for human behavior and cannot shape the well-rounded personality[13]. There is the assumption that the acknowledgement of duty and the sense of responsibility are displayed somewhere on a higher plane. The economic individual is a utilitarian and does not understand moral choices. These misconceptions were compounded by the negative attitude toward financial incentives, which were allegedly supposed to be present only in the Western society. It was the common assumption that these incentives were based exclusively on the acquisition of consumer goods. The ideological struggle against the consumer mentality as one of the vices of Western civilization began long before the efforts to solve urgent consumption problems in our society. Getting rid of the capitalist heritage was a matter of repression, prohibitions, and coercion. It is possible that this struggle was often used to cover up the lack of desire and even the lack of ability to solve our society's most acute social problems.

Marxism's unequivocal view of socialism as a society rising out of the depths of capitalism, a society for which the material prerequisites had to be established in advance, was often completely ignored[1].

When socialism "fled" bourgeois shortcomings, it gave rise to its own biases. The most common is the tendency to reduce objective social relations to personal relations. In the common ideologized mentality, economic processes acquired the semblance of wholly personal processes—in other words, processes depending exclusively on the people in the relationships: "private tradesmen" or state workers and employees. Economic relations began to be given a moral interpretation. Negative phenomena frequently led to a search for specific perpetrators of various difficulties, miscalculations, and mistakes. A discerning look at actual processes, self-analysis, and the ability to recognize and disclose one's own faults were completely rejected. The prevailing view was that of the uninvolved bystander or moralist.

The efforts to reinterpret socioeconomic relations and find ways of making them more efficient were backed up by the ideological stereotypes contrasting capitalism with socialism. It was accused of undermining socialist mores and principles. This kind of polarization of public thinking was particularly obvious after the state took

measures to develop cooperative and individual labor. Initiative and enterprise were frequently interpreted not as concrete economic terms, but were assessed from the standpoint of universal moral criteria. Two opposite points of view were revealed here.

The supporters of one were infected with a fair amount of optimism and a benevolent and receptive attitude toward the new socioeconomic phenomenon, to the point of dedicating all sorts of odes to the "private tradesman"[8]. In contrast to them, others warned us against excessive optimism and have described cooperative and individual labor in somber tones, calling for a closer look at the dangerous "ethics of the 'private tradesman'"[9]. Whereas supporters analyze primarily the economic potential of the "private tradesman," the "warners" use moral arguments to imply that the mercenary motives of the "private tradesman" will have horrifying consequences, allege that he is unfairly favored, and even ask whether he is one of "our" people.

The differences in these points of view stem from fundamental differences in perceptions of human interest (private, personal, and social) and the nature of social justice. We are assured that the "private tradesman" is pursuing his own private interest, and not the interests of society, but what does this mean? What about the interests of "non-private" members of society? Are they really devoid of personal material gain and are all of their motives strictly virtuous and altruistic?

This is hardly the case. After all, the social interest is revealed precisely through individual, including egotistical, interests. According to Lenin, this interpretation of interest by L. Feuerbach was nothing other than "the beginnings of historical materialism"[4]. The opinion that egotism is "the root of all evil, but also the root of all good," and that virtue is something "corresponding to the egotism of all people"[10] is much more vital and much closer to materialism than abstract discussions of the humanistic values of human existence and the superiority of the moral satisfaction derived from participation in great feats, closer to an understanding of the "mysteries of man."

Marxism strives to reveal the material roots of egotism and selflessness. The opponents of "private" initiative portray these as contrasting and conflicting emotions and regard interest as the moral subordination of egotistical interests to some kind of absolute "universal" interest, expecting man to submerge his own wishes and act in line with other, "higher" motives. From this simple line of reasoning, they frequently conclude that because the "private tradesman" is pursuing his "own" interests, he is a person of "low moral status and a suspicious character." And it is no longer surprising when they say that "it is the intention, and not the result, that warrants moral support"[9]. Do nothing at all, but simply sit back and observe, as long as you are filled with highly moral intentions.

This point of view seems to be too prevalent. Is this the root of the moral duplicity marked by splendid facades and unsightly backyards? It is not a long way from here to the "full course" of moral features, similar to the "full-course meal" in a restaurant. Choose whatever you like, but do not eat anything! This point of view has nothing in common with reality and is closer to a utopian wish for a bright future.

Any individual interest strives for social recognition. It is therefore useless to deny a priori that the "private tradesman" has any moral basis for his actions by enveloping them in enmity and suspicion. It is precisely this kind of separation, the "opposition of the aims of socialist construction to the interests of the individual and social groups"[14, p 63], that is recognized as one of the main causes of the deformation of socialism.

The concept of justice is another battlefield in the struggle of ideas. Here the "warners" often climb onto the shoulders of great men in the hope of using their strength in scientific debates.

References to authorities usually cause people to tremble and to believe all of the statements attributed to them, but references to interpreters rather than primary sources often lead to confusion. It has been alleged, for example, that Aristotle "was the first to divide justice into equalizing and distributive forms"[11]. This is not a transformation of Aristotle's view of justice, but a deformation and distortion. This is a simple error in logic Aristotle could not have committed. Equalization is a specific case of equalizing distribution. What is the reason for this symptomatic distortion? Could it be the special appeal equalizing justice has for several doctrines, including socialism?

But let us return to Aristotle, according to whom there are two kinds of justice: correspondence to the law and the fair treatment of others[12]. Aristotle paid considerable attention to the legal bases of justice, distinguishing between distributive, directive, and corrective forms of law. He saw the law as something relative and proportional. For this reason, the observance of just equality is possible only in proportional law. Simple equality without reservations, according to Aristotle, is always inequality. Just equality is possible only if the merits of the sides are taken into account.

It is this interpretation of justice as correspondence to the law that escapes the notice of the "warners" who inevitably relapse into moralizing lectures. They overlook the law and economics, although exchange, or commodity and money relations in their present form, is the nucleus of legal relations in Aristotle's interpretation. Aristotle uses the term "exchange" in the broad sense, primarily to describe relations between people. Directive law defines the terms of transactions to the point of voluntary exchange based on contracted obligations. Corrective law is applied in cases of voluntary (or coerced) "exchange" (or crime) surreptitiously and as a matter of necessity.

The "warners" are convinced of the impossibility of comparing different types of labor and the inevitability of equalizing justice. Aristotle proved the opposite, however, 2,000 years ago: Money serves as the medium of exchange, comparing and contrasting the labor of the shoemaker and the farmer. Aristotle regarded need as the universal yardstick because it synthesized and connected everything and everyone. If people did not need anything, they would not enter into exchange relationships and would not express the degree of necessity through prices. For the "warners," however, the price represents the quantity of labor expended and cannot be set by "the vagaries of the market." This price is more likely to reflect the caged squirrel's race in a wheel than the socially valid need for something and to reinforce the idea of the inevitability of the Sisyphean task and of equalizing equality.

This kind of "tunnel vision" is infinitely remote from Aristotle's belief that social interrelations cannot be complete and varied without exchange. Exchange relationships, including market exchange, are the most essential component of social development, and ignoring them could have the most serious social consequences.

Anything great is imperishable. It survives for centuries and even for millennia. Aristotle's insight is proof of this[15]. Theories of social exchange, with ideas of social comparison serving as their nucleus, are now being elaborated vigorously. People are not equal in terms of their accomplishments, social influence, and abilities. The attempts at their quantitative equalization have given rise to endless arguments and discontent. This is why Aristotle believed that merit had to be taken into account in distributive law. Merit does not always mean the same thing to everyone, however.

The ideology of equalizing pseudo-justice questions the very possibility of implementing the important socialist principle: "From each according to his abilities, and to each according to his labor." This principle takes the merits of the concerned sides into account and is geared to the achievement of what Aristotle called the fair treatment of others.

The "warners" are predicting the imminent threat of a "new rich," often without explaining who the "old rich" were. Did they live before the revolution or did they make their appearance in the last two decades? If it is the latter, then some discussion of corruption, bribery, and organized crime might be in order. What gave rise to the recent "old rich"? Was it their status as the "distributors" of things created by the labor of others? And what were their ethics? They were not only "skilled distributors" but also hypocrites. What do we know about them? Our information is quite sketchy. Many of them were able to hide behind the massive campaign for struggle against unearned income, of which we are more aware because of the trials of the "moonlighters" (artists, variety troupes, and builders) who earned more than they were directed to earn.

There is an ingrained prejudice in the public mind against sizable differences in income, and there are constant attempts to set some kind of ceiling and to regard any rise above it as a violation of the principle of social justice. This moral imperative is the result of the equalizing view of social justice and the maintenance of a common low income in accordance with the belief that it is all right for everyone to be poor as long as they are equal. The discussions of this idea are essentially theoretical. Are we not forgetting that the equalizing ideology led to the loss of the work ethic in our society? After all, the attempts to limit differences in income earned from labor undermined the very possibility of displaying creativity, initiative, and enterprise and deterred and stifled productive activity. In this connection, we should recall V.I. Lenin's statement that "from the standpoint of the basic ideals of Marxism, the interests of social development are higher than the interests of the proletariat...and the interests of an individual stratum"[5].

What do we know about outstanding inventors and economic officials? Do we remember their names? Do they live on in the memory of their heirs? Are they at least perpetuated in the names of various foundations and enterprises? Do we give them credit for their contribution to social development? Do we appreciate and respect their work? Many of them disappear into oblivion when their creative energy is still at its height because they are destroyed by the desperate battles and futile attempts to escape the iron clutches and cobwebs of departmentalism and the monstrous irrationality of the economic mechanism. Initiative, enterprise, and a grasp of economics are talents equivalent to the talent of a poet or writer. The people with these talents are our national pride and national treasure. Their names, however, are usually known to only a few. We are surrounded by completely different names....

These are all alarming symptoms of the declining prestige of productive and enterprising labor, the only kind of labor that can enhance the well-being of each individual and the society as a whole. They are symptoms of the decline of social morals. The decline will be irreversible as long as the economic law of distribution continues to be violated. The social dangers of this violation were pointed out more than a hundred years ago by J. Proudhon, whose talent was recognized by K. Marx. Proudhon listed the following factors of faulty distribution: the development of parasitism and sycophancy and the multiplication of luxury businesses and jobs; non-productive enterprises; excessive government expenditures; the absorption of material resources by capitals and big cities; inflation; the rising cost of almost all consumer goods[16]. Furthermore, the disruption of the balance between income and expenditures is something "the masses will refuse to understand and economists will refuse to explain, while the government will quite wisely remain silent"[16, p 19]. Violations of this kind erode national wealth and lead to the abnormal kind of poverty which has devastating effects and is known as pauperism.

Proudhon said that the violation of the economic law is essentially also a psychological fact and "stems, on the one hand, from the idealism of our wishes and, on the other, from an exaggerated sense of our own value and the underestimation of the value of others"[16, p 23]. Proudhon then went on to say that "pauperism, examined from the psychological standpoint, grows out of the same sources as war"[16, p 29]—mass heroism and victory at any price.

Only the progress of labor and the development of social relations on the basis of economically valid justice can change the entire mindset. Economic justice should lead to the disappearance of condescending biases, envy, and social distinctions. Equality before the law is particularly significant in "cases involving compensation for labor and the distribution of services and products"[16, p 22]. This is what we are most likely to forget when we speak of social justice, although complete and total justice can exist only in a civilian society—i.e., in a socialist legal state.

We measured public attitudes toward cooperative and individual labor twice. The first survey was conducted in July 1987 by IZVESTIYA in conjunction with the Center for the Study of Public Opinion of the Institute of Sociological Research, USSR Academy of Sciences, and with the participation of the Scientific Research Institute of Labor of USSR Goskomtrud [State Committee for Labor and Social Problems].¹ The second survey was conducted in December 1987 by specialists from several ministries and departments and researchers from the Scientific Research Institute of Labor and its branches.²

The same questions were asked in both surveys. This allowed us to compare the data and to gain some idea of the dynamics of public opinion. In particular, the question "How do you feel about the activity of people working in cooperatives and people engaged in individual labor?" served as an indicator. We derived the following results (Table 1).

Table 1. Attitudes Toward Cooperative and Individual Forms of Labor, %

Responses	July 1987	December 1987
I approve totally and completely and I think it is important for the society	44	33
This activity diverts a great deal of time and energy, lowers productivity in the main job, etc.	33	30
I do not approve because I am convinced that this activity fuels private property interests	10	31
Undecided	13	6

The empirical data testify that negative tendencies grew stronger in the attitudes of people toward cooperative and individual labor during the 6 months. Why? In the first half of 1987 the new movement was just gathering strength, and the July survey was therefore conducted at a time when the population had encountered few people engaged in this kind of labor and when the mass media had just begun their coverage, usually in a positive light, of the new phenomenon. This was the reason for the fairly benevolent attitude toward it. Personal experience in soliciting the services of cooperatives was limited: 22 percent in July and 40 percent in December. This means that the negative aspects of this activity were still not clear to the public.³

The situation changed quickly, however. Cooperative and individual labor developed rapidly. The population was more likely to encounter the high prices and fairly low quality of products. Publications became more critical. The inclination of people to seek perpetrators everywhere led to an outburst of hostility and previously latent social protest.

The surveys attest to an extremely interesting situation. At least half of those judging the prices and quality of goods and services had never had any personal contact with the self-employed. As a general rule, the less they knew, the more categorical their judgments were. The

polarization of opinions was apparent and the gap was particularly distinct when we studied the differences in the opinions of those preferring to moralize and take the position of uninvolved observers and those expressing a wish to try their hand at cooperative or individual labor. The July survey revealed that 15 percent of the respondents wanted to perform individual labor, and the figure in December was 20 percent. In the December survey, 67 percent of those who expressed an interest in cooperative and individual forms of labor felt that they were important to the society. Only 3 percent were convinced of the opposite. Among those who had no interest in this kind of labor, only 18 percent approved completely, and 44 percent were convinced of its socially negative consequences.

This kind of polarization was revealed in the responses to literally all questions: in opinions of the prices and quality of goods and services, etc. In all cases it was those who expressed an interest in the new forms of labor—and we found them in all social groups—that were much more likely to make use of the services (and cope with the prices) of the cooperative and individual sectors of the economy (53 percent and 35 percent of the respondents respectively); the opinion that the services were too expensive was expressed by 75 percent of those with no intention to engage in these types of labor, and by 44 percent of those with this intention.

Little attention is paid to the pricing mechanism as a whole. In most cases, only high prices are cited, and little is said about the cooperatives offering goods at acceptable rates. But what about the cost of raw materials? Do many people know that the retail price of leather is six times as high as the wholesale price? And this is not the only case of artificial price hikes. Sufficient proof of this can be found in the wholesale-retail conversion rates set in the offices of the State Committee for Prices.

There is no question that prices present many problems, especially the prices of consumer goods and prices in the public dining sector, where the markup is sometimes 200-300 percent.

One of the basic commandments of present-day marketing is "Thou shalt not resort to aggressive pricing." High prices inevitably have a boomerang effect and raise the prices of raw materials. In the West competition means that a business has to fight for each client and gear its operations to the mass consumer. Only the massive size of the market and the consequent inevitability of intensive labor and high standards of service make profits possible, and these are often quite moderate. In our country, aggressive pricing is widespread because of the monopoly conditions in the state and cooperative sectors of the economy. V.I. Lenin called this mode of trade "Asiatic," apparently because of its unpredictability and its lack of any reasonable basis. It is difficult, for example, to find a reasonable explanation for the 3 rubles charged for a 1-liter bottle of fruit juice of dubious quality in the cooperatives in many cities. High prices

arouse public opinion, alienate a high percentage of the buying public, and lead to the creation of a confined group of consumers. This is a painfully familiar situation in an economy plagued by shortages. High prices also lead to the instability of commercial turnover: Many consumers are frightened away, and the elite is extremely capricious. It takes only one or two competitors to change the situation dramatically. Then even lower prices cannot restore trust. The first promising signs of the effects of competition are now apparent. The 1-ruble photographs of the subway system indicating the shopping centers in the capital have disappeared. They have been replaced by inexpensive and appealing maps. There would be no need to withdraw patents if the state sector could react more flexibly and quickly. The prices of consumer goods are declining, and largely due to the competition of the cooperative and individual sectors. The self-employed individuals in Chelyabinsk, for example, are demanding the prohibition of trade in their city by their Baltic competitors. This is a painfully familiar tactic, but it is misfiring.

In addition to the indignation at the high prices, which is immediately apparent, there is growing dissatisfaction, fueled by rumors, with the allegedly excessive income of cooperatives. Published economic analyses of the income and expenditures of various types of cooperative activity have proved that the rumors are seriously exaggerated. According to the official data of the USSR Ministry of Finance, the monthly earnings of cooperative workers are 270 rubles on the average. A survey of cooperatives indicated an average of 260 rubles and the following distribution (Table 2).

Table 2. Distribution of Monthly Earnings of Cooperative Workers in Various Fields of Production, %

Monthly earnings, in rubles	Procurement and processing of secondary raw materials	Production of consumer goods	Consumer services	Public catering
Under 100	3	7	14	8
101-200	27	34	33	32
201-300	40	23	37	43
301-400	15	22	8	12
Over 400	15	14	8	5

From the position of the uninvolved observer, everything could be cause for indignation: the high prices of cooperatives and the substantial earnings of their workers. There is another position, however—the position of the person wishing to try his hand in the cooperative sphere. The law extends equal opportunities to all. Take the plunge and try to succeed. Regrettably, few people are willing to do this. The stagnant swamp of wage-leveling and guaranteed payment in the state sector still seems preferable to the majority. Why are initiative and enterprise undervalued?

On the one hand, the cooperative is adapting to the mass mentality. On the other, it connects private interest with the social interest, encourages the general public to

acquire economic knowledge, and teaches efficient management and labor. Furthermore, unorganized forms of collective labor are also appealing in another respect: They provide an immediate sense of the collective nature of labor and of the individual efforts lying at the basis of this, a tactile sense of the results of labor, and a chance to display initiative and enterprise. This, however, will necessitate the expansion of the economic autonomy of small state and cooperative enterprises and the renunciation of the "total state monopoly" and complete nationalization Lenin called "stupid and suicidal"[6].

Whereas nationalization in the 1920's was made necessary by the industrial underdevelopment of pre-revolutionary Russia, today the complete futility of the

attempts to control all of the billions of economic contacts in the society is clearly apparent. The idea of total government control leads unavoidably to the obsession with massive projects, the choice of the simplest methods of involving people in the labor sphere, appeals for altruism, and systems of production behavior offering no alternatives. Besides this, the belief in the omnipotence of governmental forms of labor organization is usually combined "with a belief in the constructive power of coercion and prohibition"[17].

What are the prospects for the development of the cooperative movement in our country? It is unlikely that anyone would hazard an exact prediction today. The reserved and sometimes categorically negative attitudes toward cooperatives are due largely to the inadequate historical experience in the development of market relations in the country, the underdevelopment of the economic base, and the remaining traces of the equalizing ideology in the public mind. Finally, one important reason is the inadequacy of legal bases, which began to be laid just recently when the USSR laws on individual labor and on cooperatives in the USSR were published. We can, however, learn valuable lessons from the experience of other socialist countries, especially Hungary. The cooperative movement here has gone through four phases[18].

The first phase took place in the late 1940's and the 1950's. The threat of the revival of capitalism made small-scale commercial production seem like a necessary and unavoidable "evil" which was being subjected to severe administrative penalties and economic pressure. This led to the dramatic decline of the number of small manufacturers, a shortage of consumer goods and services, and a lower standard of living. During the second phase (from the early 1960's to the middle of the 1970's) prerequisites were gradually established for small-scale commercial production based on individual labor. The approval expressed at the June (1959) MSZMP Conference, however, was not supported by middle- and lower-level administrators. Ideological stereotypes were at work here. This was a time of passive attitudes toward cooperative and individual forms of labor, when their services were not refused in principle, but when no serious steps were taken either.

The next phase (the second half of the 1970's and the early 1980's) was distinguished by a variety of forms of social relations, ideological reorientation, and the eradication of the view of cooperatives as a "threat to socialism." By this time several illegal and semi-legal ways of satisfying public demand had developed. They were equivalent to 40 percent of the services performed by state establishments. The Hungarian leadership then decided to take active steps to legalize individual labor. The last phase began in the early 1980's and is still going on. The documents of the 12th and 13th MSZMP congresses made no mention of the private form of ownership and simply referred to the personal property acquired through labor. The procedure for the issuance

of permits underwent certain changes. Prior to 1 January 1982 this was left up to the discretion of local government agencies, but now they have to issue these permits to all applicants. Cooperative and individual forms of labor are becoming the civil right of each person. The development of either form now depends only on the consumer. Competition and enterprise are becoming the norm in economic affairs. Restrictions on commercial relations have been lifted, and the pricing system is improving (depreciation, expenditures on inventions, and the cost of licenses are now included in production costs). The technical equipment and technology of cooperative and individual forms of labor are being given more attention. There has also been a change in public opinion: The overwhelming majority of the population has positive feelings about this kind of entrepreneurial activity.

It is possible that our cooperatives will have their own phases and tendencies in their development, their own specific ailments, and their own ways of overcoming them, but the mainstream entails gradual reform and the consolidation and improvement of previous accomplishments. Inertia and narrow-minded resistance can only be surmounted through the consistent development of basic relations, legal support and, above all, the improvement of civil law. The observance of existing laws on individual and cooperative forms of labor is extremely important at this time.

Footnotes

1. We surveyed 864 readers of IZVESTIYA in Moscow and in Moscow, Irkutsk, Karaganda, Kemerovo, and Kostroma oblasts in the RSFSR, and in the Azerbaijan, Belorussian, Ukrainian (Donetsk), and Estonian SSR's.
2. We surveyed 884 people ("consumers") and 705 cooperative workers in Moscow, in Moscow, Voronezh, and Chelyabinsk oblasts, in Krasnoyar and Maritime krays, and in the Belorussian, Georgian, Kirghiz, Tajik, Ukrainian (Zhdanov and Lvov), and Estonian SSR's.
3. According to the data of a telephone survey of Muscovites by specialists from the Institute of Sociological Research of the USSR Academy of Sciences in May 1988[17], 15 percent of the respondents felt that cooperative and individual forms of labor were incompatible with socialism. In our December survey, 25 percent of the Muscovites disapproved of these spheres of activity for the same reason.

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Managerial Personnel of Agroindustrial Complex
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[Text] Some of the results of studies of managerial groups in the production system will be discussed in this article. The object of analysis is the production processes taking place in one of the main spheres of the national economy—the agroindustrial complex (AIC). The AIC represents 30 percent of the country's labor resources, one-third of its productive assets, and one-third of national income. In 1987 representatives of 350 specialties and 920 occupations worked at enterprises of the complex—14 million skilled specialists. During the years of the 11th Five-Year Plan alone, 253,000 specialists with a higher education and 603,000 with a secondary education were sent to work at enterprises of the AIC.

Various aspects of production management, including management in the AIC, are the subject of colossal quantities of literature, but the sociological aspect is almost never discussed. The kind of people who manage this sphere today, the state of their consciousness, their professional and economic status, the functions they perform, the actual socioeconomic environment in which they work, and the main factors determining the quality of their work—these and similar topics have almost never been studied by sociologists.

The public has recently been informed of the inhibiting effects of the mechanical methods of personnel hiring and placement and procedures for the creation and renewal of the managerial staff that took shape in the Soviet economy 60 years ago and are still present today in their most general features. There is no question that all of these matters require sociological as well as political analysis because sociology has a specific set of concepts with which the darkest corners of the managerial system can be illuminated.

The sociological data used as the basis for this article have sectorial and territorial limits: They are the result of surveys of the managers, specialists, and workers (kolkhoz members) of AIC enterprises in West Siberia.¹ The sectorial and regional nature of the data naturally give them certain distinctive features, but the system of production management in the USSR is sufficiently

standardized, and we will try to discuss primarily the issues of the most general nature, because the discussion will apply to other spheres of national production in addition to the AIC. In particular, these issues are the excessive departmental centralization of administrative authority (around two-thirds of the managers feel that they have to perform the functions of subordinates); the inadequate personification of economic relations; the legal ambiguity of the rights, obligations, and responsibilities of many categories of managerial personnel; the prevalence of departmental criteria in evaluations of the performance of managers and specialists; and the conflict-ridden style of interaction (the existence of serious conflicts with subordinates was mentioned by 100 percent of the managers of rayon agroindustrial associations, 90 percent of farm managers, 75 percent of chief specialists, and 85 percent of middle management; conflicts with managers were mentioned by 97 percent of the workers and specialists).

Other common acute problems include the dramatic decline of "career" motivation: Few managers are striving for advancement, while many more want to transfer to jobs as rank-and-file specialists or even workers.

Theoretical research tools: the meaning of the terms employed. A special set of concepts was developed for the concrete sociological analysis of management issues. The main concepts are the following: managerial groups; managerial consciousness; the position of groups in the managerial hierarchy; managerial performance; managerial behavior; and, finally, managerial interaction. These concepts are essential and sufficient for the development of concrete studies and the accumulation of data on flaws in the functioning of the system that could be called the socio-managerial machinery of the Soviet economy and on tendencies toward change in this system. This machinery is the system comprised of managerial groups on various levels. The stability of the system depends on the managerial interaction of individuals on various levels within the system. The nature of this interaction (between superiors and subordinates) depends on the behavior of individuals on various levels and on their managerial consciousness.

Managerial groups are social groups distinguished by the position they occupy in the vertical hierarchy of production management. The distinctive features of these groups and their position in the managerial system have already been described[1]. Concrete sociological research necessitates the isolation of the specific segment of the socio-managerial hierarchy that can elucidate the problems facing the Soviet economy.

The managerial consciousness is the attitude of personnel toward superiors and subordinates, toward the "top" and the "bottom," and toward the entire managerial hierarchy as a whole. Because all levels of management (upper, middle, and lower) are interconnected, attitudes toward them are not sharply delineated. For

instance, when people are dissatisfied with the transfer of their subdivision to a system of remuneration based on final results or with the lowering of pay rates, although their dissatisfaction is a direct result of the actions of their enterprise's administration, it essentially extends to all managerial personnel, all the way to the top. From this standpoint, the managerial consciousness is similar to the political consciousness of groups.

The nature of the close relationship between attitudes toward various levels of the managerial hierarchy is the result of the management of production with the aid of plans and directives: Enterprises act on the orders of rayon managerial bodies, those act on the orders of kray (or oblast) bodies, and the latter carry out the orders of organs on the republic and union levels. The interconnection of all these levels of the managerial hierarchy is registered by the consciousness and is reflected in the view of the managerial system as a single entity. This feature of the managerial consciousness is of practical value in concrete sociological research: It allows the person studying a specific phenomenon (for instance, attitudes toward the system of management on a specific kolkhoz or sovkhoz in the rayon) to see the more general attitudes behind it, such as the attitude toward the system of management at enterprises of the given field of production as a whole.

The present situation in the USSR has set all spheres of activity and all types of social and group thinking, including the managerial consciousness, in motion. Two groups of issues are acquiring prominence: The first is the attitude of people toward the old system which existed in the country in earlier decades, and the second is the attitude toward the new system introduced during the process of perestroika. The first group of issues reflects the static aspect of consciousness, and the second reflects the dynamic aspect, people's feelings about changes in the system of management and the processes of its perestroika. Today it is important to know both aspects of the state of managerial consciousness.

Personnel attitudes toward the existing system of management should be analyzed with a view to the positions (or roles) of managers and subordinates. The majority of personnel perform both roles simultaneously, representing the manager in one role and the subordinate in the other. The distinctions between these roles in the managerial hierarchy are reflected in the consciousness, where the consciousness of managers must be distinguished from the consciousness of subordinates (or performers).

Managerial interaction is the mutually oriented behavior of managerial groups within the sphere of their common interests. The basic platforms of managerial interaction in the production system are planning, material and technical supply, labor incentives, production organization, funding, personnel administration, scientific and technical progress, and accounting and monitoring.

These are the basic functions of management, distributed among managerial groups—from the minister to the foreman. When personnel on different levels carry out the duties prescribed in each of these functions and exercise their official rights, they interact in specific ways. It is during the process of this interaction that production decisions are made.

The position of managers: the increasing difficulty of managing people. This is one of the first problems to be mentioned by all of the managers surveyed. We began looking into this problem in 1982 with the expert testimony of party, soviet, and economic administrators and enterprise specialists. A follow-up study in 1986 provided the basis for comparisons of the data accumulated during the period of observation (Table 1).

Table 1. Dynamics of Distribution of Managers' Responses to a Question About the Difficulty of Managing Subordinates, %

Groups of managers	Became more difficult	In the last 3 years the management of people...					No response
		Became easier	Did not change	Became more difficult	Became easier	Did not change	
		1982			1986*		
Kray (or oblast) administrative bodies	87	5	8	—	—	—	—
Rayon level	55	18	27	—	—	—	—
Enterprises	97	3	—	57	22	17	4
Middle management	—	—	—	42	20	36	2
Chief specialists	38	22	40	67	11	22	—
Middle-level specialists	—	—	—	43	17	31	9

* Managers on the kray (or oblast) and rayon levels were not surveyed in 1986.

The table shows that most of the respondents felt that it had become more difficult to manage people. The dynamics of the structure of responses (revealing the attitudes of managers) changed, however. In 1982 this attitude could have been described as catastrophic: Responses of "more difficult" were given 32 times as often as responses of "easier" by enterprise managers, 17 times by kray (or oblast) bodies, and 3 times by managers on the rayon level. In other words, the higher the level of the group, the keener the sense of the difficulty of management.

In 1986 the intensity of these feelings declined among enterprise managers: The "more difficult" response was given only 2.5 times as often as the "easier" response instead of the 32 times in the first survey. The perception of the difficulties of management became much more intense, however, among chief specialists. In general, this is still a serious problem. The dissatisfaction of the "upper levels" with the "lower levels" indicates that managers are unable to make full use of the labor potential of subordinates. The difficulties cited by chief specialists, for example, were largely connected with the passive attitude of workers and middle-level specialists toward innovations or their direct opposition to them[2].

The increasing difficulty managers and specialists on the rayon level, at enterprises, and in subdivisions are experiencing in their work with other people is a natural process at a time of perestroyka. New demands are being made, and the corresponding methods of solving production problems have not been found yet. This has sharply augmented the organizational and psychological pressure on the administrative personnel of rayons and

enterprises. By the same token, the political processes occurring in the country (democratization and the reinforcement of glasnost) require managers to use new points of reference in their dealings with the "upper levels" and in their own groups, with their subordinates, and with the rank and file at large. This is the situation that is giving rise to difficulties in the management of subordinates. What feelings do the subordinates have about their managers?

The position of subordinates: the performance of managers does not warrant approval. Workers and kolkhoz members have ambiguous feelings about the efforts of managers (Table 2). Although a high percentage of respondents appreciated the contribution of managers to the improvement of the organization and conditions of labor, from 47 to 67 percent of the respondents nevertheless felt that the performance of their managers did not warrant a positive evaluation. In general, this is a contradictory situation. On the one hand, there is the real progress made at enterprises of the AIC by the middle of 1986 in restoring order and making higher demands on managers on all levels. On the other hand, the conflicting assessments reflect the real difficulties in the resolution of the production problems managers encounter. Extremely indicative responses were derived when middle-level managers of AIC enterprises were asked about the difficulties of their work: "There are never enough material resources—spare parts, feeds, construction materials, etc." (68 percent); "The equipment is of poor quality" (49 percent); "There are not enough experienced and skilled workers" (72 percent); "The level of labor discipline is low" (34 percent); "Production plans are too extreme" (20 percent).

Table 2. Evaluation of Performance of Enterprise Managers by Workers and Kolkhoz Members in 1984-1986, %*

The work of managers...	labor organization	product processing	In the sphere of: struggle against losses of work time	struggle against product losses	resource supplies
Has improved	39	28	40	40	35
Has not improved	61	67	56	47	65

* In the cases in which the responses add up to less than 100 percent, some respondents did not answer the question.

It is understandable that it is difficult to manage work crews under these conditions without evoking the criticism of workers. Only 17 percent of the workers described management as good, 11 percent said it was bad, and the remaining 72 percent said it was average. Therefore, workers do not have a high opinion of the quality of the productive activity of their immediate supervisors.

In the hope of learning what was keeping enterprise and subdivision managers from doing better work, we formulated a hypothesis: Orders issued by superiors in the managerial system within which these managers function are the main factor lowering the quality of their work. The reader is reminded that our study dealt with the system of management that has been referred to as "authoritarian" in literature in recent years. The struggle against it had not acquired impressive dimensions at the time of our study, especially since we were conducting a retrospective survey, asking questions about the style of management used in 1984-1986. For this reason, our hypothesis was completely valid.

When respondents were asked to evaluate the quality of enterprise management, 62 percent said it had not changed, 25 percent said it had improved, and 13 percent said it had deteriorated. A similar pattern was revealed by responses to the question of whether it had become easier or more difficult during these years to deal with immediate supervisors. These data agree in general with the evaluations of the results of managerial work in various spheres of production in Table 2.

In this situation it was important to find out whether workers and kolkhoz members asked for the help of managers in eliminating problems in production. It turned out that around 60 percent of the respondents had made such requests, but judging by the responses, only a few of the most active workers were able to set things in motion.

Why do certain problems still exist in production even though the need to solve them has been acknowledged, by top-level management as well as by other levels, for several decades? The answer to this question probably can be found in the quality of the management of personnel working directly with work crews. We studied this problem with the aid of the results of surveys of managers and specialists of rayon agroindustrial associations, enterprises, and subdivisions.

How are managers managed? When we studied the attitudes of managers and specialists on various levels toward the quality of the management style of their superiors, we had two goals in mind: First, we wanted to determine the particular links in the chain of managerial groups where relationships are the most strained so that we could understand what was keeping managers from solving the production problems of their enterprises; second, we wanted to use the attitudes of managers and specialists toward the quality of higher-level management as a basis for the comprehension of a more deep-seated phenomenon—their attitude toward the existing system of management as a whole.

We determined the attitude toward the quality of management through assessments of decisions and orders issued from above and connected with the basic spheres of the administrative activity of managers: planning, material and technical supply, the organization of production, labor incentives, financial and personnel decisionmaking, scientific and technical progress, and accounting and monitoring.

Theoretically, it is obvious that the attitudes of managerial personnel toward the orders they receive (for example, toward plans and assignments handed down to them) can differ. We hypothesized that personnel fall into the following categories: 1) those who identify themselves with the orders they receive and who carry them out enthusiastically (those who work "with spirit"); 2) those who are indifferent to the orders they receive but carry them out anyway because "this is how things are done" (indifferent personnel); 3) those who criticize these orders but carry them out anyway ("ambivalent" personnel); 4) those who criticize the orders, do not carry them out, and do not take any action of their own ("passive saboteurs"); 5) those who criticize orders, do not carry them out, and strive to cancel them and replace them with decisions they feel are more correct ("constructive activists").

To check this hypothesis, we singled out the corresponding features of the managerial consciousness: the attitude toward orders received; points of reference with regard to their fulfillment (or non-fulfillment); active (or passive) behavior in dealing with these orders. Table 3 summarizes the responses to three questions: 1) "Have you received any orders with which you disagreed?" 2) "If so, did you carry them out or not?" and 3) "Did you make an effort to have these orders countermanded?" We learned that personnel were highly critical of orders

received from above: from 59 to 91 percent had received orders with which they disagreed. The figures were high in all groups without exception. A highly critical frame of

mind is a positive feature because the system of management is in a position in which it has to respond to demands "from below."

Table 3. Personnel Attitudes Toward Orders Received from Superiors in the Last 3 Years, %*

Attitude toward orders from superiors	Enterprise managers	Chief specialists	Middle-level specialists	Subdivision managers
I have received orders with which I disagreed	91	59	66	64
I have not received such orders	9	41	34	36
I have usually carried out these orders	52	39	58	48
I have usually not carried out these orders	32	22	11	24
I tried to have these orders countermanded	35	32	45	47
I did not try	52	60	18	27

* In the cases in which the responses add up to less than 100 percent, some respondents did not answer the question.

A comparison of the level of criticism in various groups reveals significant variation. Enterprise managers and middle-level managers and specialists (of divisions, sections, and animal husbandry facilities) are the most critical, and chief specialists are the least critical. Enterprise managers are highly critical because, in the first place, they come into direct contact with rayon and kray (or oblast) managers more frequently than the rest. The fact that 91 percent disagreed with orders is indirect evidence of the continued existence of the authoritarian style of management, with its characteristic issuance of commands with no consideration for the specific conditions and capabilities of enterprises. In the second place, enterprise managers are less dependent on superior administrative bodies than other groups of managers. They are acquiring the status of true proprietors as the processes of perestroyka progress. Furthermore, the possibility of a somewhat exaggerated critical attitude toward the decisions of superiors cannot be excluded.

Managers and specialists on the middle level rank second in terms of the level of criticism (two-thirds of those surveyed). One of the reasons is the multiple jurisdiction of the personnel of this group. In the authoritarian (non-self-funding) system of management, the leaders of brigades and the heads of animal husbandry facilities, workshops, and motor pools receive orders from enterprise managers, from superior administrators, from all chief specialists, and from the managers of related subdivisions. The high number of mutually exclusive orders has become one of the main difficulties in the work of the personnel of this group.

The least critical are the chief specialists. They have weaker "attachments" to the rayon than enterprise managers, they are largely dependent on enterprise managers, and they essentially constitute a single group with these managers. If we had studied attitudes toward orders issued by enterprise managers and by rayon managers separately, we might have learned that specialists would have been more critical of rayon management because of their identification with enterprise managers. What our survey revealed, however, was the result of dual dependence.

An important indicator of personnel attitudes toward the system of management is the fulfillment or non-fulfillment of orders with which they disagree. We interpret the first of these as formal compliance and the second as non-compliance because of critical attitudes toward the orders. In general, both types of behavior are quite common: Formal compliance is characteristic of 39-52 percent of the personnel and non-compliance is characteristic of 11-32 percent. The nature of these reactions is similar: In both cases people are alienated from the decisions made by superior agencies. There is a difference, however: The former do not display their alienation, while the latter take it to the point of open insubordination.

The distribution of alienation among groups is the following: The most revolutionary behavior is displayed by enterprise managers (one-third of them do not carry out orders); these are followed by middle management (one-fourth) and chief specialists (one-fourth). The last in line are middle-level specialists, only 11 percent of whom do not carry out the orders, while 58 percent carry them out pro forma.

In general, the situation can be described as disorganized from the standpoint of the precepts of organizational behavior, and not only because of the high percentage of personnel not carrying out the orders they receive, but also because of the many who do carry out orders with which they disagree, because the social quality of compliance is contradictory under the conditions of disagreement. From the standpoint of formal discipline (and of compliance in general), it is a positive indicator, but compliance of this kind does not really attest to the high quality of personnel who remain alienated from the actions they perform. In the ideal system of management, both situations would be bad: both the formal compliance with objectionable orders and non-compliance. The latter line of behavior plays a positive role only when a subordinate objects to an order and finds a more expedient solution. As Table 3 indicates, the percentage of those who have been able to countermand orders is fairly high (32-47 percent). This positive phenomenon testifies that there are valid grounds for the objections

and that people are trying to use available channels for the improvement of the quality of the decisions they carry out. It is true that only around 5-7 percent succeed, however.

The critical attitudes of enterprise managers and specialists were displayed when they evaluated the style of

management over the last 3 years (Table 4). They evaluated the superior levels of enterprise management with which they come into contact each day: the rayon level (RAPO [rayon agroindustrial association]), the kray and oblast organizations of Gosagroprom [State Agroindustrial Committee], and others.

Table 4. Chief Specialists' Assessment of Changes in Style of Management (combined data for 1984-1986), %

Problems in administration	Responses			No response
	No change	Greater, more severe, or harder	Fewer, less severe, or easier	
Number of officials issuing orders	50	40	9	1
Supervision of work	39	58	2	1
Number of required reports, certificates, and other paperwork	24	73	2	2
Decisionmaking and coordination	38	39	22	1

Therefore, the attitudes of managers and specialists toward the quality of superior managers are highly critical at first, are subsequently distinguished by formal compliance and alienation from the orders they carry out, and finally lead to constructive action to find other options. The social portraits of managers and specialists differ in terms of these three features, but the distinctions point up a common feature of the entire chain of managerial groups and the entire socio-managerial mechanism: the conflicts between links and the lack of correspondence in the thinking and actions of people on various levels. Some groups (superior ones) "send down" orders, others criticize them, and still others strive to circumvent them in order to minimize the adverse effects of these orders on production. We could hardly dispute the fact that *the lack of correspondence in the managerial thinking and actions of various subjects of administration perceptibly inhibits the development of production*. The lack of correspondence in the administrative hierarchy is passed on through social links to the immediate manufacturers of products, deteriorating the quality of their labor and diminishing its productivity.

Performance self-evaluation as an indicator of managerial efficiency. The incomplete use of labor potential is a comprehensive indicator of errors, some of which are caused by conflicts in the system of management. The surveys which have become a tradition in Soviet sociology in recent years are based on the self-evaluation of respondents ("Could you work better than you do now?"). The resulting responses are interpreted as indicators of the quality of human factor use. Self-evaluations of performance can also be used, however, as criteria of attitudes toward the system of management. Excessive self-criticism (Table 5) can only be the result of a strong social and moral sense of outrage stemming from the unsatisfactory management of affairs at the enterprises and in the sectors where the respondents are employed. There is also resentment when the respondents and their colleagues with sufficient education, experience, and knowledge are working below their potential. It is possible that respondents exaggerate their

failure to live up to their own expectations in order to focus the administration's attention on this situation.

Table 5. Self-Evaluations of Performance, %

Groups	Could work better under different conditions	Could not work better than I do now
AIC enterprise managers	83	17
AIC enterprise chief specialists	68	32
Middle-level specialists	70	30
Subdivision managers	67	33
Workers (kolkhoz members)	69	31

The self-evaluations have changed in recent years: The percentage of those who feel that they are working as hard as they can has risen. In 1982, for example, this was true of 14 percent of the managers of kolkhoz and sovkhos subdivisions, but the figure was 33 percent in the 1986 survey. In general, however, the number of those feeling that they could do better work is quite high in all groups (67-70 percent). Enterprise managers warrant special mention: The proportional number of those who feel that they are working at full potential is quite low in this group in comparison with others—17 percent as compared to 30-33 percent. In other words, they have a stronger sense that they are contributing less than they could to production. Although they can overcome all sorts of difficulties in the performance of administrative functions and although they expend a great deal of effort and energy, they are frequently unable to solve problems that arise. This naturally affects production, and not only production: It ruins the manager's mood and gives him the feeling that he is wasting his time and that his potential is not being used to the maximum.

This kind of situation is caused by the conditions in which managers, specialists, rank-and-file workers, and kolkhoz members work. Surveys offer indisputable proof that the known defects of the AIC economic mechanism lie at the heart of these conditions (Table 6). The most

serious obstacle for all groups is the state of material and technical supply operations, the second most serious is

the organization of labor and wages, and the third is the style of management.

Table 6. Responses to Question: "Under What Conditions Could You Do Better Work?"—%

Changes in working conditions needed for better work	Groups of respondents		
	Managers	Chief specialists	Workers (or kolkhoz members)
Improvement of material and technical supply	90	59	63
Improvement of wages	69	27	25
Broader autonomy	48	30	4
Improvement of enterprise management by superior agencies	37	36	22
Improvement of labor organization at enterprise	36	51	29
Augmentation of role of work crew	11	15	9
Salary increase	11	8	23
Fair distribution of housing, goods, fodder, etc.	—	55	24

Why is the majority not striving to "rise"? The study revealed dramatically low ambitions for professional advancement in managers and specialists. Although this promises greater financial gain, it entails greater responsibility. The data in Table 7 reveal that the overwhelming majority of people in all groups (58-83 percent) would prefer to stay in their present jobs. The number wishing to

"move up" was only 1-2 percent of the workers, 2-4 percent of the specialists (many more—21 percent—would agree to "move down"), 1-3 percent of subdivision managers (24 percent would "move down"), and 1-4 percent of the chief specialists (8 percent would "move down"). Finally, not one of the enterprise managers wanted to move up to a higher position. On the other hand, 21 percent wanted to be workers.

Table 7. Job Preferences, %*

Groups	If possible, I would like this job:										
	The same as now	Day laborer	Worker	Employee	Technician	Middle-level specialist	Subdivision manager	Chief specialist	Enterprise manager	RAPO specialist	RAPO manager
Workers (kolkhoz members)	83	1	10	2	—	2	1	1	0	0	—
Middle-level specialists	64	—	21	1	1	4	2	4	—	2	1
Subdivision managers	58	—	24	2	—	7	5	3	1	0	0
Chief specialists	71	—	9	1	2	8	2	—	4	3	1
Enterprise managers	79	—	21	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

* Blank spaces in the table signify that this response was not suggested to this group.

Therefore, most people would prefer to remain in their present jobs, and those who would like to change jobs would rather move downward than upward. How can we explain this tendency? First of all, higher demands are being made on administrative labor. Although it was always of a complex nature, it has become particularly intense during the period of perestroika. Second, perceptions of this kind of work are influenced by the unsatisfactory treatment of managers in the past: petty interference, excessive criticism, unfounded dismissals and transfers, inaccurate performance evaluations, and misunderstandings. All of this naturally diminished the prestige of administrative labor and gave rise to the desire to avoid the unpleasantness associated with a

higher position. Third, the negative attitude of managers and specialists toward promotions is connected with the reluctance of people to take on responsibilities in situations in which they have no right to make the main decisions. Whenever people feel that they have little chance to make decisions on their own, they tend to have negative feelings about administrative labor. Finally, the lack of ambitions of professional advancement is the result of the struggle that went on for many decades against opportunism in the administrative sphere, when the emphasis was not on the negative personality traits of the opportunist, but on the very desire to occupy a higher position. This dramatically diminished the incentive for advancement.

This is an extremely disturbing situation in view of the present attempts to strengthen the human factor in economic management. It threatens the values the manager should uphold. The true manager is a person who values his own labor as such, who values the opportunity to manage others, to take responsibility for complex areas of production development, and to deal with matters of national economic significance on his own level. If this system of motives collapses, the quality of the managerial corps will suffer. The diminished motivation for advancement we discovered is one of the symptoms of this kind of collapse.

Footnotes

1. The research began to be conducted in 1982 by a group studying the social problems of management (L.Ya. Kosals, S.Yu. Pavlenko, M.L. Sukhovskiy, and O.V. Sharnina) from the Sociology Department of the Economics Institute of the Siberian Division of the USSR Academy of Sciences under the author's supervision. In 1985-1987 they surveyed 1,236 managers, chief specialists, and rank-and-file specialists at 213 enterprises and 1,080 workers and kolkhoz members at 24 enterprises of the AIC in Altay Kray and Novosibirsk Oblast. As part of this study, they surveyed all of the managers and specialists of AIC enterprises in one of the rayons of Altay Kray.

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Social Differentiation and Integration at a Time of Perestroika

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[Text] Differentiation and integration could be categorized as concepts of dialectical materialism. They are correlative (or paired) concepts of a general nature,

signifying quite distinct, united but conflicting tendencies in the development of nature, society, and human thinking. The founders of Marxism regarded the division of the whole into increasingly small parts, the intensification of differences, and the multiplication of connections between them—i.e., processes of differentiation—as an essential prerequisite for the processes of integration: the heightened integrity or "systemic" nature of material forms and the growth of their relative autonomy and ability to respond intelligently to changes in their surroundings[1]. On the other hand, the higher the level of integrity of the organism, society, or system in general, the greater the possibility of the continued differentiation of its elements, the functions they perform, and the connections between them. As Marx observed (in reference to society), the development of the system "in the direction of integrity consists precisely in taking control of all of the elements of the society or creating its missing organs from it. In this way, the system becomes a complete entity during the course of historical development"[2].

The revolutionary renewal of socialism in our country which began in the middle of the 1980's and the struggle headed by the party to get rid of the deformities that have been taking shape for decades in all spheres of life are raising new questions about the social contradictions of socialism, including tendencies toward social differentiation and integration. Because of the limited length of this article, we will discuss only their effects on the development of social-class relations, but we must remember that all types of social structures (each of which has its own differentiation criteria) are closely related[11] and we will therefore have to examine the sectorial employment structure, the structure of work crews, the professional structure, etc.

The use of dialectics in the analysis of the contradictions of capitalism allowed K. Marx and F. Engels to anticipate the main trends in the development of the socialist society that would take its place. The tendency toward integration undergoes qualitative changes and acquires increasingly broad dimensions under socialism. The elimination of class antagonism establishes the prerequisites for the increasing economic equality of social groups and strata and of members of society and, by the same token, the common features of their objective status. The gradual elimination of social differences signifies the converging interests of classes, social groups, and strata of the laboring public, the increasing sociopolitical unity of society, and its consolidation. All of these processes of integration are interconnected by deep inner ties and are objectively natural. Nevertheless, for several reasons the construction and development of socialism in the USSR took place under extremely complex historical conditions and were accompanied by temporary deviations and even by deformity, and this had the most direct effect on integration processes. In the second place, the latter cannot exist without processes of differentiation—both objective ones and those with subjective causes.

The dialectics of the establishment of the new society, viewed in the broad historical context, are reflected in the inseparability of the increasing equality of people in terms of the place they occupy in the system of social relations from the increasing role and significance of the singular and particular in the "organs," "tissues," and "cells" of the social organism—in other words, in social groups and strata, small groups, families, and individuals. Socialism, as a freer and more just society than capitalism, secures the increasing equality of opportunities to realize each individual's personal inclinations, which differ because of biological factors and, in particular, because of the influence of the social environment. V.I. Lenin refuted the lies of socialism's opponents with the remark that Marxism sees equality as "equality in social status, and certainly not equality in the physical and spiritual capabilities of individuals"[3]. On the contrary, socialism is expected to make substantial advances toward "the *absolute* well-being and free *all-round* development of *all* members of society" necessary and possible[4].

The tendency to view people, in theory and in practice, as "screws" in the machinery of state and the deeply entrenched tendency toward wage-leveling, which deformed the tendency toward integration, are among the main problems the authoritarian system of administration caused in the development of socialism in our country. The veneration of certain individuals, not to mention cults of personality, submission and subservience to leaders of various types, and their claims to economic and political privileges are just as contrary to the essence of socialism. This perverted the effects of the tendency toward integration.

The accomplishment of tasks on a historic scale in the qualitative renewal of Soviet society will be impossible without the restoration of the real essence of socialism and Leninist traditions. The materials of the 27th CPSU Congress and other party documents of recent years have repeatedly stressed that socialism is compatible neither with the cult of personality and the assumption of privileges nor with wage-leveling and the encouragement of excessive conformity. The spirit of Marxist-Leninist doctrine is conveyed in its entirety in the 27th party congress statement that "socialism develops all of the diverse interests, needs, and abilities of individuals and actively supports the independent activity of social organizations reflecting this diversity. Furthermore, socialism needs this diversity, seeing it as an essential condition for the continued augmentation of individual creativity"[5, p 51].

How were these trends in the development of social relations portrayed in the Soviet social sciences, and especially in sociology? We know that the successful development of sociological research in the 1920's was artificially suspended by I.V. Stalin and his associates. After the 20th party congress this research was reborn

and began to produce increasingly large quantities of empirical information, which was generalized to some degree as it accumulated, but this process was halted by two fundamental factors.

First of all, the state of social statistics (we include so-called moral statistics in this concept) was absolutely deplorable. Even the data collected by the USSR Central Statistical Administration (TsSU) at that time (now Goskomstat [State Committee for Statistics]) were rarely published. Stricter censorship then made its appearance at the end of the 1970's, and even such social data as the infant mortality rate, the death rate for different age groups, the average longevity of men and women, the distribution of workers in different occupations in relation to the level of technical equipment in different fields, the number of people applying for self-employment permits, and so forth "disappeared" from statistical reference works. Moral statistics were non-existent. Information about crime and other varieties of social pathology, the number of prisoners, and so forth were completely confidential and are still inaccessible in principle (some comparative data on the increase or decrease in certain types of crime began appearing in the press just recently[12]).

Sociological research shed some light on several artificially obscured problems, but it is no secret that sociology cannot and should not be a substitute for a well-organized statistical service accessible to the public. Using statistics as a basis, sociology can and should say what statistics cannot tell us about the objective indicators of various facets of the way of life and about motives, judgments, opinions, and plans—i.e., the attitudes of people, their reflection of objective conditions, and proposed ways of changing them.

In the second place, the science of sociology, just as the social sciences in general, had to take prohibitions, the prevailing ideological precepts, and the existence of areas exempt from scientific criticism into account in the analysis of research findings and in theoretical conclusions. For example, the internally contradictory thesis regarding the growing unity of society and the simultaneous intensification of class struggle, which became an official tenet in the 1930's, was still influencing the science even in the post-Stalin years, and so was the thesis regarding the complete and obligatory correspondence of production relations to the level (and developmental requirements) of productive forces. Both of these precepts led directly to vulgar interpretations of the processes of social integration and differentiation. I.V. Stalin's statement about the elimination of commodity-money relations during the advancement of socialism was criticized in the middle of the 1960's but continued to have a serious decelerating effect on the theories and practices of some economists and sociologists. A false sense of triumph and a desire to embellish reality and thereby "hasten" the future were expressed in N.S. Khrushchev's time in the slogans about the direct transition to the construction of communism and in L.I.

Brezhnev's time in the description of socialism in the USSR as developed and mature. It was in the 1970's, however, that the technological gap between our country and the developed Western countries acquired distinct outlines. The thesis of the theory of mature socialism about the "organic integrity" of society played a direct part in exaggerating the role of integration processes (along with others, the author went along with this fad).

In spite of these difficult conditions, many real processes of social differentiation and integration were portrayed in sociological literature in the 1960's, 1970's, and early 1980's. There were studies, for example, of the interrelationship of inter-class and intra-class differences and the growing significance of the latter in comparison with the former, discussions of the appearance and growth of a stratum midway between the working class and the intelligentsia, analyses of the role of mixed marriages and social mobility in the convergence of social groups and strata, the role of the educational system in the enhancement of social mobility, the social status of groups and strata not fitting into the basic structure, the possibility of planning and managing the development of the social structure in work crews and at subsequent levels of organization, etc. (see, for example, [13]). In addition, sociologists were responsible for the warranted criticism of some dogmatic beliefs expressed in all works on the theory of scientific communism: for example, the thesis regarding the impossibility of the appearance of new social strata (even border strata) under socialism, which was allegedly incompatible with the general tendency toward the convergence of classes and social groups and the growth of social homogeneity [14].

In general, we must admit that integration tendencies were exaggerated and sometimes glorified and that this was accompanied by a corresponding underestimation of the importance of growing processes of social differentiation (including the differentiation of interests) and of the contradictions this engendered. The documents of the January (1987) CPSU Central Committee Plenum contain an overall evaluation of the state of the social sciences: "The social structure of society was given an oversimplified interpretation as something devoid of contradictions and the dynamism of the diverse interests of different strata and groups" [6].

The situation began to change gradually during the stage of perestroika, but not as quickly as it should have. Surmounting dogmatic tendencies turned out to be difficult. Here is a recent example. A respectable academic journal recently published an article in which the contemporary Soviet society was described as a "one-class" society. The authors' line of reasoning was quite simple. They referred to a pre-NEP work by V.I. Lenin, found this sentence—"Socialism is the elimination of classes"—and considered the matter settled [15]. Lenin's statement was taken out of its historical context. At that time Lenin assumed that the elimination of differences between workers and peasants would be accomplished when everyone would perform equal work in state

(industrial and agricultural) enterprises. As we know, he later changed his mind about the evolution of the peasantry under socialism. In spite of all the efforts to nationalize the kolkhozes, they retained the status of cooperatives at least in the formal sense. Now that this status has been completely restored, other forms of cooperative activity are being developed. The authors of the article assert that it is "impossible and senseless" to subscribe to the belief that "socialism is based on two forms of ownership."

The common formula describing the general features of the social-class structure of the contemporary Soviet society (the working class, the kolkhoz peasantry, and the intelligentsia) is also being criticized from another standpoint. The renunciation of the formula of "two classes and one stratum" has been suggested because "there are dozens, if not hundreds, of groups and strata occupying completely different positions in the society and national economy" [16]. This is absolutely true. There are dozens (and in a more detailed analysis, taking sectorial, regional, and professional differences into account, hundreds) of such groups. They include groups which do not fit into the basic social communities (self-employed individuals, clergymen, the lumpenproletariat, etc.). Most of the social strata, however, are part of the working class, peasantry, or intelligentsia (in the broad sense of the term, as the entire group of people performing mental labor). We see no reason to renounce the general statement on the grounds that it does not cover all individual cases. The working class and the kolkhoz peasantry, distinguished by different forms of ownership of the means of production, and the intelligentsia, distinguished from the other two by the nature of its labor, do represent the three basic social groups in the contemporary Soviet society. The examination of processes of social integration presupposes the consideration of the interests of these groups and the methods of their coordination. It is no coincidence that party documents of the post-April period, including the CPSU Program, set the task of strengthening the unity of the working class, kolkhoz peasantry, and intelligentsia while maintaining the leading role of the working class. Today the chief method of securing this unity consists in the coordination of interests on the basis of the new party strategy. The resolutions of the 19th party conference say that "the consolidation of society (emphasis mine—M.R.) and the surge of creative energy in the working class, peasantry, and intelligentsia are taking place under the influence of the ideas and accomplishments of perestroika" [6].

The insufficient attention paid to social differentiation by researchers, an oversight which became even more pronounced during the period of stagnation, caused them to avoid or limit the discussion of processes which are now being widely discussed in the atmosphere of glasnost.

Above all, the self-employment allowed by the constitution (in 1936 and then in 1977) must be recognized as a

completely natural feature of the present level of productive forces in the Soviet society. As the experience of several developed countries has shown, it is crowded out of some fields by large-scale production but occupies new spheres where it is capable of satisfying the needs of society effectively. As we know, individual activity was not encouraged in our society for a long time. Only a negligible number of citizens were engaged in "legalized" individual labor: The percentage of the population engaged in this kind of activity was recorded as 0.0 percent in TsSU reference works of the mid-1960's [17, p 11]. In reality, this kind of activity not only continued to exist but was also expanded, in terms of the number of people engaged in this kind of work and in terms of turnover, as national shortages grew more acute and the bureaucratization of the service sphere grew more pronounced. According to the estimates of some economists, by the middle of the 1980's this kind of activity was the main occupation of 2 million and the occasional occupation of 17-18 million. There is no question that this kind of activity is a strong differentiating factor, particularly since the income from it was frequently the basic income and was incommensurate with labor expenditures.

The additional sources of income of the upper echelon of administrators represent the second topic, and one of the ones that was definitely "closed" to science. At the time of this echelon's colossal growth to 18 million people (for the 130 million employed in the national economy), more than 3 million managers enjoyed two types of privileges. There were legal ones—based on administrative ordinances: "special meals," "special medical treatment," residences, official vacation homes, and transportation services (a variety of "professional maid-service"), and at one time they were even issued "envelopes" over and above their nominal salary. These privileges were calculated strictly in accordance with official "weight." Illegal income in the form of graft, gifts, entertainment, and sometimes even regularly collected "contributions" could be just as substantial.

Third, millions of people in prison, special colonies, special resettlement centers, and so forth were effectively left out of sociological research. During the period of mass repression millions of people passed through the labor camps, and the number of unjustly accused political prisoners, members of resettled ethnic groups, and other innocent people was higher than the number of common criminals, con-men, thugs, and other felons. More recently, the population of corrective labor camps and of therapeutic labor clinics was (and is) impressive. Official data are not published, but there are references to thousands of people isolated from society, and performing hard labor in most cases [18]. This group of people, their unique way of life and mentality, and the role the group plays in supplementing the stratum of professional criminals all require investigation by researchers.

Fourth, during the period of stagnation the lumpenproletariat grew considerably. It has an extremely diverse

composition: vagrants (or "drifters"), derelicts, prostitutes, drug addicts, alcoholics, professional thieves, speculators, and so forth. Some studies of this stratum were conducted (for example, by sociologists in Tbilisi), but the public still learns more about these people from fiction, journalism, and documentary films than from sociological research, although foreign and domestic science has accumulated a great deal of experience in the study of the "dregs" of society and in recommending ways of preventing various types of social pathology.

Last but not least, there is the effect of the obsolete system of management on the distribution of material goods and, consequently, on the labor of workers, employees, specialists, and kolkhoz members. The income level of work crews depended little on their satisfaction of society's needs, just as the wages of workers in shops, divisions, and brigades had little connection with their actual labor contribution. The inhibition of the differentiation of income by wage-leveling hurt the economy and had equally grave social and moral consequences. Besides this, the obsolete system of management led to the constant growth of shortages in the last 20 years and differences in supplies and the actual "weight" of the ruble in different parts of the country and different social strata. This extra differentiation of income, which did not meet the criteria of socialist justice and evoked extremely negative reactions, was (and is) a cause of social tension along with wage-leveling. The alleviation of this tension will require a flexible social policy, especially at a time of resource shortages and increasingly apparent inflation. It was this policy that was lacking in the period of stagnation. Obviously, these processes do not cover all of the areas of social differentiation that developed in the pre-perestroika period.

Under the conditions of the reorientation of economic development, democratization, and glasnost, social problems acquired priority in all fields of the social sciences, including sociology. Of course, we must not think that sociology has a monopoly on the study of the social sphere [19], but there is no question that these matters are its central concern. Let us take a brief look at the principal effects of radical economic reform on the social processes mentioned in the title of this article. Of course, we must not lose sight of the fact that 3 years is not a long time as far as radical social change is concerned and that we will be referring more to apparent trends than to the obvious results of reform.

The focal point of the reform is the move from the authoritarian system in which enterprises (and organizations or associations) are managed by the issuance of commands to primarily economic methods of management. The implementation of the provisions envisaged in the Law on the State Enterprise (or Association) and the closely related set of decrees revising the functions of ministries and central economic agencies [9] will lead unavoidably to the more pronounced differentiation of work crews on the basis of the results of their activity

(socially acknowledged through the purchasing power of consumers). In this context, the transition to the so-called second model of economic accountability, in which all assets, including funds for social development and wages, will depend on income distribution in cost accounting, will be particularly important [ibid., pp 7-8]. As a result of this, the tendency to equalize successfully and unsuccessfully operating enterprises should be overcome and the ministerial practice of nurturing the latter at the expense of the former should be terminated. At this time the issuance of non-refundable bank loans is still being practiced and is a particularly common practice in the agroindustrial complex. "We love the lame and indigent," V.P. Kabaidze observed eloquently in this connection[20]. The projected price reform should put an end to the situation in which prices are so far removed from socially necessary expenditures that it is difficult to define the actual profits or losses of enterprises. This, however, is something that will happen in the future. At this time, the reform entails difficulties and is being impeded in various ways. In particular, the wage fund is still growing more quickly than labor productivity. In the first 6 months of 1988, for example, labor productivity in industry increased by 5.4 percent and production volume increased by 4.7 percent, but the average wages of workers and employees increased by 5.7 percent[21].

Differentiation is inseparable from integration. The changes in the functions of Gosplan and other central economic agencies and ministries and the reduction of their number and personnel should strengthen the actual unity of the national economic complex by establishing more efficient economic ties and intensifying the division of labor among sectors and enterprises and also among territorial complexes. Broader economic accountability in relations between territories and, above all, between union republics will heighten the regional differentiation of public income. Territorial division of labor will be intensified simultaneously on the basis of economic accountability.

Changes in relations between enterprises and in their relations with superior administrative bodies will be extended to intraorganizational relations. This will entail the establishment of economic accountability in relations between structural subdivisions, all the way to the lowest units (brigades and links), and the institution of contracts and leases. The social significance of these steps is equal to their economic significance. It is in this way that the worker's connection with the means of production will become fully visible, and participation in management will become direct—for example, through the election of brigade leaders, the monthly determination of labor participation coefficients, etc. In this way, the differentiation of the income of production crews will "reach" each worker. The current measures to "expand" the wage network for workers in industry, the increase of 25-30 percent in the salaries of engineering and technical personnel, the changes in managerial bonuses, and so forth will aid in surmounting the tendency toward the equalization of the

wages of highly skilled and unskilled workers and of workers and engineering and technical personnel. Equitable differentiation according to labor will pave the way for healthier relations in work crews, will strengthen their unity, and will develop their self-reliance. In other words, it will strengthen the effects of integration tendencies.

Another important trend in the development of the processes of social integration and differentiation was accelerated by the Law on Cooperatives in the USSR. Expanding on Lenin's idea of socialism as the order of civilized cooperatives, the law declares the equality of the two basic forms of socialist ownership: Cooperative organizations "are a fundamental link of the single national economic complex along with state enterprises (or associations)"[10]. The rights of workers and employees extend to the members of cooperatives. Because cooperatives are based wholly on the principles of economic accountability and on the satisfaction of changing market demand, they will have an increasing effect on socioeconomic relations in state enterprise collectives. There is already a precedent for the leasing of unprofitable state enterprises to cooperatives (for example, the construction materials plants in Butovo in the Moscow suburbs and in Nevyansk in Sverdlovsk Oblast). As a result, the managerial staff was reduced dramatically, the use of productive assets improved, and—what is most important—production became profitable.

Cooperatives are of tremendous social significance in the overall strategy of renewal. The development of the "new cooperatives" (involving 450,000 people by 1 July 1988[21]) and the restoration of the status of genuine cooperatives to kolkhozes, with the simultaneous extension of the principles of economic accountability, characteristic of cooperatives from the very beginning, to the state sector, are the elements of this social significance. These processes represent the objective basis for eliminating social boundaries between kolkhoz members, members of cooperatives in general, workers, and employees.

The next important differentiating factor in the development of social relations is connected with the development of so-called personal ownership of the tools of labor and the resulting product. Here the differentiation has been manifested in two ways.

The first is private subsidiary farming. It accounts for around one-fourth of the gross agricultural product and 10 percent (in 1985) of the commercial agricultural product. For much of the society, private subsidiary farming is a significant additional source of income (23.1 percent of the family income of kolkhoz members[17, p 445]).

The second is individual labor. By the middle of the 1980's around 100,000 people were engaged in legal forms of individual labor, and annual turnover in this sphere amounted to around 100 million rubles. I have already said that this kind of activity was situated primarily in the "shadow" economy. State sales of consumer services to the population in 1985 amounted to

10.4 billion rubles, including 5.6 billion in the RSFSR[22], for example, but the RSFSR Ministry of Justice estimates that individuals performed 10 billion rubles' worth of services for the population of the republic[23]. Of course, the prices of unofficial services were usually higher because of the shortage of "official" services, their poor quality, and the disregard for the client's interests, and income was regularly earned through the illegal use of state-owned means of production. Furthermore, the "self-exemption" from taxation meant that these population groups received billions of rubles from the society "imperceptibly" because they joined everyone else in enjoying the benefits of public consumption funds and were able to purchase food, children's wear, and other items at low prices because of state price supports.

The Law on Individual Labor is mainly intended to legalize the "black market" in services and crafts and thereby involve many new people in the sphere of individual labor on the basis of "secondary employment." By the end of the first 6 months of 1988, 512,000 people were officially engaged in individual labor[24]. The majority of people engaged in this sphere, however, are apparently still avoiding registration and the payment of taxes. The potential for the growth of this sector is particularly great in regions where much of the able-bodied population, including youth, is not employed in the public sector (the Central Asian and Transcaucasian republics, the Chechen-Ingush ASSR, and others). It is precisely in these regions, however, that official individual labor is an underdeveloped sphere: In Lithuania 106 out of every 10,000 people are registered as "self-employed" with local soviets, whereas the figure in Tajikistan is only 9 [ibid.]. In some socialist countries the proportional number of these individuals is not equivalent to 0.4 percent of the population, as it is in our country (officially), but several times higher. In Hungary, for example, individual (or family) small producers and retail merchants accounted for 3.3 percent of the employed population in 1970 and 4.4 percent in 1985[25].

We must remember, of course, that cooperative and individual labor will represent one of the "starter engines" of the market economy and will stimulate a rise in prices and not always justified differences in income at times of shortages. To deter these negative processes, economic methods will have to be used, and even administrative methods in some cases. In Czechoslovakia, for example, the prices of cooperative goods and services cannot exceed state prices by more than 30 percent.

Here it would probably be best to make one theoretical observation. In most of the socialist countries of Europe the means of production owned by individuals (or families) are defined as small private property. In the USSR, "the idea of the incompatibility of socialism with any form of private ownership became an immutable dogma" at the beginning of the 1930's. KOMMUNIST

magazine remarked[26]. This dogma was based on the assumption that private property geared to the market and not connected with the hiring of manpower was the same thing as capitalist property. This thesis was related to the more general dogma regarding the incompatibility of socialism with the market, and it turned out to be extremely tenacious. In an article published after the perestroika had begun, I said that private subsidiary farming "represents an extremely specific *remaining* form of small-scale production, *partially* distinguished by a private nature—to the degree that the product takes on the form of a commodity"[27]. I had to present this line of reasoning to substantiate the thesis regarding the need for the maximum support of private subsidiary farming during the reinforcement of its connection with the public sector. This, however, did not keep some critics from accusing me of "issuing an appeal" for the elimination of private subsidiary farming[28]. Is it not time to admit that socialism, at this stage in its development, when public ownership is the prevailing form, could certainly allow (in the presence of the necessary control) the effects of a differentiating factor such as small-scale individual (or family) ownership without the use of hired labor?

The tendencies toward integration and differentiation in the social sphere stem from processes occurring within the sphere of the professional division of labor. The irrepressible growth of science and the flow of scientific information leads unavoidably to the differentiation of scientific knowledge and necessitates specialization in increasingly narrow fields along the scientific front. These changes are inseparable from the increasing specialization in technical systems and practical managerial skills and, therefore, from more intense professional division of labor in technology, medicine, and all of the applied fields, including the humanities. The increasing differentiation of professions, specialties and, finally, the jobs of citizens creates the prerequisites for stronger integration in two ways.

First of all, the society as a whole is the sum total of the labor of the most diverse professions and specialties, and the continuing development of specialization increases the need for integration. Second, professional integration rests on social integration, on the development of a common basis within each type of labor. The tendency toward integration also grows stronger within the sphere of the professional division of labor and is reflected in the better educational and technical training of workers and specialists in physical production and other fields. It is becoming increasingly obvious that the growing complexity of social ties and the rise in cultural standards require a stronger background in the liberal arts in all professions.

Therefore, the reduction of social differences and elimination of social class distinctions do not signify the disappearance of the differentiation of professions, specialties, and personalities. On the contrary, the comprehensive development of the personality of each citizen

necessitates the fuller development of individual abilities and distinctions in an atmosphere of growing social equality. Genuine socialism has nothing in common with "barracks" socialism, not to mention the grotesque portrayal of socialism in such anti-utopian novels as Ye. Zamyatin's "We," A. Huxley's "Brave New World," and G. Orwell's "1984."

The struggle to eliminate income unrelated to labor and to surmount the differences in the standard of living that are achieved by violating the precepts of social justice and robbing the society is an important part of perestroika and warrants special discussion. After the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium published the ukase "On Stronger Measures To Combat Unearned Income," some positive changes took place. The number of people convicted of the embezzlement of state and public property declined from 192,100 to 115,100 and the number convicted of the theft of private property declined from 178,200 to 123,400 in just 2 years (between 1985 and 1987)[29]. Law enforcement agencies are being purged of personnel who shielded criminals or were implicated in crimes, and crime detection indicators have risen. Until there has been a radical change for the better in the economy, however, and until the market is filled with consumer goods and services, genuine economic accountability has been established, each work crew has realized that loafers and slouches hurt them directly, and supplies have been equalized in all regions, there will be room for speculation, embezzlement, and bribery. The political and legal reform envisaged in the decisions of the 19th party conference will establish the preconditions for the elimination of social strata living completely or partially on income unconnected with labor.

The CPSU Central Committee decree "On the Augmentation of the Role of Marxist-Leninist Sociology in the Resolution of the Main Social Problems of the Soviet Society" focused attention on the most urgent problems in socioeconomic development[8]. We feel that they include the need to study tendencies in the development of the social structure, including social differentiation and integration. Just a few of these problems have been discussed in this article, and this discussion will probably be continued in our journal.

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Ethnic Groups Face a Choice

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[Text] After the events in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast it would not be difficult to convince anyone that ethnic policy cannot be based on ideological dogmas, however beautifully they might be worded. This, however, is only the first lesson. The second, which is sometimes difficult to learn, is that it is possible to rely on common sense only as long as the participants in inter-ethnic relations are guided by it. After all, a situation is settled effectively less with the aid of appeals for restraint and common sense than with extraordinary measures, including actions on the highest level. What will it take for people to finally realize that ethnic policy is realistic and effective only when it has a sound scientific basis? This article will be a brief discussion of some of the results of sociological studies of ethnic relations and will show how these results can help in forecasting and regulating them.

Inter-Ethnic Contacts at Work and at Home

Sociological methods were first used to study ethnic relations in two related fields of science—ethnosociology (or the sociology of ethnic relations) and statistical ethnography[1]. They came into being at the end of the 1960's as a combination of ethnography and sociology and contributed to the transfer of research from the institutional to the interpersonal level. The current phase, which began in the middle of the 1980's, is completing the dialectical cycle: The term "international relations" is regaining its original meaning—"relations between nationalities." Now, however, sociologists have been fortified by the experience accumulated in earlier decades in the study of daily life.

Of course, this experience cannot be called complete because ethnic processes were given an oversimplified interpretation in sociological theory. This affected the methods of empirical research. Ethnosociological public surveys usually employed the simplest questions to reveal respondents' attitude toward contacts (as relatives, neighbors, friends, co-workers, etc.) with people of other nationalities. More complex sociopsychological methods (the disclosure of verbal stereotypes, the interpretation of photographs, and sociometric tests) were used only occasionally, and usually in isolation from analyses of the social aspects of inter-ethnic relations[2]; the results were almost never published. Besides this, census data on the correlation of nationality and language, registration data on inter-ethnic marriages and divorces, migration statistics, and other information were used to characterize ethnic processes[3].

What were the main results of these studies? Above all, there was the conclusion that interpersonal contacts exist in two basic spheres and that inter-ethnic relations "take shape" around them. We will refer to these spheres as "family" and "professional." Attitudes in these spheres usually have weak connections and are influenced by different factors. This is illustrated in Table 1, presenting the results of a survey conducted in the mid-1970's. The data of public surveys are never interpreted as precise assessments of the number of people with a specific attitude toward inter-ethnic contacts. For example, the data in this table do not mean that 70 percent of the Moldavians supposedly have a positive attitude toward mixed marriages (although the Moldavians were apparently more likely to agree with this statement than the Estonians, and the Estonians were more likely than the Uzbeks; this conclusion is confirmed by a comparison of the dynamics of inter-ethnic marriages with the theoretical probability of these marriages). Furthermore, the "family" and "professional" attitudes are not only relatively independent of one another but are also different for different ethnic groups: The Estonians were most likely to be "wary" of inter-ethnic contacts in work crews, and the Uzbeks were more likely to have these attitudes about marriage and family matters.

Table 1. Attitudes of Urbanites Belonging to Different Ethnic Groups Toward Ethnically Mixed Marriages and Work Crews, %

Responses	Uzbekistan		Moldavia		Estonia	
	Uzbeks	Russians	Moldavians	Russians	Estonians	Russians
Nationality is of no importance in marriage	16	44	70	76	32	62
Inter-ethnic marriages are objectionable	24	11	2	2	19	4
It depends on the circumstances, I am undecided	60	45	28	22	49	34
The ethnic composition of a work crew is of no importance	69	77	82	82	55	72
It is harder to work in an inter-ethnic group	10	11	10	11	34	22
I am undecided	21	12	8	7	11	6

Why are ethnic attitudes in these spheres relatively independent of one another? As early as the 1960's the results of studies in the Tatar ASSR indicated the existence of two main sources of ethnic restraints. The first was a certain degree of cultural conservatism as a result of extremely meager experience in inter-ethnic contacts, the inability to accept the standards of another culture, and the insufficient knowledge of the language of inter-ethnic communication. The second was experience with the distorted forms of social competition engendered by the relative supply and demand for skilled manpower and the shortage of sociocultural amenities, especially housing[4]. These groups of factors play different roles in the development of inter-ethnic relations. Broader contacts inevitably reduce cultural distance. Conversely, the effects of sociocultural interests on inter-ethnic relations can become stronger following a more acute shortage of social comforts. Attitudes toward contacts in the family sphere are affected more by the elimination of cultural differences. The situation in the professional sphere is influenced more perceptibly by the nature of social competition[5]. The research also demonstrated that the abrupt escalation of tension in the professional sphere intensifies negative processes in all spheres of interaction[6].

Ethnic Variations in Social Mobility

The role of social status in the development of inter-ethnic relations was recorded in the very first ethnological studies in our country. We will cite the results of the survey conducted in the Tatar ASSR in 1967 as an example. We are going this far back into the past because there is no question that greater prestige was attached to mental labor at that time than to the mass professions of physical labor. This should produce a highly reliable assessment of the effects of characteristics connected with social status.

Table 2 indicates that negative attitudes toward inter-ethnic contacts were least likely to be expressed by those whose careers had developed within the framework of the most prestigious occupations of mental labor and by people who had elevated their social status. Negative opinions were expressed more often by those who had climbed down the social ladder. Later studies confirmed that negative attitudes toward inter-ethnic contacts were

encountered most frequently among people who were dissatisfied with the prestige of their chosen profession and with cultural-consumer and housing conditions[8]. This is the result of a specific psychological mechanism which transfers the blame for personal failures to "others," regardless of whether these others have any connection whatsoever with the problems. Cultural differences between communities usually serve as the "raw material" for the development of attitudes toward other ethnic groups and frequently serve as the basis of negative inter-ethnic stereotypes in the average mind.

Table 2. Effects of Types of Social Mobility on Attitudes Toward Production and Family Inter-Ethnic Contacts, % Expressing Negative Opinions*

Sphere of contacts	Different types of social mobility			
	m—m	p—m	p—p	m—p
Professional	7.1	8.7	10.4	15.6
Family	6.9	7.4	7.8	9.4

* m—mental labor; p—physical labor. Source: [7].

Research helped to define the basic social situations engendering negative tendencies in the development of ethnic attitudes: 1) contacts between ethnic communities in the context of competition; 2) the rapid growth of social demands accompanied by the stability or even reduction of the basis for their satisfaction; 3) intensive changes in the status of representatives of ethnic communities coming into contact, especially the loss of a privileged position by one of the groups.

Broader inter-ethnic contacts in any of these cases can lead to negative attitudes. These situations frequently arise during the process of the development of regions as side-effects of positive social innovations rather than as a result of errors in ethnic policy. In most cases, however, tension is escalated by mistakes and miscalculations in administration. This is why policy has to perform a dual role. When the intensification of social competition is unavoidable, special measures must be taken to neutralize or extinguish its negative consequences, but the main thing is the prevention of various socioeconomic actions, primarily departmental ones, which artificially exacerbate inter-ethnic relations. The theoretical principles on which ethnic policy is based are extremely important.

Two Approaches to Ethnic Policy

Two concepts come into conflict when the role of social factors in the development of ethnic attitudes in the country is being assessed. They are not always expressed clearly, but the choice between them is of primary importance in policymaking. One approach is based on the assumption that broader inter-ethnic contacts are always a positive development, contributing to the interpenetration of cultures and the establishment of internationalized modes of behavior and lifestyles. Another point of view is that broader inter-ethnic contacts can lead to the optimal development of inter-ethnic relations only when these contacts are voluntary and are not accompanied by social competition. In spite of the obvious superiority of the second approach, the first has its own supporters and frequently prevails in policy. Its "offspring" include the large-scale inter-regional relocation of manpower with no consideration for the socioethnic factor in adaptation (the Baltic and Non-Chernozem zones); the establishment of ethnically mixed schools and preschools without any preliminary studies of parental opinions, and so forth.

The first approach is based on the view of the ethnic group as a statistical set of unconnected or barely connected families or individuals. It is true that with this kind of mechanistic approach, the broader the contacts with representatives of other nationalities, the easier it is for people to get accustomed to them, learn the language of the other ethnic group and (or) the language of inter-ethnic communication, and give up elements of their own culture. From this standpoint, broader inter-ethnic contacts might have negative consequences but only in the case of individuals and not of the entire ethnic group or its strata. In the opposite theory the ethnic group is viewed as a complex self-organizing system with an inherent need for self-preservation; the stability of the ethnic group depends on a set of close interpersonal relationships. As long as the system retains internal integrity, any action, deliberate or unconscious, to violate this integrity will evoke a reaction. The latter grows stronger when members of the ethnic groups coming into contact with one another are in competition for vital necessities. Furthermore, the system is frequently upheld by people who are not involved in this competition and have not experienced any inconveniences as a result of external pressure on the ethnic group.

The new ethnic attitudes which took shape in the second half of the 1980's have, in our opinion, two causes. In the first place, negative tendencies in several regions acquired the form of overt conflicts. Second, whereas attitudes once developed largely in an atmosphere of ethnic contacts between individuals, now they are more likely to take shape as a result of the interaction of whole nationalities representing integral socioeconomic organisms. This requires fundamentally new research methods and procedures. The emphasis must be shifted from the study of personal characteristics and their effect on

ethnic attitudes to the analysis of the internal structure of the ethnic group: the informal strata and groups whose members play different roles in the establishment of the general atmosphere of inter-ethnic communication, the interaction of these strata, and the influence of the mass media. For example, ecological problems are increasingly likely to become a cause of "concentrated" ethnic self-awareness and, consequently, a factor in inter-ethnic relations. They might not affect each individual, but they have a tremendous effect on the entire nationality or ethnic group.

Of course, this does not mean that the interpersonal level of ethnic relations has lost its significance or that earlier research findings have lost their value. They can aid specifically in determining how perestroika in the social and economic spheres is influencing the development of inter-ethnic relations. We will make a few assumptions on this basis.

Above all, surmounting the stagnation in the growth rates of material well-being will decrease the number of conflicts in the society in general and in the sphere of inter-ethnic in particular. It will be possible to spend more money on the resolution of the ethnocultural problems which have already caused or could cause friction in inter-ethnic relations. Existing negative processes in the ethnic sphere are largely connected with the extensive development of the country. This connection, however, is not a simple one. Paradoxically, the tendency toward extensive development has occasionally deterred conflicts in inter-ethnic relations, particularly in regions with relatively little socioeconomic potential. For example, the continuous increase in the number of university students in the 1960's and early 1970's lessened the social competition in education in some parts of the country. The extensive development of Central Asia helped to stabilize many elements of the traditional way of life, alleviated some of the problems connected with the shortage of housing and jobs in cities, and so forth.

A Promised Land for Settlers?

The same tendencies toward extensive development, however, exhausted their potential and began to have the opposite effect, increasing the probability of negative occurrences in inter-ethnic relations. The social inertia of the extensive dynamic is quite strong and takes more than a few years to surmount. For this reason, we will be experiencing the negative effects of outdated methods for a long time. One of the most acute problems we inherited from the period of stagnation, for example, is the labor surplus in Central Asia. The interregional redistribution of labor resources is being discussed widely. In recent years some organizational measures have been taken to encourage part of the Central Asian population to seek work in regions with a labor shortage. This raises many questions, but I will direct your attention to only two: What effect do inter-ethnic relations have on migration from Central Asia, and how might

this resettlement affect inter-ethnic relations in the place of settlement? We will take a look at some research findings in connection with this.

People from Uzbekistan and other regions with a labor surplus who had moved either as part of a resettlement program or independently of such programs were surveyed during several expeditions to Ivanovo Oblast and other oblasts in the Non-Chernozem Zone from 1984 to 1987[9]. The absolute majority of the migrants were not natives from rural communities but members of other nationalities—Russians, Ukrainians, Tatars, and Germans. Only 15 percent of the resettled heads of households were natives of Central Asia, but because there were many mixed marriages the actual proportional number of natives in the group did not exceed 10 percent. Most of the migrants were urbanites, and therefore the use of the inhabitants of

Tashkent (surveyed in 1979 under the supervision of Yu.V. Arutyunyan) as the control group did not present any great problems. The rural inhabitants of Kalinin Oblast—a group similar in several basic respects to the rural population of the Non-Chernozem Zone—constituted another control group.

Table 3 shows that the migrants were more wary of ethnically mixed marriages than the native rural inhabitants of the Non-Chernozem Zone and the non-native population of cities in Uzbekistan. The members of the group in question were less likely to say that nationality does not matter in marriage and were more likely to stipulate various conditions for the acceptability of this kind of marriage or to avoid answering the question altogether. The latter usually indicates a reluctance to reveal negative attitudes.

Table 3. Attitudes of Various Groups Toward Ethnically Mixed Marriages, % of Respondents

Responses	Urban population of Uzbekistan		Urban population of Kalinin Oblast (n=3,985)	Migrants (Ivanovo Oblast, n=92)
	Russians (n=650)	Tatars (n=95)		
Nationality does not matter in a marriage	54	50	67	26
This kind of marriage is undesirable	9	11	7	18
Other responses	37	39	26	56

The results suggest two conclusions. First of all, the extensive development of the Central Asian region will inevitably cause many non-natives to leave the region, and one of the mechanisms of this migration is the negative state of inter-ethnic relations. Second, this migration on a mass scale can also affect the attitudes of natives of the Non-Chernozem Zone toward inter-ethnic contacts. Until recently, the inhabitants of the Russian heartland had no experience in regular inter-ethnic contacts. Now, however, they have to live side by side with migrants, some of whom, judging by their answers to survey questions, have had negative experiences in inter-ethnic contacts.

The possibility and expediency of resettling Central Asian natives in the Non-Chernozem Zone are being debated widely in sociology. How might this affect inter-ethnic relations? Research findings do not help in answering this question because this group was represented poorly in the group of settlers we surveyed. The impact of this kind of resettlement can be judged by the results of research in the 1960's, 1970's, and 1980's. The existence of vast cultural differences between the rural populations of the Non-Chernozem Zone and Central Asia is self-evident. Contacts between cultures with such different social norms can be comparatively problem-free only after the establishment of the proper conditions specifically for this purpose. The actual situation in the region, however, holds out little hope for this turn of events. In spite of huge capital investments, there is still an acute shortage of vital resources here, especially

housing and fuel. It is completely obvious that the new settlers and the natives will be put in a competitive situation (which already happened when the Russians, Ukrainians, and Tatars arrived). New settlers are granted certain privileges during distribution processes, although the impact of their labor is unavoidably smaller than that of at least part of the native population. In view of this, we could conclude that this policy, which is ultimately based on the logic of extensive development, leads unavoidably to inter-ethnic conflicts.

Most of the researchers of inter-republic rural migration have noted its low economic and social effectiveness. Besides this, it is unlikely that these measures will ever have a positive effect on inter-ethnic relations. This is confirmed indirectly by a survey of new settlers in Ivanovo Oblast. Cultural-consumer and production difficulties took a heavy toll even on Russian migrants and were often transferred psychologically to the sphere of interpersonal relations. For example, when migrants were asked whether there were differences between the Russians living in Uzbekistan and those in the Non-Chernozem Zone, 54 percent replied that there were substantial differences, and 25 percent replied that differences existed but were largely unimportant. Around three-fourths of those who noticed these differences expressed negative feelings about the behavior of local inhabitants in comparison with the behavior of the Central Asian population. It is easy to imagine the kind of problems that could arise when representatives of far-removed cultures come into contact in a situation this difficult.

Ethnic Development According to the Departmental Scenario

A different situation took shape in Latvia and Estonia, but it was also partly the result of extensive factors. The departmental approach to the economic development of the republics, which conflicted with territorial and ethnic interests, led to an uncontrollable influx of foreigners into the cities. We will use the situation in Estonia as an example. The percentage of non-Estonians in the republic is rising constantly, and they already represent around half of the population in cities [10]. The expansion of inter-ethnic interaction in the absence of a sound territorial economic and social policy leads to the deterioration, and not the improvement, of inter-ethnic relations. Judging by the data of sociological research, Estonians and non-Estonians have sensed increasing friction in inter-ethnic relations. Russians, Ukrainians, Belorussians, and others have more optimistic opinions than the Estonians with regard to the situation and tendencies in its development, but their attitudes have also undergone dramatic reversals (see Table 4).

Table 4. Assessments of Relations Between Estonians and Foreign Population, % of Respondents*

Responses	Estonians		People of other nationalities	
	1986	1988	1986	1988
View of current situation				
Relations have:				
improved	22	3	42	8
stayed the same	41	28	44	49
deteriorated	37	69	14	43
Predictions for future				
Relations will:				
improve	16	11	58	35
stay the same	46	34	33	44
deteriorate	38	54	9	21

* Source: [11].

There are three groups of reasons for some Estonians' fairly pessimistic view of inter-ethnic relations. First of all, the natives see the influx of migrants as an ecological threat to the region because most of them work in industrial facilities with an adverse effect on the ecological situation (shale pits and power plants). The competition between ethnic groups for the region's natural resources starts here.

This competition is even more distinct in the social infrastructure. The intensive migration is overloading it, and this is reflected in shortages of housing (this is taking the heaviest toll on the native inhabitants of cities), food, consumer goods, recreational services, etc. The situation is complicated by the tendency of native inhabitants (both Estonians and non-Estonians) to associate the increasing number of migrants with the relative decrease in the quantity of services and with the deterioration of

their quality. This is the second group. Finally, the third group consists of cultural-ecological factors. It is usually difficult for people of larger nationalities to appreciate the importance of these factors to the Estonian population. The rising number of people from other parts of the country unavoidably diminishes the social functions of the Estonian language: It is being crowded out of the most important spheres—production and business—and is used primarily in the cultural sphere and in intra-ethnic communication at home. This is evoking the small nationality's (the number of Estonians in the republic is lower today than it was in 1934) legitimate concern about the future of the native language and of the national culture as a whole.

These processes are naturally arousing the dissatisfaction and opposition of Estonians, including organized opposition on the republic level. Many non-Estonians, especially recent migrants whose interests are closely interconnected with the interests of all-union departments, regard this as a sign of nationalism. In fact, however, it is essentially an attempt to implement the basic principles of Lenin's policy on regions and nationalities. Departmental ambitions, which are a direct reflection of extensive methods of development, are contrary to these principles. The revision of the economic and social policy of ministries and departments is an essential condition for the normalization of inter-ethnic contacts in the region.

It Is Wrong to Count the Money in Someone Else's Pocket

Therefore, the influence of extensive factors of socioeconomic development is now one of the sources of problems in inter-ethnic relations. It would be wrong, however, to assume that the transfer to intensification will put everything in order. Without making any claims to an exhaustive analysis, we will try to describe some of the processes that might influence the development of inter-ethnic relations.

The idea of territorial economic accountability is now the subject of lively discussion. There is no question that it fits into the strategy of economic reform. It is probable, however, that the consistent advancement in this direction will result in even more substantial differences in nominal and real income in different parts of the country, and this will affect the status of ethnic groups. Furthermore, the growth rate of real public income depends not only on the augmentation of labor productivity but also on the territorial redistribution of the surplus product. Under the conditions of regional economic accountability, a region will have to support itself primarily on what it has earned by itself. Without additional investments in the social sphere of regions with a labor surplus (primarily Central Asia), we can hardly expect a significant increase in labor productivity and, consequently, the convergence of the socioeconomic features of various regions. Disparities will continue to affect the development of inter-ethnic relations for a long time.

Intensification will make it possible to surmount many acute social problems, such as the labor shortage in many fields. The opposite possibility—a surplus of manpower in several fields—cannot, however, be excluded either. In some republics this surplus has existed in the sphere of intellectual labor for a long time. The same thing could happen in the sphere of skilled physical labor. When members of work crews are of different nationalities, a competitive situation can have a negative effect on inter-ethnic contacts. These processes could even affect skilled workers—the least “ethnocentric” group in all of the ethnic communities studied to date. This turn of events is quite probable. Some studies indicate that differences in the skills of workers of the native nationality and migrants have not decreased in recent years and have even increased. Workers responsible for the maintenance of automatic lines and electronic equipment—in short, those employed in complex fields of production—are mostly migrants or native urbanites who do not belong to the local nationality. Workers performing semiskilled labor are mainly former rural inhabitants of the native nationality. This situation is characteristic of republics in Central Asia and some parts of the Volga region, and it will increase friction in inter-ethnic relations unless special steps are taken.

The cooperative movement could have a definite effect on the development of inter-ethnic relations. Ethnic groups in cities are not equally distributed among spheres of labor. This is particularly true of the service sphere and related branches of physical production. At the beginning of the 1980's, for example, the percentage of Uzbeks in trade and services was 1.5 times as high as the percentage of Uzbeks in the population of Tashkent, while the opposite ratio was characteristic of the Russians. The correlation of Estonians and Russians in Tallinn was similar, although less distinct. Meanwhile, cooperatives are being formed primarily in the service sphere. The result could be a quicker rise in the income of certain ethnic groups. Of course, these differences will affect relatively limited strata of the population, but many people tend to generalize from the particular.

There is no question that these situations are possible and that the actual course of events will depend on many factors, especially ethnic policy and social administration on the local level. One thing is clear, however: Success in the minimization of negative social consequences will necessitate considerable investigative research and the active inclusion of scientists in administration.

Ethnosociology in the Administrative System

Above all, the closest contacts must be organized between ethnosociology and other branches of sociology. Groups of questions about inter-ethnic relations are already being used in studies of migration, the social problems of labor, and several other types of research. This should become common practice. Each study conducted in a multinational region or in a region where the

way of life is distinguished by ethnic peculiarities should include consultations with a qualified specialist—an ethnosociologist. This approach must be secured by organizational measures. We now have a broad network of centers for the study of ethnic processes. A scientific research center for the study of ethnic relations has been established under the jurisdiction of the Presidium of the USSR Academy of Sciences. But this is only half of the matter. The influence of science in decisionmaking in the sphere of inter-ethnic relations is still only sporadic and consists primarily of submitting reports to official agencies and analyzing specific problems. The interaction of science and administration must be raised to a new qualitative level. In particular, a unified program should be drawn up for the investigation of inter-ethnic relations by all scientific establishments. Besides this, professional ethnosociologists should be on the staff of the divisions, subdivisions, and groups on ethnic relations now being established by party and soviet organs.

This presupposes the training of the necessary specialists. In this case the basis could be an education in ethnography or sociology, with the stipulation that each specialist will also acquire knowledge in the other field and study the theory and method of research into inter-ethnic relations, ethnolinguistic processes, and so forth. Unfortunately, this is still largely a dream. As far as I know, the only academic institution offering the full line of courses in ethnosociology is Moscow State University. Here these courses are taught in the Ethnography Department, and courses in ethnopscychology—a “vital necessity” for the ethnosociologist—are taught in the Psychology Department. Regrettably, few graduates with the proper credentials are studying inter-ethnic relations and not one works for a government agency concerned with inter-ethnic relations. There is not a great demand for qualified ethnosociologists—the entire union needs only a few hundred specialists. Their training would not present a problem and could be organized quickly with existing resources. The only condition is a firm guarantee of job placement in this field. Unfortunately, the administrative bodies concerned with ethnic relations are manned, as far as I know, by means of redistribution within the framework of the administrative system. There is hardly any need for more discussions of the problems that can result from the absence of competent specialists in these organizations. Ignoring science will either cost the society millions or will cause irretrievable losses and mounting conflicts.

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How To Oblige the Reader

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[Samuil Abramovich Kliger, candidate of philosophical sciences, senior scientific associate at the Book Institute of the Knizhnaya Palata Scientific Production Association, and author of the monograph "The Use of Point Scales During the Collection and Analysis of Sociological Information" (1978, co-author) and of the article "Some Polling Errors: The Wording of Questionnaires and Experience in Using Point Scales" in SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA (1974, No 2); words in boldface as published]

[Text] In terms of their ability to evoke strong emotions, the book shortage, circulation policy, and books in general as a sociocultural phenomenon occupy, in our opinion, a place among the top five matters of the greatest concern to the public, superseded only by moral issues, ecology, education, and national history. In recent years, only SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA has published a few incisive articles on this topic[1-4].

The arguments have transcended the bounds of scientific debate and are close to the dangerous point at which people become either indifferent ("It is too late to change anything now anyway!") or hysterical ("Stop publishing unnecessary books immediately, and give us the books we need!"). This can be judged from the letters the Book Institute received from readers in response to the article "What Should Be Published in 1989?" in KNIZHNOYE OBOZRENIYE[5]. A sad letter was written, for example, by G.I. Chernitsova from Tomsk Oblast: "I am now 50. There are books I could not find in the library or in the stores, and I do not even have any hope of ever getting these books I want so much.... How many copies have to be printed before a book can reach this remote place...in Tomsk Oblast and before it can reach me personally? Life is short, and there are things I will never be able to read. This is regrettable, of course, and it is very sad." And here is a "cry from the heart" of P.F. Krovyakova from Leningrad: "I have no hope of buying even one of these books.... We cannot read or get anything. We hear about books, but where are they? And this is in Leningrad, so what can people in other cities expect?... The money we earn through honest labor cannot be spent on anything. Sell us books! At least books! We are not fantasizing about fancy clothes, tea sets, and so forth. We want thousand of rubles' worth of books!"

Impressive, wouldn't you say?

The main complaints are levied against the departments which are officially responsible for satisfying the public demand for books and other reading material but for some reason have not been doing this for many years. The complaints make their way to sociologists, because the public still trusts scientists, even if it already has little trust in government officials. "The connection between readers' interests and consumer demand," D. Granin wrote, "is hopelessly tangled. It will be impossible to get along without sociological analysis and sociological studies of the reading material which should be one of the main elements of spiritual life today"[6]. Many people are already aware that the further qualitative development of the book trade in our country will be unthinkable within the confines of earlier ideas—i.e., without thorough scientific knowledge[7].

Let us consider the main question: "For whom are books published?" It is based on the technocratic (or instrumental) approach, in accordance with which there is someone in the society who knows what books to publish and how many, and someone else who reads them. In line with this approach (which, incidentally, A.G. Vishnevskiy revealed so well in his analysis of demographic behavior[8]), which is characteristic of our cultural policy as a whole, the consumer of reading material (the reader or buyer) is not regarded as an autonomous and sovereign subject of culture, but only as the object of education, the development of taste, the elevation of standards, etc. In other words, we (publishing houses, book stores, and libraries) give them (the readers or the masses) good and necessary books, and if there are sometimes not enough of them to go around, the explanation is simple: There is not enough paper, and the capacities of printing plants are inadequate.

Loud appeals for the cultivation of taste and the elevation of the mass reading public's standards can always be heard[9]. What usually lies behind them is the technocrat's conviction that if a person is given just a little more education and if his standards are raised just slightly, he will begin to read and buy the right books. The appeals are irresponsible because they deny the cultural autonomy of the reader and buyer of books and thereby establish the preconditions for the notorious book shortage with which the technocratic consciousness has been fighting a losing battle for so many years.

The question "for whom are books published?" is invalid because it substitutes the subject of the book culture for its purpose. It would be much more valid to ask "for what purpose are books published?" The answer is self-evident: The developed society needs the dynamic circulation of the maximum variety of reading material for the purpose of the reproduction, preservation, renewal, and transmission of cultural and social values.

This certainly does not mean that the book culture can be examined in isolation from its subject—the reader and buyer of books. It is the consumer of reading

material who should determine the degree of its differentiation and the direction, volume, and structure of the flow of books. Of course, it is true that the reader's demands should be shaped intelligently and that his literary tastes and preferences should be developed and enriched, but it would be naive to assume that they can be manipulated by, for example, flooding the book market with huge quantities of mediocre literature[4], or by organizing the exchange of books for paper recycling coupons[3], or by means of pricing procedures[1; 10].

The issue of standards of behavior in the book culture does not seem valid either because it also proceeds from the instrumental assumption that there is a certain maximum of books (or texts) marking the "ceiling" of reader and consumer demand. It is true that the normative (desirable or ideal) number of books in, for instance, a personal home library is of some significance because it can serve as a point of reference in planning the allocation of resources (paper, printing plants, etc.), but the reader (or buyer) does not need an abstract normative. What is important to him is the actual accessibility and variety of reading material, so that he can exercise his freedom of choice. Variety is one of the most important indicators of the book culture, and if it is not taken into account, it is difficult to answer the following question: "How many books can a person read in his lifetime?" The avid reader, even one who reads up to 100 books a year, cannot read any more than 5,000-7,000 books. Between 1918 and 1986, 3.7 million books were published in the USSR and were issued in 66 billion copies[11]. Can this be called variety? No, it is far from genuine variety! In fact, this is easily illustrated with figures.

Let us assume that there are 50 million readers in the country who are capable of reading 5,000 books. The total number of books they read is then 250 billion. If the average book is printed in approximately 18,000 copies (66 billion divided by 3.7 million), the index of variety is 250 billion—18,000 x 14,000,000. This means that at this level of intensity of reading and with a reading public of this size, sufficient variety would necessitate the circulation of approximately 14 million different titles. If we compare this indicator to the 3.7 million books published between 1918 and 1986, we find that the desirable level of variety is still quite distant. The indicator can also be calculated in another way. In 1985, 10,371 books (fiction) were published in the country, and the average number of copies was 102,000[12]. If we assume that 50 million people in our country read an average of 50 books a year,¹ then the annual consumption of fiction is 25×10^8 copies. If we divide this figure by the average number of copies (around 102,000), we derive a variety index of 24,500 titles and we learn that this indicator is 2.5 times as high as the number of books of fiction published in 1985 (10,371). If we consider that the number of titles (fiction) has decreased in recent years (10,431 in 1984 and 10,371 in 1985), that the average number of copies is rising (98,600 in 1984 and 101,900 in 1985[12]), that reader tastes, preferences, and

interests are growing increasingly varied, and that the accessibility of books has not changed[13], it is clear that we are not approaching the normative (signifying the necessary variety and accessibility of books) but are getting further away from it instead. For this reason, the complaints that we have too many writers (10,000) and the advice to publish fewer but better books[4, pp 76-77] sound irresponsible, if for no other reason than because they suggest to the public and to administrators that there is a simple solution to the shortage of books and paper: Reducing the number of titles and issuing more copies of good books will correct the problem completely. This approach oversimplifies the diversity of real life and of the book culture and promotes oversimplified programs. As a result, "pulp" literature is the only reading material in millions of homes, and 180 million copies of this literature represent only 125 titles[3, p 48]; the average number of copies in the pulp edition is 1.44 million, in comparison with the 100,000 copies of the books with artistic value.

Of course, the problem of variety in reading material is not confined to the number of titles and copies. Book prices, binding, paper quality, publishing speed, and other factors also serve as indicators of variety, but it will be a long time before book publishers take all of these indicators into account. The size of editions would be a good place to start. In the article "Anatomy of the Book Shortage," I.S. Goldenberg asks a trick question: "What do N. Gribachev, A. Sofronov, M. Ibragimov, A. Koptayeva, V. Kochetov, and W. Faulkner have in common? Their works have been published (or will be published) in six volumes in editions of 100,000 copies"[4, p 69]. How do publishers know that the six-volume sets of these authors' works will appeal to 100,000 readers? They do not. It is just that all of them were included in the plan for allocations of paper, printing presses, and other resources. This plan cannot be changed, although it is no secret that there is a colossal demand for Faulkner[2, p 58] and much less demand for V. Kochetov. The two whips of our economy and culture in recent years—the gross product and the plan—have been scourging the book culture, leaving the reader only the right to hunt for scarce books.

Now, however, the long-awaited system of economic accountability is approaching, and no one will be dictating plans or allocating resources to publishing houses. They will make their own decisions on what should be published, in how many copies, etc. (with the exception, of course, of the state requisition). Will there be any changes in the near future? I would like to say that changes for the better are already evident and that positive tendencies in publishing are growing stronger. One example is the unique program of the Knizhnaya Palata Publishing House, which began issuing the works of 1986 and 1987 in huge editions as part of the "Popular Library" series: A. Bek's "Novoye Naznachenie" [New Appointment], A. Rybakov's "Deti Arbat" [Children of the Arbat], D. Granin's "Zubr" [The Diehard], V. Dudintsev's "Belye odezhd" [White Clothes], and others. Another example

is the extensive program drawn up by USSR Goskomizdat [State Committee for Publishing Houses, Printing Plants and the Book Trade] for the publication of books in great demand (reference works, encyclopedias, "do-it-yourself books," and children's books). Radical changes are also being planned in the publication of sociopolitical literature[14].

The book culture needs serious in-depth investigations. Without these, the problem will be impossible to solve even with two or three times as much paper and printing facilities. The previously mentioned technocratic approach, which erected an impenetrable wall between the book and the reader, must be disavowed. We need a new set of methods, within the framework of which the behavior of the reader (the buyer or consumer of books) will be regarded as autonomous, sovereign sociocultural behavior, the diverse cultural needs of the reader will be shaped, differentiated, and integrated under the influence of the social culture, and the satisfaction of these needs will be legally and socially equitable. In this context, the entire current mechanism of book publishing and distribution will be an instrument or a medium for the exchange of ideas, opinions, information, and artistic images. To some extent, periodicals have already taken the first steps along this road, but newspapers and magazines can react more quickly and they were able to discern the cultural concerns of large segments of the reading public, which was easy to do during the period of transition.

We must oblige the reader (or buyer) of books; we must oblige him twice as much tomorrow. We do not have to flatter him or court him, but we do have to oblige him—i.e., to carry out his requests quickly and precisely. Otherwise, after spending billions of rubles and using up whole mountains of paper and carloads of printing equipment, we will send millions of copies of books to the recycling center again, we will perpetuate the book shortage, and we will ask for more money for paper and equipment.

Furthermore, it is not necessary to satisfy the reader at large—the average statistical, anonymous reader—but completely specific groups of people: workers and employees, men and women, children and the elderly, urbanites and kolkhoz members, inhabitants of the Far East and Central Asia, engineers and historians, and soldiers and militiamen. It is precisely the opinions of the readers and buyers of books, their tastes, demands, and cultural interests that are, however, uncharted territory as far as publishers and (to a lesser extent) researchers are concerned. Publishers usually do not know who reads the books they publish; they have only a vague image of "their" readers, foggy at best and completely indistinguishable at worst (a faceless crowd). Store and library personnel have a clearer view of the consumer of reading material, but their knowledge is only superficial and pragmatic. In any case, for trade and library personnel the buyer or reader is only a means or instrument of fulfilling the commodity turnover plan in one case and of filling out reports in the other.

Researchers are already approaching the "unknown continent" and are discovering extremely strange combinations and conglomerates of preferences that cannot be reduced to the relatively simple sociodemographic differences in reading "habits"[15, p 89].

The sociologist who plans to analyze the book culture and book policy and who proceeds from the methodological principle of the cultural sovereignty of reader and buyer behavior must first define the object of analysis—i.e., the dimensions of the total group of readers and buyers of books and its structure. It is obvious that we are dealing here with two different (although frequently converging) types of behavior: reading books and acquiring books. Each is distinguished by its own demands, motives, attitudes, situations, and results of action, and therefore they have to be analyzed separately. The total group of readers is not the same as the total group of buyers, and it certainly does not coincide with such large social groups as "the entire employed population," "urbanites," "the intelligentsia," "youth," etc. It is therefore obvious that any sample sociological study of reader or buyer behavior cannot be based on the analysis of specific sociodemographic groups. The problem of constructing a sample group to represent an "elusive" total group was the subject of an extremely interesting and relevant discussion by O.B. Bozhkov[15]. This procedure has not been studied adequately, although the sociologist frequently encounters the problem of the "inversely proportional" sample group. In essence, this is a matter of the "mutually representative nature" of the sample and total groups. "In this case," O.B. Bozhkov remarked, "the emphasis is shifted to theoretical and methodological analysis, during the process of which the researcher has to find the time and place of manifestation or concentration of the 'natural sample group' of people representing the total group. The sample group itself begins to perform strictly cognitive and heuristic functions in addition to the 'economic' function. Its quantitative parameters, on the other hand, are not of decisive importance"[15, p 100].

We were able to find this kind of "natural" sample group at the Moscow International Book Fair and Exhibit in September 1987. Around 200,000 people attended the fair (from 8 to 13 September), but they naturally do not represent all of the people included in the book culture. They represent only an active and developed segment of the reading public with higher basic parameters of reader and consumer behavior (intensity of reading and buying books, channels of accessibility, etc.) than other groups. This is why the sociological analysis of this group (which can be regarded as "advanced" in some respects) is of special interest.

The study was conducted by asking individuals to fill out questionnaires in the presence of an interviewer. Respondents were chosen at random and each visitor to the fair had an equal (or close to equal) chance of being polled when the survey was being conducted (for 6 hours each day in two pavilions). Local radio announcements were used, and participants in the survey were offered free gifts. The

size of the sample group was not calculated in advance, and from 70 to 80 percent of the questionnaires were returned. In this way, we derived a quasi-random group of visitors to the fair, but we have no regular rate of error. The only possible control procedure under these circumstances entailed a series of observations at the entrance to the pavilion to record the gender of visitors. These observations revealed that the proportional number of men among the visitors ranged from 63 to 70 percent, and the number in the sample group was 65.9 percent (the group consisted of 1,271 people).

The study had a procedural aim as well as substantive ones: the creation of a telephone panel to be used in regular surveys. To this end, the respondent was directed (or requested) to write his home (or work) telephone number, name, and patronymic at the bottom of the questionnaire. There was the fear that this kind of subgroup might lead to a high probability of error, but the fear was unfounded: 645 of the 1,271 people at the fair (51 percent) wrote down their telephone numbers, and they match the total group of respondents in all basic respects (see Table 1). Muscovites represented 74.3 percent of the total sample group and 73.9 percent of the telephone subgroup; the indicator of the average number of books read each month was the same in both groups—3.2, and the average number of books in the home library was 831 for the exhibit's visitors and 895 for those who gave their phone numbers.

Table 1. Comparison of Parameters of Sample Group of Visitors to 1987 Moscow International Book Fair and Exhibit, % of group

Characteristics of respondents	Sample group (1,271 people)	Telephone subgroup (645 people)
Gender		
Male	66.2	68.5
Female	33.8	31.5
Age		
Under 16	4.4	4.3
16-19	8.0	6.9
20-24	18.9	15.9
25-29	15.5	14.9
30-49	37.6	39.7
50 and over	15.6	18.3
Education		
Partial secondary	4.6	4.4
Secondary general	6.8	6.2
Secondary specialized	11.8	10.7
Higher or partial higher	62.9	62.8
Post-graduate studies, candidate's degree, or doctorate	13.9	15.9
Degree of satisfaction with visit to MMKVYa-87		
Completely satisfied	27.7	27.9
Somewhat satisfied	53.8	53.5
Dissatisfied	7.7	6.7
No response	10.8	11.9

The slight deviations in the telephone panel's parameters from the parameters of the whole sample group are

within the bounds of random error, although the first group did have a slightly higher percentage of men, people of advanced years, people with a higher educational level, and people with more books in their personal home libraries. In any case it is clear that the telephone subgroup is representative of all respondents. If we assume that the group of respondents is representative enough of all of the people who attended MMKVYa-87 [Moscow International Book Fair and Exhibit-87] (200,000 people), and that these, in turn, constitute a natural sample group representative of the entire national reading public, the telephone panel is a model of the active group of readers in some respects and could serve as the object of sociological research.

In addition to the telephone panel of readers the Book Institute has also established two other telephone services, including a sample group of libraries and bookstores (representing all neighborhoods in Moscow). In this way, the basis has been laid for a telephone sociological service for the study of books and reading. Its first project was the previously mentioned experiment suggested by the Knizhnaya Palata Publishing House. It was a study of the series of books known as the "Popular Library." It is based on the following principles: 1) 15-20 works of literature which were published in journals the previous year and which received the highest number of votes in telephone surveys of readers and library personnel (and a poll of the readers of KNIZHNOYE OBOZRENIYE) are published each year; 2) the interval between the appearance of the work in a journal and the issuance of the book is less than a year (this interval will be shortened in the future); 3) the books, most of which are by Soviet writers, are published in mass editions

(from 200,000 to 300,000 copies); 4) a book can include not only the work receiving a high number of "votes," but also other works by the same author (published or unpublished) and other materials (reviews, memoirs, etc.); 5) book sales are monitored with sociological techniques (telephone surveys of readers and bookstore personnel), and if there is still a demand for a book a year later and if the work is still on the "best-seller list," it is republished (more copies are printed); 6) the prices of books in the series are stipulated in contracts; 7) the sociological service shares responsibilities and profits with the publishing house.

A list of 20 works published in journals in the second half of 1987 and January 1988 was compiled on the basis of the results of a telephone survey and an analysis of circulation figures. This list (in alphabetical order) was printed in KNIZHNOYE OBOZRENIYE, and readers were asked to rate the books[5]. The results (around 5,000 people responded) are presented in Table 2. In this way, we derived a unique "best-seller list" (of works printed in journals). The questionnaire asked the readers to name the authors whose articles should be included in an anthology of current journalism. An analysis of the responses led to the compilation of a unique "ratings list." The names at the top of the list (the ones mentioned most frequently) were N. Shmelev, A. Nuykin, Yu. Karyakin, Yu. Chernichenko, A. Strelyanny, G. Popov, Yu. Burtin, G. Lisichkin, V. Selyunin, G. Khanin, N. Ivanova, A. Vaksberg, M. Antonov, I. Klyamkin, D.S. Likhachev, D. Volkogonov, G. Shmelev, S. Zalygin, Yu. Afanasyev, F. Burlatskiy, V. Rasputin, I. Vasilyev, N. Ilyina, O. Latsis, T. Zaslavskaya, T. Ivanova, E. Henry, V. Korotich, Ye. Losoto, K. Simonov, A. Aganbegyan, and others.

Table 2. List of Works Suggested for Publication in "Popular Library" Series and Their Evaluation by KNIZHNOYE OBOZRENIYE Readers

Author and title	Evaluations, % of respondents		
	Priority	Not necessarily priority	Undecided
1. V. Grossman, "Life and Fate"	70.0	9.6	20.4
2. B. Pasternak, "Doctor Zhivago"	68.7	15.4	15.9
3. V. Vysotskiy, "Novel About Girls," "Verses," "Memoirs"	67.2	13.0	19.8
4. Science Fiction Anthology (A. and B. Strugatskiy, "Predestined Hail," "Crippled Fate," and others)	59.7	19.4	20.9
5. A. Akhmatova, "Requiem" and other works	59.0	21.5	19.5
6. V. Nabokov, Selected Works ("The Circle," "The Defense," "The Gift," "Other Shores," "Mary")	58.4	16.3	25.3
7. M. Shatrov, "Farther, Farther, Farther...," "The Treaty of Brest," "This Is How We Will Win!" "Dictatorship of the Conscience"	58.1	19.0	22.9
8. Yu. Trifonov, "The Disappearance," "The House on the Embankment"	57.4	16.2	26.4
9. B. Pilnyak, "The Tale of the Unextinguished Moon" and other works	51.0	16.5	32.5
10. Mystery Anthology (contents to be suggested by readers)	49.5	24.5	26.0
11. Anthology of Current Journalism (contents to be suggested by readers)	47.0	15.9	37.1
12. F. Kafka, "The Trial," "The Castle"	46.4	22.6	31.0
13. Yu. Nagibin, "Stand Up and Go"	33.3	27.9	38.8
14. A. Bitov, "Pushkin's House"	32.2	41.3	26.5
15. V. Konetskiy, "No One Can Take the Past Away from Us"	29.3	30.4	40.3

Table 2. List of Works Suggested for Publication in "Popular Library" Series and Their Evaluation
by KNIZHNOYE OBOZRENIYE Readers

Author and title	Evaluations, % of respondents		
	Priority	Not necessarily priority	Undecided
16. V. Astafyev, "The Cane"	26.5	41.7	31.8
17. S. Antonov, "The Tsarist 20-Kopeck Coin," "Ravines," "Vaska"	24.3	38.1	37.6
18. Yu. Arakcheyev, "Pyramid"	23.1	34.5	42.4
19. Yu. Bondarev, "The Wish"	16.8	46.3	36.9
20. A. Zhitinskiy, "The Lost Home"	12.0	24.7	63.3

When we speak of popularity, we should stress that the term does not simply mean that the work arouses the interest of readers, which naturally happens when, for example, something new by a well-known author is published in an authoritative journal. This kind of reader interest can lead to two alternative types of behavior: a) I read it and I want to get it in book form; b) I read it but I do not plan to buy the book. Furthermore, the plan to acquire (or buy) a book is not that closely related to whether the person did or did not like the book. Sometimes a person reads a work and likes it but does not plan to buy the book when it comes out. Other alternatives are also possible: Some people read a work and do not like it but still plan to buy the book, and some even have not read the work but still want the book to be published and plan to get the book. It is difficult at this time to assess all of the reasons for all of the nuances of verbal behavior, and it would be dangerous to base any assumptions about supply and demand on these assessments. Something else is important here: the verification of the hypothesis that reading a work (of literature) and acquiring a book are two different types of sociocultural behavior and are regulated by different social mechanisms. It is possible that this is a common feature of the book culture, but it is also possible that we are dealing with a phenomenon of our own day, now that the shortage of printed material has been surmounted in many respects but the shortage of books still exists. It is true that the circulation figures of the leading journals rose dramatically in 1988, that the variety and quality of publications were augmented, and that many respondents said they did not have time to read everything, but it is still hard to buy a book. Therefore, we have encountered (or soon will encounter) a fundamentally new situation in the book culture: an adequate variety of reading material, the increased availability of this material, and the continuing shortage of books as a specific form of reading material. At this time of radical socioeconomic and political reform in the country, this situation could lead to unpredictable changes in the nature and volume of consumer demand for books, especially works of literature. It is possible that we will soon witness something like a "crisis of demand," in which even the extremely popular works (printed in journals) that are published in relatively small editions in book form will gather dust on shelves, and economically

accountable publishing houses and book sales organizations will suffer huge losses (F.E. Sheregi also expresses apprehensions of this kind, although they are based on other assumptions[1]). For this reason, it is already time for a more flexible circulation policy in the sphere of literature. Publishing houses and the book trade must be prepared for any turn of events: from a dramatic rise in circulation figures to the minimization of the demand for seemingly unquestionable items. We must be fully aware that these reversals will have little or nothing to do with reviews by critics. These reviews, provided that they are in line with the real artistic value of a work, will influence only reading—i.e., the reader's contact with the work. Consumer demand, on the other hand, under the new economic and social conditions will be influenced more by socioeconomic mechanisms: the relationship between the prices of books and wages, the type of dwelling, the publishing format, advertising, etc.

At this time circulation policy (at least for 1988 and 1989) is not based on the scrupulous study of demand (or popularity), but on other, not completely rational grounds. For example, according to the data of the Knizhnaya Palata Association at the beginning of 1988, several works scoring high in popularity in our surveys are to be published in relatively small editions. For example, V. Grossman's novel "Life and Fate" will be published in an edition of only 350,000 copies; B. Pasternak's novel "Doctor Zhivago" and N. Karamzin's "History of the Russian State" will be published in editions of only 300,000 copies. An analysis of the projected publication figures of 25 popular books reveals that 1,050,000 copies will be published of the top six books combined, and 9,400,000 copies will be published of the six books at the bottom of the list. In other words, the size of editions has little to do with the popularity (or reading frequency) of works. Although publishing plans for 1989 have not been finalized, they are unlikely to introduce any significant changes into the general situation. In any case, it is clear that the publishing houses and USSR Goskomizdat, which is supposed to perform coordinating functions and pursue a scientifically sound circulation policy, pay little attention to the opinions of readers or are too late in their assessments of these opinions. This means that the disparity between reader and consumer demand and the supply of books at the end of the 1980's and the beginning of the 1990's is already in the making.

Book policy is not keeping up with social policy, but a strong social policy presupposes a strong cultural—including book—policy. The only question is how the word "strong" is to be interpreted. The advocates of the technocratic, departmental approach and the authoritarian style of management invariably interpret it in the spirit of bygone days. In their opinion, a "strong" book policy is policy from a position of strength, which, despite the good intentions of its advocates, will perpetuate the book hunger in the country and the imposition of outdated cultural stereotypes and values on people and lead to the monotonous similarity of books and authors, the subordination of the cultural and economic interests of citizens to the extra-cultural and extra-economic interests of departments, and the continued pseudo-ideologization of the book culture.

Differences in approaches to the basic guidelines of book policy were clearly revealed in the discussion of cooperative publishing houses. Without going into the details, we should observe that we feel the establishment of cooperative publishing houses would have an extremely beneficial effect on the entire book trade. As soon as the first attempts were made to act on these proposals, however, someone stepped on the brakes. Bureaucratic functionaries impeded all attempts to establish cooperative publishing houses and expressed the "opinion" that they would be inexpedient. Their arguments sounded amazingly familiar: "We" do not have enough paper, printing equipment, and other resources for "them." What a familiar refrain—"we" and "they," the department and the people....

The books we choose to buy are still books that have been chosen for us. How long will this go on?

Footnotes

1. This is a completely realistic estimate and it is in line with expert opinions of the size of the reading public [13, p 176] and with research findings. When we surveyed 1,300 visitors to the Moscow International Book Fair and Exhibit in 1987, for example, we learned that they read four books a month on the average (around 50 books a year). The results of Book Institute studies in which the author was directly involved are used here and later in the article.

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Causes of Epidemic Among Children

18060004f Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE
ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 6, Nov-Dec 88
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[Article by Vladimir Mikhaylovich Lupandin, doctor of medical sciences and lead scientific associate at the Sociology Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and Yekaterina Petrovna Kakorina, candidate of medical sciences and senior scientific associate at the All-Union Research Institute of Social Hygiene and Organization of Health Care imeni N.A. Semashko]

[Text] A lengthy study of the health of children in Salavat in the Bashkir ASSR (1980-1988) revealed a high

incidence of involuntary muscle contractions, or tics, among the children. Sociohygienic investigations indicated a high probability of petrochemical causes. This required the verification of the previous diagnosis (rheumatism) of the majority of children with tics. Examinations of the patients by experts proved that rheumatism was not the cause of the tics. Another group of experts specializing in pediatric neurology, however, expressed the opinion that most of the tics were of a psychogenic nature. If so, then is the high incidence of tics in Salavat something like the epidemics of nervous disorders in medieval Europe?

It became obvious that traditional approaches to the study of disease would be ineffective in this case. The use of a new approach developed in social ecology was suggested[1]. In essence, it consists in the following. A strong social policy and the satisfaction of economic requirements necessitate an analysis of the processes of societal development, population growth, and changes in the biosphere. After all, health is reproduced on the biological level, is developed in the social sphere, is used in the process of the production of items of material and spiritual value, and is restored by means of recreation and health care. In this approach, health simultaneously represents a derivative of the gene pool and a function of social development, a result of the current level of scientific and technical progress.

From the standpoint of social ecology, Salavat is a small community, which came into being in 1948 when a petrochemical combine was built there. Today Salavat is a large industrial center with developed petroleum refining, petrochemical, and machine-building industries. The city also has reinforced concrete, vehicle repair, prefabricated housing, and industrial glass plants. In all, there are 94 industrial enterprises and 459 sources of air pollution! An analysis of the ecological situation does not present much difficulty: Pollutant recovery levels are around 62 percent on the average, but the figure is below 30 percent at some enterprises. Many chemical substances are not recovered at all by decontamination equipment. In particular, pollutants have changed the ecology of micro-organisms. The content of these is low in the zones where industrial enterprises are concentrated. Chemical pollutants have even entered the food chain: There is a high content of benzene, styrene, xylene, and other hydrocarbons in vegetables grown within 7 kilometers of the petrochemical combine.

For several years, 250 people with tics between the ages of 3 and 11, living in the experimental and control zones of the city (see Figure 1) [figure not reproduced], were studied (by Ye.P. Kakorina). Boys were 1.4 times as likely as girls to have tics. During the final stage of the study, 70 of the 250 children were examined (by V.M. Lupandin).

The tics are usually multiple spasms and are virtually incurable. Antiphlogistic agents do not produce positive results and often increase the severity of the tics. The number of afflicted children rose dramatically in the last 5 years and is still rising.

The study revealed minor organic disorders, so-called minimal cerebral dysfunctions, in most of the children. They take the form of defective attention and memory functions, chronic fatigue, kinetosis, and emotional instability. They experience perceptible difficulties when they begin going to school. This gives the children with the tics many features in common with children suffering from mental deficiency. One of the authors[2] once studied this problem, but the children in Salavat display spasmodic tics—hyperkinesis—in addition to minimal cerebral dysfunctions. We have never seen this combination of symptoms in such a high number of children before.

In this way, we drew our first conclusion: These were children with minor psycho-organic disorders, and not neurotic children. Pathological symptoms in pregnancy and labor are the main cause of the cerebral dysfunctions (this is also attested to by foreign experience).

The high rate of prenatal pathological symptoms in pregnant women living in the petrochemical provinces aroused concern long ago[3]. Our study also revealed a higher rate of complications during labor and premature births. The following features are characteristic of pregnant women in the 1980's: miscarriages in earlier pregnancies, severe anemia, toxemia, renal disorders, hypersensitivity to petrochemical pollutants in the air, and premature labor. During periods of chemical smog many pregnant women experience increased foetal activity, physical weakness, and the danger of abortion. Furthermore, complications are more common in residential neighborhoods closer to the combine. A connection between prenatal complications and the length of residence in the city was also established. Therefore, a sociohygienic analysis corroborated the assumption that the cause of the epidemic of tics was intrauterine foetal injury by harmful chemical substances. This is also corroborated by an analysis of the state of infant health and data on infant mortality. Children who could not breathe through their noses were born during the period of chemical smog in March 1987. They soon displayed respiratory insufficiency and high body temperatures and developed pneumonia. In the last 5 or 6 years there has been a considerable increase in the number of newborns with a low body weight (after a quick labor) and of infants with weak reflexes and a high leukocyte count.

Now let us take a look at the infant mortality rate in this region. The average is low and differs little from the rate in other parts of the country, but if we look at the figures for different months, we find an extremely indicative tendency. There were 16 deaths per 1,000 newborns in January 1987, 16 in February, 31 in March, 30 in April, 29 in May, 14 in June, 14 in July, and so forth. What is the reason for the seasonal fluctuation? The answer is simple: It is precisely in these months that the state of ecology in the city was unsatisfactory. We discovered the same seasonal (or monthly) flare-ups of infant mortality in 1986.

Now let us look at the dynamics of children's health. The first striking feature is the organism's weakened immune system. At times of chemical smog the number of patients visiting the pediatric polyclinic increases by 200 or even 300 percent. Another distinctive feature of the situation is the higher frequency of convulsive seizures, especially when the temperature rises. These seizures were recorded, for example, in one out of every five children brought to the hospital with a severe respiratory disorder. Besides this, there is a high rate of emotional disorders. The rate of neurosis and mental retardation among children from 4 to 7 years of age is 1.5 times as high here as the national average, and the indicator in the housing complex adjacent to the chemical combine is almost twice as high as in more distant neighborhoods.

What happens in the children's hospital during periods of chemical smog? Personnel caulk all of the windows as if they are preparing for the frosts of winter. In spite of these precautions, the health of most of the children being treated in the hospital for disorders of the upper respiratory tract deteriorates sharply. Some of the children are moved to the intensive care unit and are kept there until the smog is gone.

Now let us look at changes in physical development. The percentage of children between the ages of 4 and 11 with unsatisfactory height and weight deviations is 32.5 percent in the experimental zone and 23.5 percent in the control zone. Body length is now regarded as one of the most reliable indicators of children's health, and excessive height and deficient height are regarded as equally negative symptoms. Problems in the experimental zone in connection with this indicator are illustrated in Figure 2 [not reproduced] (4,379 children were studied in 1980 and 1985). The excessive increase in body length is an indisputable result of the various gases emitted by the petrochemical combine.

In the last 5 or 6 years pediatricians and gynecologists have reported births of microcephalic children. Their torsos and heads are proportional but reduced in size. They are not mentally retarded, but some of the children have displayed slight delays in mental development. According to pediatricians, the number of these microcephalic children is rising. Therefore, we are dealing with a new and mysterious phenomenon here, which must be studied with the participation of anthropologists.

These data attest either directly or indirectly to a high number of children with minimal cerebral dysfunctions (psycho-organic syndrome) as a result of ecological factors. The results of the medical examinations of 167 healthy children by a team of neuropathologists are interesting in this connection: "Minimal cerebral dysfunctions," "hyperkinesis," and "psycho-organic syndrome" were diagnosed in 58.8 percent of them. There were 1.5 times as many such children in the experimental zone as in the control zone. Furthermore, tics were most commonly found among children whose mothers worked in the petrochemical combine.

In conclusion, we will cite a brief ecological report. "The highest levels of air pollution were recorded from 11 to 15 February 1988. The hydrogen sulfide content was 4 times the maximum allowable concentration, and the content of ammonia and nitrogen peroxide was 3 times the maximum. Average monthly data indicate a rise in the level of air pollution by ammonia from 2 times the maximum in January to 3 times in February"[5]. No further comment is necessary, as the saying goes: The chemical attacks on children are continuing, and the windows in the children's hospital are still being caulked.

What are the implications of the epidemic of tics as far as traditional medicine and social ecology are concerned?

Let us take a look at the first of these. All of the children with tics were registered in the rheumatoid division and were treated regularly (according to a schedule) with antibiotics. Some of the children were even treated with hormones. The diagnosis of "rheumatism" was "erased" by military medical commissions when boys reached adolescence because there had been no changes in cardiac functions. The boys were pronounced healthy and were drafted for army service. Their parents were confused, to say the least. For 10 or more years they and their children had lived with the threat of heart problems, had received almost continuous treatment, and had adhered to a strict regimen, but now their children were suddenly supposed to be healthy when they reached conscription age. The parents' indignation was compounded by the fact that the protracted use of certain medicines during the treatment had caused new illnesses in some of the children: chronic gastritis, cholecystitis, dysbacteriosis, adiposis, etc.

Pediatric neuropathologists also view the problem within the context of traditional medicine and usually arrive at the conclusion that "there are no pathological reflexes," "there are no surgical disorders," etc. A symptom, particularly a tic, is viewed abstractly, in isolation from the patient's general state of health, not to mention the environment. Tics, for example, have traditionally been blamed on a bad scare or on a family conflict, and the fundamental fact that the child lives in a chemically polluted area is not taken into account. The consequences of this approach are extremely regrettable. We are now saying that some agencies (the Ministry of the Chemical Industry, the State Agroindustrial Committee, and others) are waging "chemical warfare" against the people, but medicine is waging the same kind of warfare on an equal or even greater scale. We have already discussed the treatment of tics. Many children in Salavat begin receiving, literally from birth, psychotropic medicines, nootropes, hormones, and even neuroleptics, including leponex, which has been banned in the West and is listed in textbooks as an example of a drug posing an unconditional threat to human health[4].

Now let us look at the same epidemic from the standpoint of social ecology. We know of epidemics of nervous disorders from history, particularly the tics known

as "St. Vitus' Dance." An epidemic in Russia was known as the "measuring disease." The facts discovered in Salavat testify that mankind now has to deal with fundamentally new types of epidemics, in which the tics are only the visible tip of a gigantic iceberg. Population reproduction is occurring under fundamentally new conditions today, namely under the conditions of an environment polluted by substances which did not exist during the process of human evolution. These are toxic gases and metals and radioactive isotopes.

We have to look into the past, into the 1930's, to find the reason for what has happened in Salavat. It is a direct result of the cult of personality and the closely related primitive thinking and authoritarian style of economic, scientific, and cultural management. We are still paying the bills for the cult of personality, the authoritarian style of management, and the primitive perceptions of our surroundings. The liquidation of several fields of science connected with the study of man in the 1930's and 1950's could not fail to have an impact. This diminished the nation's intellectual and creative potential and led to the absolute prevalence of a way of thinking incapable of assessing the situation realistically or foreseeing the consequences of various processes. This simplistic thinking is responsible for the use of old technologies harmful to nature and the human being, for the chaotic accumulation of hazardous production units in certain cities, and for serious mistakes in the location of residential and industrial zones.

The epidemic of tics among the children of Salavat is not an isolated or local problem. It is not a problem of petrochemical regions. It is a symptom of social trouble. The time has come to not only declare "Everything for the individual," but also make certain that each move we make is in agreement with this slogan. Any other choice could have unpredictable consequences. The cheap philosophy of the general plan for the distribution of national economic projects has cost us a great deal. The individual is the final goal of scientific and technical progress. This is an indisputable fact, and it should lie at the basis of any theory or decision.

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Between the Stadium and the Hospital
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[Article by Viktor Aleksandrovich Ponomarchuk, candidate of philosophical sciences, senior scientific associate at the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Physical Culture, author of the monograph "Styles of Thinking in Philosophy and the Natural Sciences" (1984, co-author), and one of our permanent contributing authors; words in boldface as published]

[Text] Recently there has been a perceptible increase of interest in physical culture. Athletic competitions win the attention of millions of viewers and listeners. Jogging and the just recently exotic sport of aerobics have become a habit for many citizens. Sportswear is in fashion. Break-dancing takes hours of practice. The fascination with all kinds of diets borders on a craze. Concern about health (which is specifically reflected in visits to saunas and the use of various "medicinal" herbs and other folk remedies) has become an "obsession" for young people as well as the elderly. Countless numbers of people have taken an interest in various Eastern schools of thought (genuine and phony) in their quest for physical and moral self-improvement. Of course, there are also facts attesting to the opposite, to a fairly high rate of disease and death in our country, to the weak material and technical base of public health and of mass physical culture and sports, and to the fact that the number of people actually engaging in them is much lower than the figures in optimistic official reports.

Of course, the lack of correspondence between the public's interest in, and need for, physical culture and the possibilities for their satisfaction is disturbing in itself, but it can be corrected. To do this, however, we must have a clear understanding of physical culture itself and of the goals, means, and methods of its development. It is in this fundamental area that clarity is lacking.

Let us look into the "Soviet Encyclopedic Dictionary," intended for the general public. Only 10 lines are devoted to physical culture, and the definition is quite abstract: "Part of the general culture of society, one of the spheres of social activity aimed at improving the health and developing the physical potential of the individual." The article on "Culture" does not say a

single word about its "physical" component. For clarification and explanation, we can turn to another publication—the "Popular Medical Encyclopedia." It contains a lengthy and detailed discussion of our topic, but the definition is approximately the same as in the earlier reference work: "Physical culture is one of the **means** (emphasis mine—V.P.) of improving health, of thorough physical development, and of preparation for labor and the defense of the motherland." In short, the average citizen who wants to be a physically cultured individual can learn much about health and the development of physical abilities and virtually nothing about culture from these and other publications. Even specialized textbooks say almost nothing at all about the moral, intellectual, and overall cultural development of the individual.

This narrow interpretation of physical culture merely as a means of restoring health or "improving" the physique is no coincidence. It reflects the prevailing approach for a long time in theory and practice—the approach to physical culture and physical education as a process intended primarily for the professional training of the individual for a specific social role (as a worker, engineer, athlete, etc.). In the 1920's they trained fighters for the industrial front, in the 1950's they trained manpower, and in the 1980's they trained labor resources. The barracks logic resulted in the relative decline (in comparison to the world average) of public health and reduced the scales of the traditional movement for physical culture. Under these conditions the common view of physical culture as physical exercise for the improvement of health certainly has a right to exist, but is it a complete definition of physical culture, if the latter is regarded a system for the ordering of priorities in the physical development of the individual?

Policy in the sphere of mass physical culture is a topic requiring special investigation. In any case, however, the views and attitudes of the public must be taken into account when changes in policy are being considered. The "therapeutic" approach has a strong influence on these views and attitudes. Physical culture is usually equated with a group of qualities located at the center of a continuum, with the stadium—where records are set for athletic abilities far beyond those of the average citizen—on one side, and the hospital on the other.

Let us take a closer look at the physical culture of the population. This article is based on the results of two studies. The first was conducted by the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Physical Culture from 1986 to 1988; 4,146 people were surveyed in 12 parts of the country. The second was conducted in 1988 by the institute in conjunction with the State Committee for Physical Culture and Sports; around 1,500 people were surveyed in various parts of the country. In both cases the members of the sample group represented all of the main sociodemographic groups in the population, mainly urban.

First we should note that health is the primary factor distinguishing respondents in terms of their degree of satisfaction with life. The people who are satisfied with their life usually have a positive evaluation of the state of their health, and vice versa. Those who engage in physical culture feel better and get sick less often, and this group contains only half as many people with complaints about the state of their health. Most of the people in the group of respondents who could not describe their state of health avoided physical exercise. The majority of people who described their health as good or excellent make an effort to take care of themselves: They undergo preventive medical examinations on their own initiative, they consult a physician as soon as they feel ill, etc. In general, respondents used a variety of methods to stay physically fit (see Table 1). Furthermore, the most widely available and effective means, such as body-building, saunas (or baths), and physical exercise, are most often used by people who describe their health as satisfactory. This reaffirms the direct effect of the general physical culture of the individual on health. Many of those who try to stay fit drink alcohol and smoke. Only 28.5 percent of the respondents believed in temperance. The situation is particularly disturbing among youth: 46.3 percent of the boys and around 40 percent of the girls in the ninth and tenth grades and in vocational and technical institutes drink. Almost half of all men and one out of every ten women smoke. Only 18.4 percent of the men and 15 percent of the women consult a physician as soon as they feel ill, while 59.5 percent of the men and 60.2 percent of the women wait to see if their health will improve and consult a physician only in emergencies. One out of every fourteen men and one out of every ten women believe that medical examinations are a complete waste of time. Around 22 percent of the respondents who described their health as "excellent" and 53 percent of those who described it as "poor" take medicine to stay healthy.

Table 1. Use of Various Means of Optimizing Health, % of Respondents*

Means	Perfect health, n=694	Good health, n=1,400	Satisfactory, n=911	Impaired health, n=435	Poor health, n=88
Physical exercise	69.3	58.9	47.1	44.8	31.8
Saunas (baths)	64.4	51.2	41.4	34.9	28.4
Tea, coffee	58.5	62.9	64.1	66.4	54.5
Body-building	47.4	29.2	22.2	17.0	17.0
Massage and self-massage	34.4	21.0	20.0	19.5	15.9
Medicine and vitamins	28.1	21.9	31.7	41.4	53.4
Diet	26.5	21.7	26.5	33.3	22.7
Folk remedies	18.9	19.9	21.8	30.1	25.0

Table 1. Use of Various Means of Optimizing Health, % of Respondents*

Means	Perfect health, n=694	Good health, n=1,400	Satisfactory, n=911	Impaired health, n=435	Poor health, n=88
Smoking	18.9	16.5	15.0	13.1	12.5
Alcohol	11.3	7.7	5.9	5.7	11.4
Non-traditional activities (yoga, etc.)	11.4	7.1	4.1	3.7	4.5

* Respondents were able to choose several answers.

Shortcomings in the development of physical culture in the broad sense of the term—as a component of the overall culture of the individual—are also attested to by the results of a study of respondents' feelings about the effect of their state of health on the fulfillment of their ambitions (see Table 2). Inadequate physical training and poor health kept only a small percentage of respondents from reaching various goals. In general, in the opinion of the respondents, these factors had no effect on the main events in their lives. It is difficult to believe that this was due to the excellent health and athletic

abilities of the overwhelming majority of respondents. Their self-evaluations and their level of activity (which will be discussed later) cast doubts on this. It is most likely that many assign secondary importance to their physical health when they make important decisions in their lives (there were no significant differences in the data for men and women in this respect). In any case, judging by the last column in Table 2, almost half of the respondents did not take this seriously. These people are effectively lacking in one of the main elements of physical culture.

Table 2. Effect of State of Health (A) and Physical Fitness (B) of Respondents on Realization of Ambitions, % of Respondents (n = 3,984)

Situations	Was of no importance		Proved to be an obstacle		Shortcomings were concealed		Difficult to judge	
	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B
Starting a family	47.8	50.6	2.0	1.2	0.9	0.7	49.3	47.5
Choosing a profession	53.3	56.0	5.6	2.9	1.4	0.8	39.7	40.3
Getting a job or an education	56.4	58.8	4.0	1.8	1.8	0.9	37.8	38.5
Getting a promotion	47.6	49.3	2.0	1.0	0.7	0.6	49.7	49.1

Another important characteristic is daily physical activity. The research findings were disturbing. From 6 to 8 hours of physical exercise a week is considered to be the norm, but far from all of the respondents spent this much time exercising, even among those who described themselves as advocates of physical culture or as athletes: one out of three of the "physical culturists" and around 40 percent of the "athletes." They spend much more time sitting on stadium bleachers or in front of the television set and reading the sports page (see Table 3). According to the 1988 study, only one-fifth of the respondents engaged in several forms of exercise. The majority were interested in only one—running, skiing, soccer, etc. Around 67.8 percent got their exercise at home, 39.2 percent exercised near their homes, 42.7 percent in city sports facilities, and 8.3 percent near

work or school (the respondents could choose several answers). Around 10.6 percent had been exercising for less than a year, 16.1 percent for 1-3 years, 16.6 percent for 4-6 years, 21.6 percent for 7-10 years, 10.5 percent for 10-12 years, and 22.9 percent for over 12 years. Incidentally, the number of illnesses begins to decline sharply after 3 or 4 years of exercise. What is more, perceptible positive changes in the state of health require at least 4 to 6 hours of regular exercise a week. The study revealed a disturbing fact. Of all the sociodemographic groups, workers performing heavy physical labor were the least likely to engage in physical culture—one out of fifteen. We must not think that additional physical effort is "unnecessary" in this case; it is necessary for the restoration of strength. Shortcomings in physical education are the problem here.

Table 3. Time Allotted for Satisfaction of Interests in Physical Culture and Sports, % of Respondents
(top figure represents advocates of physical culture, bottom figure represents athletes)

Types of activity	Up to 15 minutes	15-30 minutes	0.5-1 hour	1-2 hours	Over 2 hours	No response
Vigorous physical exercise	24.6 15.0	23.6 17.7	22.6 14.9	9.8 25.4	3.1 16.2	16.3 10.8
Watching sports on television	24.0 16.6	23.0 12.9	23.1 29.3	15.4 22.3	7.7 10.3	10.8 8.6
Reading sports publications	37.4 24.3	26.9 38.2	14.0 16.8	2.4 4.8	0.9 1.3	18.4 14.6

Independent activity is one of the central elements of physical culture. According to the 1986-1988 survey data, 34.7 percent of the respondents engage in this kind of activity, with VUZ students and employees ranking highest and workers ranking lowest. Three indicators, in our opinion, measure the degree to which the person has mastered skills in this area: the ability to exercise self-control in this activity, the ability to determine the optimal group of exercises, and the ability to gauge the optimal amount of physical effort. These features seem to be the most visible signs of the real physical culture of

the individual because these abilities require a certain amount of knowledge in the spheres of medicine, sports, and hygiene and presuppose the appreciation of physical activity as part of daily life.

If the data in Table 4 are analyzed from this standpoint, the respondents who answered "Yes, I could, and I have already had to do this" can be categorized as people with a fairly developed physical culture. The response "I think I could" should be viewed as a propensity for activity at best. As a rule, women are less likely to master the skills of independent activity than men.

Table 4. Degree to Which Respondents Have Mastered Abilities and Skills Required for Independent Activity, % of Respondents

Indicators	Yes, I could, and I have already had to do this	I think I could	No, I could not	Undecided
Self-control in physical exercise	25.0	35.9	13.6	25.5
Development of optimal set of exercises	19.2	32.6	18.9	29.3
Calculation of reasonable physical effort	21.0	34.4	19.4	25.2

As we can see, the real state of affairs in physical culture falls short of the desirable situation. Respondents were also disturbed by this. Today more and more people are likely to support "health bonuses." Research indicates that the population as a whole has positive feelings about these incentives. Even 43.4 percent of the people who do not engage in any kind of physical exercise support the bonuses (14.6 percent oppose them). The support of this initiative has virtually no connection with the self-evaluation of health. In all of the groups, from the people in perfect health to those with poor health, around half voted "for" and 10-15 percent voted "against." Which measures won the highest approval? The lengthening of vacations by 3-6 days (43.4 percent), the chance to choose vacation times (43.4 percent), and immediate eligibility for travel privileges (36.7 percent). Fewer people supported financial incentives: 23.9 percent of the respondents voted for special bonuses, and 21.5 percent voted for pay raises.

Therefore, we are dealing with a contradictory situation. The population is concerned about health and views it as a major personal and social value. In spite of this, health

is not identified with physical culture in public thinking and behavior. At best, physical culture is regarded as a means of restoring health. This is also characteristic of policy in the sphere of mass physical culture. This is why our job must begin with changes in theoretical and practical approaches. Physical education should be conducted in conjunction with the sociocultural development of the society and the individual.

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Structural Changes in Circulation of Periodicals
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[passages in boldface as published]

[Text] At the end of the summer and the beginning of fall subscriptions to periodicals unexpectedly became the object of almost major concern. "What do sociologists think about this?" People asked us this question in letters and on the telephone, and they were many in number. In

view of the keen interest of our readers, the editors asked the Book Institute of the Knizhnaya Palata Scientific Production Association for a sociological evaluation of the situation. The results of a study conducted by institute specialists are presented in this article.

In the 1970's most journals lost from 6 percent to 56 percent of their subscribers. The circulation figures of a few publications rose. The demand for periodicals was markedly stable and conservative. The list of popular authors consisted of just over 10 names. Then the situation suddenly changed so dramatically that the change could not be described as anything but unprecedented.

The April policy line of the CPSU called for significant changes in the work of journal editors. The situation in 1988 had all of the characteristics of a boom. The demand for journals increased by around 150 million copies, the public response to periodicals was colossal, the competition for readers grew more intense, and clear-cut differences in the programs of editorial teams were revealed. As a result, the circulation of some publications approached the maximum satisfaction of demand, while others lost many readers because their editorial teams could not reorganize their own work and give up their conservative views as quickly as they should have. In other words, the country's journals underwent a qualitative structural reorganization.

Table 1. Periodical Publication Dynamics (1980-1989)

Years	Journals				Newspapers			
	Circulation Millions of copies	Increase, %	Millions of quires	Increase over previous year, %	Circulation Millions of copies	Increase, %	Millions of quires	Increase over previous year, %
1980	2433	—	14,038	—	40,012	—	79,978	—
1981	2370	-2.6	13,706	-2.3	40,683	+1.6	81,159	+1.5
1982	2393	+1.0	14,040	+2.4	39,683	-2.0	80,484	-0.9
1983	2531	+5.7	14,652	+4.3	40,862	+2.2	82,223	+2.1
1984	2556	+1.0	14,902	+1.7	42,265	+3.4	85,085	+3.5
1985	2640	+3.3	15,189	+1.9	43,455	+2.8	87,451	+2.8
1986	2740	+3.9	15,846	+4.3	45,240	+4.1	90,375	+3.3
1987	2815	+2.7	16,320	+3.1	47,635	+5.3	95,661	+5.8
1988 (estimate)	2970	+5.5	17,350	+6.3	48,730	+2.3	98,050	+2.5

The changes mentioned above attest to the increasingly strong process of the ideological restructuring of society. Journals of the program type, which publicized the ideas of renewal enthusiastically, give readers something like standards of social and political thinking, and these are being used as points of reference by the intelligentsia and by the public at large. Furthermore, the contents of progressive journals and the stability of their line are now viewed by the public as a unique barometer of the spiritual renewal of society. It is no coincidence that any attempts to limit the activity of these journals immediately become common knowledge and the topic of widespread debate.

Table 2. Circulation Dynamics of Some Journals (1987-1988), Data for 1 January in Descending Order, %

Druzhba Narodov	+433
Argumenty i Fakty	+189
Novyy Mir	+135
Neva	+90
Znamya	+80
Rovesnik	+60
Smena	+54
Avrora	+43

Table 2. Circulation Dynamics of Some Journals (1987-1988), Data for 1 January in Descending Order, %

Roman-Gazeta	+40
Oktyabr	+35
Nauka i Religiya	+20
Voprosy Istorii	+19
Ogonek	+18.7
Studencheskiy Meridian	+15.7
Moskva	+14
Rabotnitsa	+12.5
Zvezda	+11
Raduga (Kiev)	+11
Molodaya Gvardiya	+11
Semya i Shkola	+11
Nash Sovremennik	+9
Krestyanka	+8.6
Priusadebnoye Khozyaystvo	+8.4
Zdorovye	+7.7
Don	+7
Literaturnoye Obozreniye	+6.7
Iskusstvo Kino	+6
Yunyy Tekhnik	+5
Voprosy Ekonomiki	+4.7
Vokrug Sveta	+4

Table 2. Circulation Dynamics of Some Journals (1987-1988), Data for 1 January in Descending Order, %

Voprosy Literary	+4
V Mire Knig	+2
Chelovek i Zakon	+1
Voprosy Filosofii	0
Za Rulem	0
Krokodil	0
Literaturnaya Ucheba	0
Radio	0
Selskaya Molodezh	0
Sovetskiy Ekran	0
Teatr	0
Yunost	0
Yunnyy Naturalist	0
Prostor	0
Kodry	0
Sever	0
Dalniy Vostok	0
Ural	0
Daugava	0
Sibirskiye Ogni	0
Literaturnyy Azerbaydzhan	0
Sovremennaya Dramaturgiya	-0.7
Priroda	-1.8
Murzilka	-1.8
Zvezda Vostoka	-2
Novoye Vremya	-3
Detskaya Literatura	-3
Kommunist	-5
Bibliotekar	-6
Izvestiya AN SSSR. Seriya Literaturny i Yazyka	-7
Nauka i Zhizn	-7
Pioner	-7
Sovetskoye Foto	-7
Neman	-9
Izobretatel i Ratsionalizator	-11
Tekhnika—Molodezhi	-11
Politicheskoye Obrazovaniye	-13
Partiynaya Zhizn	-14
Agitator	-16.4
Khimiya i Zhizn	-17
Inostrannaya Literatura	-17.5
Donbass	-18
Znaniye—Sila	-18
Russkaya Rech	-26

Limits were imposed on subscriptions in 1988 without adequate scientific investigation and without consideration for the possible negative effects of these limits. The paper shortage was the only valid argument, but this was valid only because of the mechanical extrapolation of last year's situation to the present day, when a significant increase in total subscriptions was anticipated instead of further structural changes in demand. There was no consideration for the fact that the percentage of average expenditures on subscriptions in the family budget had virtually reached the maximum and that, besides this,

books in high demand began to appear on the market in large numbers.

Table 3. Circulation Dynamics of Some Party and Political Journals

Name	Thousands of copies		1988, % of 1987
	1987	1988	
Novoye Vremya	334	324	-3
Kommunist	1,065	1,025	-5
Politicheskoye Obrazovaniye	2,620	2,350	-10
Partiynaya Zhizn	1,100	950	-14
Agitator	1,615	1,350	-16.3
Zhurnalist	90	70	-23

The cancellation of the subscription limits for most newspapers and journals during the 1987 subscription campaign dispelled the myth of many years' standing that the paper and printing industries were supposedly unable to secure the satisfaction of public demand for periodicals. It turned out that there was no absolute (quantitative) shortage of periodicals to speak of; the shortage was structural (or relative) and was due to the ineffective distribution of circulation figures among publications with no consideration for demand.

Table 4. Circulation Dynamics of Some Academic Journals

Name	Thousands of copies		1988, % of 1987
	1987	1988	
Sotsiologicheskoye Issledovaniye	10.3	14.6	+42
Voprosy Istorii	16	19	+18.8
Voprosy Ekonomiki	43	45	+4.7
Voprosy Literaturny	15	15.6	+4
Vestnik Drevney Istorii	7.1	7.35	+3.5
Voprosy Istorii	1.8	1.86	+3.1
Yestestvoznaniye i Tekhniki			
Voprosy Filosofii	26	26	0
EKO	155	146.6	-6
Russkaya Literatura	13.3	12.8	-4
Izvestiya AN SSSR. Seriya Literatury i Yazyka	2.9	2.7	-7

During the subscription campaign in 1986 and 1987 two factors affected circulation dynamics: the dramatic change in the nature of Soviet journalism as a result of perestroika and consequent improvement of the quality of journals and the cancellation of subscription limits. The anticipated skyrocketing rise in gross circulation figures did not take place, however, and the subscriber could only "vote" for the journals best meeting the requirements of the times. Circulation figures were redistributed within the confines of a comparatively slight increase in total quantity. In 1986 the increase was more substantial than it was a year later. The reduction of

retail sales and of departmental subscriptions certainly played a role, although it was a fairly unimportant one. In general, however, the cancellation of limits was an extremely valuable experience: We learned that without these limits, demand could be satisfied without any extraordinary effort on the part of industry.¹

It is completely obvious that the tumult over subscriptions was due less to a real shortage of resources (which was the reason cited by officials) than to the very procedure of conducting the campaign and the attempt to distribute resources without any consideration for the actual situation. Predictably, the move from unlimited to limited subscriptions immediately gave rise to shortages, even when there was no change in resource volume. In other words, the limitation of subscriptions stimulated demand artificially. This is the "psychology of shortages." Furthermore, this effect was compounded by the rumors of bureaucratic opposition to glasnost.

Just as in any other case when scientifically unsubstantiated decisions are made, the avoidance of negative consequences is not a simple matter. Nevertheless, it appears that it would be best to definitely avoid all such restrictions in the future.

Footnotes

1. The incorporation of the latest technical achievements could have a colossal impact on the output of paper. Suffice it to say that our industry produces only 16.3 tons of paper from each thousand cubic meters of timber, whereas U.S. industry produces 70.6 tons—Editor.

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Forceful Motifs

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ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 6, Nov-Dec 88
(signed to press 7 Dec 88) pp 63-67

[Article by Leonid Isaakovich Goldin, doctor of philosophical sciences, professor, department head at Advanced Training Institute for Managerial Personnel and Specialists of USSR Ministry of Chemical Industry, and author of the books "Shchekinskiy metod" [The Shchekino Method] (1979, co-author), "K vysshey effektivnosti khozyaystvennogo rukovodstva" [Striving for the Maximum Efficiency of Economic Management] (1980, co-author), and "Sotsialisticheskoye sorevnovaniye i nauchno-tekhnicheskoy progress" [Socialist Competition and Scientific and Technical Progress] (1984). This is his first contribution to SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA]

[Text] For many years we told ourselves that classical music was flourishing in our country, until we finally believed it. Glasnost shook this belief severely. Even without special surveys it was clear that the audience for pop and rock was a hundred times as large as for classical

music. Stadiums are not big enough to accommodate all of the fans of the latest popular rock group, but the concert halls where people are invited to listen to classical music are almost empty. All of the commotion over the tours of V. Horowitz, Y. Menuhin, and S. Richter, and even the outstanding "Moscow Virtuosos" adds few positive features to the depressing general picture. Classical music accounts for only a slight percentage of record sales. Only rock fans complain about shortages, although a Beethoven record costs only half as much as a "Modern Talking" disc.

Glasnost also brought another fact to light. Classical music is experiencing a genuine boom abroad. Excellent concert halls, superlative symphonic orchestras, and first-rate performers are commonplace even in small cities in Western Europe, the United States, and Japan. Prestigious competitions, festivals, and exhibitions of artistry are held here regularly. Philanthropic activity in support of classical music and young talent is well-developed here, and concerts are held for the public.

The realities of the music culture in our country are disturbing. The present situation disturbs anyone who feels responsible for the spiritual health of the people. As always, the loudest voices belong to people inclined to take immediate action. Strictly speaking, all of this action is of a prohibitive nature. The advocates of vigorous action are convinced that all of the problems of the music culture lie "within" and can be solved by the reordering of priorities to promote some currents and severely restrict others. This kind of concern about classical music is interesting in itself.

New Systems of Categorization According to Old Criteria

The fate of classical music is inseparable from the spiritual state of society. Its popularity has always coincided with periods of intense social progress. Classical music cannot take hold, on the other hand, in an atmosphere of hypocrisy or in a society in which the highest values have been deformed or supplanted. The current pitiful situation is not solely the result of shortcomings in aesthetic education or of incompetent propaganda. Even the neglected state of the material base is not the primary cause. The main factor is the spiritual atmosphere and the personality of the composer, performer, and listener. The alarming symptoms of moral crisis and personality degeneration have been most apparent in the highest spheres of art, while the "low" genres have won priority under these conditions and have even flourished in their own way.

Barracks morals, the monopoly on the truth, the dictatorial intrusions into the creative process, and the savage roaring at the disobedient—all of these principles of Stalin's policy in the sphere of ideology and culture had a particularly adverse effect on the state of affairs in

music composition. The attitude toward the music culture was worded as specifically as possible in the memorable 1948 decree on V. Muradeli's opera "The Great Friendship." It was called "an anti-artistic work with flawed music and a defective plot line." This was followed by the statement that the failure of the opera "is not an isolated case, but is closely connected with the unsatisfactory state of contemporary Soviet music and with the spread of the formalist current among Soviet composers.... This current found its fullest expression in the works of such composers as comrades D. Shostakovich, S. Prokofiev, A. Khachaturian, V. Shebalin, V. Popov, N. Myaskovskiy, and others whose works clearly display the formalist distortions and anti-patriotic tendencies in music that are alien to the Soviet people and their artistic tastes"[1]. The names of D. Kabalevskiy and Yu. Shaporin were added to this list at a conference of Soviet musicians in the VKP(b) [All-Russian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)] Central Committee held soon afterward under the leadership of A. Zhdanov. In this way, the greatest composers, distinguished by talent and creative inquiry, became the targets of criticism. It was a paradox: They condemned atonality, dissonance, and disharmony and demanded realistic portrayals of an absurd reality. Life became increasingly brutal, but the pastorate and cantilena were supposed to dominate music.

A. Zhdanov, who then stood at the helm of cultural policy, saw the creative current which did not impress him as "a rejection of folk music and a refusal to serve the people instead of serving the strictly personal tastes of a select group of aesthetes"[2, p 17]. Was there any basis for this harsh political verdict? Here it is: "Several works by contemporary composers are so filled with naturalistic sounds that they remind us...of a dentist's drill or a musical bobbin"[*ibid.*, p 22]. On the basis of this body of evidence, Zhdanov made some theoretical generalizations: "This music is turning anti-patriotic and strictly individualistic, and the people therefore have a right to be indifferent to it, and they are"[*ibid.*, p 24].

It goes without saying that all of this was followed by practical conclusions to supplement the measures (which had turned out to be insufficient, in the opinion of the leadership) taken after the publication of the articles "Imitation Ballet"[3] and "Cacophony Instead of Music"[4] in PRAVDA in 1936. The latter article was about D. Shostakovich's opera "Lady Macbeth of the Mtsensk District." "The ultra-leftist deviations in the opera come from the same source," declared the author, a spokesman for high-level officials, "as the ultra-leftist deviations in painting, poetry, pedagogics, and science. Petty bourgeois 'innovations' lead to alienation from true art, from true science, and from true literature. The composer apparently does not care about what the Soviet audience wants and expects from music. He seems to have deliberately composed the piece in code, mixing up all of the sounds so that his music will reach only the formalist aesthetes who have lost their taste"[*ibid.*].

The "perestroyka" which followed this criticism (and self-criticism, because most composers understood the situation perfectly and amicably confessed their errors and promised to correct them) gave birth to an endless stream of monotonous symphonies, concerts, operas, cantatas, and oratorios with contemporary heroes, works in which good always triumphed over evil. They were full of melodious and euphonious consonance and their crescendos affirmed optimism and lifted the spirits of the dwindling audience, but for some reason no Glinkas or Tchaikovskys were born in this atmosphere.

The authoritarian methods of interfering in the creative process and the wretched talk about the "national roots" of art and its connection with life left deep traces. In the 1960's and 1970's this was reflected completely in the attitude toward the music of Alfred Shnitke and many other composers of his generation. For a long time the people were isolated from whole strata of national culture—the music of S. Rachmaninov, D. Bortnyanskiy, and A. Grechaninov. There were also standard interpretations of classical music, and the scales of the conflicts it portrayed were diminished.

The simplistic approach and simplistic interpretation of the connection between culture and society also left their mark on theory. Music criticism and sociological studies are still marred by false justifications and a disregard for the contradictions of the music culture. Utopian, vulgar-sociological beliefs about the connection between the art of music and social development took root here for decades. In particular, there was the common assumption that certain musical genres and currents aroused criminal instincts. Today rock music is constantly under attack. At a plenum of the board of the Union of Soviet Writers, for example, Sergey Mikhalkov described it as "moral AIDS, a means of stupefying the younger generation, a soil in which anything can be cultivated, from drug addiction to prostitution and from treason to felony." Radical views on music are characteristic of many famous contemporary writers, including Yu. Bondarev, V. Astafyev, V. Rasputin, and V. Belov.

Any expert knows that the simplistic prohibitive approach to a problem can only compound it. The inappropriate behavior, emotional reactions, and thinking of some young people are not the result of the music they hear. These choices were dictated by the spiritual atmosphere of the era of the cult of personality and the years of opportunism and stagnation. Music only "channels" cynicism and suppressed aggression and can even alleviate their social danger.

Who Is In Charge

A serious obstacle impeding the development of classical music and its dialogue with the general public is the bureaucratization of concerts. It is possible that no other sphere provides as much scope as music for subjectivism and biased tastes and, consequently, for arbitrary actions by bureaucrats. An artist or rock musician can make a

name for himself through informal channels, and sometimes more successfully than through official channels. The performer of classical music does not have this option. Furthermore, the question of what is good or bad in music is of unparalleled complexity. Technical errors do not count, and everything else provides unlimited possibilities for debate.

Today the road to philharmonic halls and to competitions, without which it is virtually impossible to perform on the best stages, is open to an extremely small group of people. The cultivation of proteges, group biases, and fierce conflicts have become integral features of music in our country. All of this is particularly distinct when foreign tours are booked. It is impossible to convince a performer that he is less deserving of one than his colleague. In any case, I have never met a musician who would agree to be called second- or third-rate. In view of the fact that foreign concerts can satisfy the natural desire for a larger audience and also involve prestige and, last but not least, monetary considerations, any decision is bound to make someone unhappy. Furthermore, musicians often have an exaggerated idea of the financial status of their foreign colleagues and underestimate the force of competition and the problems connected with the absence of social protection. What is more, for a variety of reasons our country lost many talented performers during the years of stagnation when they went to the West. It is significant, however, that the foreign audience's interest in Soviet musicians was largely connected with features having nothing to do with their artistry. Propaganda motives frequently coincided with commercial motives.

Our main problems, however, are still connected with the organization of music within our country. Change is difficult in this area. The main obstacles are the absence of genuine artistic competition and the monopoly on the truth. We are fully aware of the pernicious effects of the monopoly status of agencies on the economy. It appears that our spiritual life also needs a perestroika to eliminate the privileges of the feudal lords in the art world, especially since the eloquent Italian neologism "Mafia" became a common term in the cultural community long before we learned about the unscrupulous actions of the trade barons in Moscow and Rostov, the cotton kings in Uzbekistan, and the gangsters in Turkmenia.

Today, of course, there is no absolute connection between a prestigious tour or inclusion in a philharmonic orchestra or a leading theatrical company and a service fee paid mainly in the form of imported electronics. It is no longer a simple matter to lead the latest member of a dynasty onto the stage at the finale of an artistic competition. Does this mean, however, that mutual guarantees and corporativism have been surmounted and that their nutritive medium has been destroyed? Today it is becoming increasingly obvious that mere changes in personnel and control "from above" and "from below" are not enough to discontinue such culturally harmful practices as the lowering of criteria for the evaluation of

artistic performance, conventionalism, formalism, extreme intolerance for criticism, excessive ambition, biased tastes, and authoritarianism. This will require a social mechanism and the organizational, legal, and economic conditions to secure the early discovery of talent, the provision of creative scope for this talent, and the establishment of reliable obstacles against protectionism, stagnation, cliquishness, and even simple human envy of more talented individuals. It is clear that this kind of mechanism cannot be established without glasnost and without extensive public involvement.

For many years music journals and the art divisions of some newspapers have served essentially as advertising offices for departments and administrators, deciding, in small and exclusive groups, who should be punished, who should be shown mercy, who should be the target of publicity, and who should not even be allowed to come close to an international competition or even an almost empty concert hall. There is no question that the situation has changed in many respects, but it is still too early to say that glasnost and democracy are firmly established in the cultural sphere. I do not know what would happen to a music critic today if he were to publicly ask whether T. Khrennikov's concert for violoncello and orchestra was interesting enough to be included in the program of the Eighth Tchaikovsky Competition, or if he were to mention how quickly the conservatory hall emptied during the performance of R. Shchedrin's "Musical Offering."

The All-Union Music Society might be able to engage in a productive dialogue with cultural departments and the Union of Composers, but how independent could it be if it took shape—from the drafting of its charter to the appointment of its administrators—under the control of the same departments? The possibility of forming a performers' union has been considered for many years. They have just as many creative and organizational problems as writers, artists, actors, and composers, and they are not inferior in numbers to their colleagues in the arts. A new union would weaken the monopoly in the music culture.

Composers and performers should pay close attention to the educative experience of their colleagues in the cultural sphere, especially artists and actors. Today the Union of Artists and the Arts Foundation have to coexist with a Union of Graphic Artists and a "free" market for all those who want to test their abilities in the arts. No one is complaining about oppression and there is no more turmoil over unacknowledged geniuses, unofficial exhibitions, or various types of speculation—financial and political. The world of drama has entered an era of studios and of a bold search for new organizational forms. Why have there been no changes of this kind in music?

The situation in which certain individuals control the music culture must be changed. Even an individual with superior professional and moral qualities can make

mistakes. After all, in addition to the legend of Mozart and Salieri, there were completely real conflicts between Tchaikovsky and Rubinstein and between Wagner and Verdi. We do not have to mention any of our contemporaries by name, because these conflicts are common knowledge. Is it right that a single famous singer, even though she is indisputably talented, should always head the panel of judges in prestigious competitions and head the largest public music organization, decide the fate of young people in the conservatory and on dramatic and philharmonic stages, and act as chairman of the editorial boards of music publications? Is it possible for one conductor, even an extremely talented one, to handle three orchestras? Here is another example: Is it a coincidence that the world-renowned S. Richter is not a chairman of any organization and does not judge anyone? The desire to concentrate on his main interest in life is probably not the only reason for this. He probably also realizes how difficult it would be to question his judgment.

Of course, the organization of musical events would be impossible without the active participation of outstanding artists, but it also requires constant renewal, regular elections for cultural administrators on all levels, artistic competition between schools and currents, the publication of decisions, and a greater concern for public opinion. Experiments and a variety of organizational forms are essential, particularly private theatrical companies, performers' cooperatives, and cost accounting relationships with "clients."

The All-Union Music Society and "unofficial" movements (at least half of them have distinct musical preferences) should study the experience of the Russian Music Society, which was active in music education. Just before World War I the society had 54 branches responsible for organizing concerts on the local level. Personal initiative played an important role in the promotion of the musical arts, especially the efforts of A.I. Sziloty in St. Petersburg and of S.A. Kusevitskiy in Moscow, who publicized Russian and foreign symphonic music. The company of S.P. Diaghilev became famous throughout the world.

The "monopoly mentality" is still alive in the world of music. For example, 300 associates of the Dnepropetrovsk Philharmonic Orchestra are complaining that the financial plan is unrealistic. To put it more precisely, its fulfillment is being impeded by competitors— independent self-supporting organizations which have begun operating in the music world on the basis of economic accountability. City clubs—the "Leisure Center" and the "Entertainment World"—hold concerts and pay soloists 30 percent of the receipts. Under these conditions, there is no shortage of artists. The orchestra personnel made their request in the hope that the plan would be set aside and that they could get rid of their competition in this way. We would like to ask the offended parties how the city could be at a disadvantage if a few individuals can perform the duties of 300 people

on a cooperative basis or even with public funding. Were the artists happy in the past with the way you professionals provided them with instruments, hotel accommodations, and advertising and took care of their other needs? Unfortunately, the situation was wretched from every aspect. Are you afraid you will go bankrupt? Then just keep the people who know how to work.

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Is the Ban on Prostitution Effective?

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ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 6, Nov-Dec 88
(signed to press 7 Dec 88) pp 68-70

[Article by Yakov Ilyich Gilinskiy, doctor of juridical sciences, senior scientific associate at the Leningrad State Institute of Culture imeni N.K. Krupskaya, and author of the article "The Social Dynamics of Suicide" in SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA (1988, No 5, co-author); words in italics as published]

[Text] The turmoil over the issue of "prostitution" has died down slightly. The flow of letters from suddenly enlightened and irate citizens, demanding, as usual, "stricter laws," "prohibition," "imprisonment," or "exile to an island," has grown noticeably scantier. In short, we are dealing with another of the familiar situations in which the time has come to move from words to action and begin a systematic and unbiased investigation of the problem in order to organize a methodical campaign which will have more than just an immediate impact. I am making these comments in order to raise a few questions which have to be answered before we can move on.

There are several definitions of prostitution. In my opinion, it should be regarded as casual extramarital sexual relations for pay in the absence of emotional or personal attraction (or affection). This approach allows us to separate this phenomenon from mercenary marital

relations and from non-mercenary extramarital sexual relations based on personal affection and attraction. Prostitution is possible in heterosexual and homosexual relations, by women and by men. In ancient Greece, for example, there were public houses for women as well as for men, and at one time in Rome there were more male than female prostitutes. People often forget about this "variety" and regard prostitution exclusively as a "female occupation" confined to heterosexual relations.

Prostitution is only one of the ways in which people sell themselves. Unless we are fully aware of this, we will not be able to understand the problem. Under the conditions of commodity-money relations, K. Marx wrote, "the development of items of exchange value (and monetary relations)" is tantamount to "universal venality and corruption." "Universal prostitution is a necessary phase in the development of the social nature of personal inclinations, potential, ability, and activity. In more polite terms, it could be called a universal feeling of usefulness and willingness to be used"[1]. This is why "prostitution (in the narrow sense of the term—Ya.G.) is only a *specific* form of the *universal* prostitution of the *worker*, and because this prostitution represents the kind of relationship in which there is a prostitute and a client, a relationship in which the latter is far more vile, the capitalist and others of that type can also be put in this category"[2].

Renowned sociologist G. Simmel also tried to reveal the essence of prostitution through commercial relations. He said that the nature of money and the nature of prostitution were the same and that the latter became a symbol of human interaction under the conditions of commercial, materialistic, and alienated relationships[6]. Money ruins everything it touches: "The indifference with which it gives itself up to any new use, the ease with which it leaves any person because it has no real connection with anyone, and its inherently materialistic nature, excluding any kind of sincerity, all point up the fateful connection between money and prostitution.... The essence of prostitution, which we have found in money, is communicated to objects"[7].

Prostitution has a second "parent" in addition to commercial relations—monogamy. The indissoluble connection between the two was revealed by F. Engels: "Could we have failed to see that monogamy and prostitution might be opposites but are inseparable opposites in today's world, the poles of a single social order? Could prostitution disappear without causing the downfall of monogamy?"[3]. It is interesting that even the strictest advocates of monogamy intuitively arrived at similar conclusions. Thomas Aquinas, for example, once exclaimed: "Destroy prostitution and watch immorality take over!"

What are the distinctive features of prostitution in our society? First of all, the lengthy concealment of the real state of affairs led to a situation in which many people were "shocked" by the news that prostitution did exist.

This explains the unhealthy interest, the angry demands, and the confusion (including the confusion of law enforcement agencies). Prostitution, however, requires an approach as objective and balanced as the approach to alcohol abuse. Finding and carrying out the correct strategy is twice as difficult because virtually everything has to start anew. The history of scientific socialism includes some perfect examples of studies of this issue[4; 5]. Prostitution was actively investigated during the first years of Soviet rule. During the period of the Stalinist dictatorship the studies ceased, however, and were not resumed until the 1960's, and the press did not print the first results of these studies until recently[8].

Second, the social base of prostitution, the motivation, and the actual moral attitude toward it have changed considerably since the 1920's. At that time many women were driven to a life of vice by hunger and poverty (of course, there were also the "elite" girls who served the Nepmen [New Economic Policy capitalists] and soviet officials). Most of the prostitutes were recruited from among people with a low level of education who had moved to the cities from rural areas. Now the social base is much broader. According to the results of a study by A.A. Gabiani, 73.8 percent of all prostitutes have at least a secondary education, and 7.1 percent have a partial or complete higher education. In terms of social status, the distribution is the following: 34 percent are officially categorized as workers, and 31.8 percent are employees. The prostitutes in Leningrad include the students of the city's secondary schools, vocational and technical institutes, *tekhnikums*, and *VUZ's*[9]. The "B-girls" are pushed into the embraces of their clients not by hunger, but by the thirst for wealth and the "good life." During the years of stagnation, just as during the period when capitalist social relations were established and began flourishing, prostitution was leavened by the yeast of venality and became an integral element and symbol of interrelations in the world of the "flunkies" and the *Mafiosi*, the "needy" and the landowners, the toadies and the "masters."

What is the correct strategy? There have been three main forms of policy on prostitution in history: prohibition (entailing bans), regulation (entailing registration, medical examinations, etc.), and abolition (entailing preventive and education work in the absence of bans and registration). Bans have been powerless in the struggle against prostitution. In principle, repression is ineffective if it is used to eliminate some kind of social phenomenon without eliminating its causes. It is true that prohibition and punishment are used widely in the struggle against some forms of social pathology, such as crime, because the society has still not found more effective ways of protecting itself. In the case of prostitution, homosexuality, alcohol abuse, and other "victimless crimes," however, repression is more likely to be a hindrance than a help. The insistence on the absolute restriction of the alcohol trade, for example, leads to mass moonshining, speculation, the use of surrogates, and substance addiction. The futility of "cavalry raids"

without painstaking work geared to the long range is also attested to by the international experience in the struggle against drug addiction[10]. Criminal-legal means (and prohibition in general) of combating homosexuality ceased to be effective long ago[11].

Prostitution will exist as long as commercial relations exist, and it cannot be eliminated by means of appeals and exhortations or by bans which only drive this phenomenon deeper underground and drive the price of the service up. This is attested to by an entire millennium of human experience. Only our amazing disregard for history, common sense, and science can explain our blind faith in the power of prohibitions, repression, and moralizing.

This certainly does not mean that I approve of prostitution. It is immoral and it should be morally condemned in the same way as any other form of venality, but the writer, scientist, journalist, or politician who prostitutes himself is just as morally reprehensible and contemptible as the streetwalker. Should the sale of the body be prosecuted more vigorously than the sale of the soul (or intellect)? Do the advocates of repression not realize that it is illogical, or unfair at the very least, to demand the prosecution of the prostitute and ignore her partner (or client)? After all, in cases of bribery the person who offers the bribe (Article 174 of the RSFSR Criminal Code) and the person who takes the bribe (Article 173) are both held accountable. Both partners are also prosecuted in cases of pederasty (Article 121).

The policy of regulating prostitution is also unacceptable in the socialist society. Abolition—the lifting of bans—seems to be the best choice. Of course, this does not preclude criminal liability for the involvement of minors in acts of prostitution (Article 210) and for the maintenance of a house of prostitution (Article 226).

Prostitution will probably disappear, along with the incentive to get rich, when the consumer mentality is supplanted by higher values, when people develop a sense of pride, dignity, and self-esteem, and when any form of venality arouses feelings of disgust instead of a latent envy of a lucrative trade.

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'Blank Spaces': Imaginary Dialogue on Limits of Glasnost

18060004k Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE
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[Article by Svetozar Aleksandrovich Yefirov, lead scientific associate at the Sociology Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, doctor of philosophy, professor, and author of "Assault on the Future: Logic and the Futurology of the Extreme 'Left'" (1984), "'Leftist' Terrorism in the West: Past and Present" (1987, co-author), and other monographs and of several articles in our journal, including "Stereotypes of Criticism and Criticism of Stereotypes" (1988, No 1); words in italics as published]

[Text] Here is something that happened to me recently. I was asked to write an article on a topic of my own choice for a sociopolitical journal. I mentioned a few topics. The editor, an old friend of mine and a fairly broad-minded man, immediately said they would not be allowed. "Why not?" I asked. "You know that no one talks about these things yet," he replied, "because we need authorization from above. When we have it, you can write about these things." "But what about glasnost?" I insisted. "We are not supposed to have any more 'forbidden' topics!" "Do you really take all of this so seriously?" the editor asked in amazement. "Permissible limits are broader, but the limits still exist.... It is not even a matter of instructions from above," he went on to say. "I, thank God, have an 'internal censor,' and he will not allow this." "Then let me write you an article

about the social phenomenon of the 'internal censor,'" I suggested. "That is a wonderful idea," the editor laughed, "but are you certain that the censor you write about will authorize it?" "Then what if you and I discuss the social implications of the 'non-glasnost' of the past and the present limits of 'glasnost'?" I asked, making a final plea. "Maybe we can reach some kind of agreement." "All right, we can give it a try," the editor said, "but to keep us from wasting our time, let the 'internal censor' take part in our conversation. I am certain that he is not a stranger to you either."

What could I say? He was right, of course, and the three of us had a conversation. I must say that the 1988 model of the "internal censor" does not resemble the models of past years at all. He has a modern appearance, he is bold (within definite limits, of course), and he supports glasnost and perestroika within even broader limits than those allowed by the administration, but there is no question that he will not tolerate any kind of "irresponsibility" or "extremes." The writers' community, in his authoritative opinion, must never lose its "keen political sense" or its understanding of what is "needed" in each specific situation.

We proceeded to have a conversation, the author (A), the editor (E), and the "internal censor" (IC).

One of the "Forbidden Zones"

A: Sometimes the most interesting part of a discussion has nothing to do with what has been said, but with what is still not being said. Of course, the number of "blank spaces" is incomparably lower than before, but they still exist and they often pertain to the most fundamental matters. It is important to figure out the sociological implications of these silences.

E: "Blank spaces"—what an eloquent term. It is usually applied to history....

A: I think we should extend its meaning. Let us agree to use it in reference to any omission, not only in history but also in discussions of our life today. We will use it to refer to unsurmounted silences and unremoved taboos, whatever the subject. I always get an unpleasant feeling, a feeling of anxiety and regret, when I read an article and I can tell that the author wants to say something important but cannot or will not say it and has to resort to the "tried and tested" method of allusions, hints, and analogies.

E: The reasons are obvious. It is impossible to accomplish everything in an instant and to move immediately from "non-glasnost" to absolute glasnost. This kind of abrupt shift is too much of a shock for the public mind, for people who are not used to this and whose thinking is still largely governed by stereotypes that were decades in the making. Besides this, we can never forget the powerful forces opposing perestroika—bureaucratic and psychological forces. After all, they would use the

slightest excuse to say: "Just look at what all of this has led to now." And what about the guarantees that are being discussed at length today? Do you think there are any guarantees against the kind of "shift into reverse" that occurred so many times in the past? Just imagine what this would mean for the excessively bold authors and...editors. But let us state the exact purpose of this conversation instead.

A: I am interested in the "blank spaces" as a sociological phenomenon and in their social context, causes, and effects.

E: First we need facts. Let us start with them.

A: First I want to talk about something that seems odd but might actually be symptomatic instead. Until recently there were many more "blank spaces" or forbidden topics in foreign policy than in domestic life. We often hear about this now in debates and read about it in letters to editors and in articles. One of the participants in a debate in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA (29 June 1988), entitled "From the Balance of Power to the Balance of Interests," said: "We still use only official phrases when we write about foreign policy. When we do this, we are deceiving ourselves, our people, and the rest of the world." Problems in this sphere were discussed at the 19th party conference. Why did this happen? After all, foreign policy was just as subject to errors and distortions as domestic policy in the Stalinist era or the period of stagnation. A sociological interpretation is essential here.

E: There have been great advances in this sphere too. For example, now people can talk frankly about the grave consequences of the unfortunate references to the Social Democrats as "social fascists" and our main enemies. Objectively, Stalin helped Hitler rise to power when he did this....

A: And later, after the pact had been signed, he trusted him until the very start of the war in spite of all warnings. Was all of this, including the public and secret agreements, a coincidence? Or were there some kind of connecting links in this behavior, even if only unconscious ones?

IC: It was a coincidence. After all, socialism and fascism are diametrically opposed systems in principle.

A: Certainly in principle, but I am referring specifically to the Stalinist system. Can we disregard the similarity of the methods the two dictators used? Much is being said overseas about several common political and social features.... In any case, the similarity of authoritarian regimes of different types is an important sociopolitical issue which is still a "blank" to us....

IC: Do not cross the line....

A: All right, but why is such a complex, contradictory, and, in my opinion, largely—if not primarily—negative phenomenon as the Soviet- German pact still being interpreted in such simple terms?

E: The pact was something that had to be concluded to postpone the war.

A: But it seems to have had the opposite effect. Or what about the Soviet-Finnish war? It seems to me that it was an organic result of the Stalinist regime, and without an analysis and assessment of this war we cannot have a complete understanding of this period, much less analyze a sociopolitical element of Stalinism as integral as expansionism. I will not speak of the moral and international legal aspects of the matter, although a giant who declares war on a small neighbor who just won his independence provides ample grounds for this. Consider just the purely utilitarian aspect: Finland's position might have been completely different in 1941. It is possible that it might even have remained neutral.

E: Hardly. Mannerheim was extremely intransigent....

A: I suppose so, but why should these matters not be discussed openly? By specialists! The younger generation knows almost nothing about this episode in our history, which might also have led to Germany's invasion of the USSR. After all, the Germans could see that we were unprepared to fight a modern war. I must say again that I am not concerned now with foreign policy issues as such. The sociological implications of these silences are important to us. It is from this vantage point that all of the aspects of the history of our relations with neighboring countries will sooner or later be examined. I think that an unbiased examination of all of the related international-legal, moral, political, and social issues would not make our actions look bad in the eyes of the world public. In fact, it would probably have the opposite effect. After all, there are differences of opinion on these matters even within the international communist movement. What about Afghanistan? There have been admissions that our actions were wrong, but has anyone questioned their ethical basis and their actual, rather than ritual, international-legal aspect? We can never overestimate the importance of the free and open discussion of such matters as far as the correction of mistakes and the prevention of mistakes in the future are concerned. Remember the role protests and debates played at the time of the Vietnam War. If the era of glasnost had begun earlier, the necessary decisions might have been made much earlier.

E: Let us move on to domestic affairs. This will be a more relevant topic over the long range and it is also a more important topic today.

The Sociopolitical Structure

A: It seems to me that there are two main issues here: the actual social structure and the political structure.

E: Both have recently been debated extensively. Let us consider the first of these. Academician Zaslavskaya has repeatedly spoken of the need to present a realistic description of the social structure of Soviet society. Besides this, there were the articles by Nuykin, Andreyev, and others.

A: It is true that this issue is ceasing to be a "blank space," but the process is not complete yet. All of these writers have neglected to draw the main conclusion and to discuss many details. For decades we had the oversimplified Stalinist model of the social structure which disregarded its evolution, dynamics, and complexity. There was endless talk about increasing social homogeneity and about the convergence of the working class, peasantry, and intelligentsia.

E: But were these processes not taking place?

A: They were, but sometimes it would have been better if they had not. Besides this, there were other processes that were not discussed at all. Other strata and groups came into being and created more pronounced social differences. Many of the negative factors impeding perestroika today are connected with this. I do not know whether the bureaucracy can be called a ruling class, as it frequently is in Western literature and even at times in our literature in more cautious terms, but words are not the important thing. The criteria for delineating a class are extremely complicated.

E: If we refer back to the classic Leninist class-distinguishing feature, ownership of the means of production, we can answer this question quite simply: The means of production did not belong to the administrative bureaucracy.

A: To whom did they belong? To the people? To the laboring public? Some people say that they seem to have belonged to no one, but what if this was some kind of covert form of collective ownership by the bureaucracy? All of the discussions and theories about the laboring public as the owners of the means of production, of state and national property, and so forth, could have been a convenient way of concealing this.

E: Are you saying that you agree with M. Djilas and M. Voslenskii?

A: That is a difficult question, but in any case I believe that it would be useful to publish their works and the works of many other Sovietologists in our country....

IC: But they are rabid anti-Soviets. The talk about "ideological sabotage" sounds outdated today, but I still would not call this "useful."

A: A knowledge of the views of ideological opponents is far from useless. Works by some Sovietologists are now being published in our press. This is a wonderful beginning, but most of Sovietology is still a "blank" and is

either ignored or categorically denied. In my opinion this is only an indication of a lack of political sophistication and democratic standards and perhaps even a slight "inferiority complex." Many valuable observations and recommendations can be found in works by Western researchers. The views of an outsider, even an unfriendly one, should not be ignored. Returning to our topic, I must say that it would probably be better not to speak of a class, but of a ruling social group which accumulated colossal economic and political power with considerable assistance—and this was probably the deciding factor—from such leaders as Stalin and Brezhnev, occupied a dominant position in the society, stood above the law, and acquired a multitude of privileges.

E: A different point of view with regard to the privileges was expressed at the 19th party conference.

A: Various opinions were expressed there.... The hypersensitive reaction of the group I am referring to, however, tells us a great deal....

E: But could this group have been described as dominant in, for instance, Stalin's time, when it had no power to make decisions, was one of the main targets of repression, and suffered tremendous losses?

A: This does not change anything. When Stalin set up the bureaucratic hierarchy and then strengthened it and used it as a power base, he, like all other dictators, did not want it, or any other group, to acquire too much power and influence. Nothing must threaten the absolutist regime. This is why he turned various groups against one another, one segment of the bureaucracy against the other, and security agencies against everyone without exception and against themselves. There was a pervasive atmosphere of common dread and chaos and a feeling of apocalyptic doom. The enigmatic and almost mystical figure of the charismatic ruler towered above everyone and everything else and seemed to be the only just, merciful, and wise person in the surrounding bacchanalia of violence he had fomented. Remember Ivan the Terrible. The institution of the oprichnina did not mean that the boyars had ceased to be the dominant group but was only designed to reduce their influence so that they would not be able to oppose the state or challenge its absolute authority.

E: In my opinion, the bureaucracy should be called an administrative group, and not a social group.

A: Let us clarify this: I am not speaking of the bureaucracy in general, but of the dominant elite. This is a fairly amorphous group without any distinct outlines. Elite groups from other, non-administrative spheres—trade unions, the military, science, technology, literature and the arts, etc.—are adjacent to this group, and some of their members belong to this group as well. On the other hand, it cannot be regarded as a purely functional group. This is a social group in the full sense of the term, a group with strong ties, established standards and beliefs, and a

low level of social mobility. Of course, this also means that it is distinguished by constant conflicts. If, on the other hand, we are speaking of the entire administrative system—i.e., the 18 million about which so much is being written today—we have to consider the arguments presented in the article by L. Gudkov, Yu. Levada et al in *KOMMUNIST* (1988, No 12). The authors object to the definition of the bureaucracy as a class or stratum, saying that it is more like a vertical hierarchy or pyramid. Authority, responsibility, and privileges, according to the authors of the article, are not distributed evenly among its different levels. There are pronounced disparities in the status, capabilities, and advantages of different levels and strata. This is true, of course, if we are speaking of the entire pyramid, but I am referring only to its top levels. Incidentally, their argument is not completely indisputable either. Many other classes, social strata, and social groups also have a "vertical" structure in addition to a "horizontal" one. Could we say, for example, that different strata of the bourgeoisie are not distinguished by significant differences in status, capabilities, and privileges? Are these distributed evenly?

I want to stress that I certainly am not saying that the position of the group we are discussing has not undergone serious changes since the days of Stalin and Brezhnev. Its monopoly has become tenuous and its composition has become more mobile and variable. The system of privileges, the caste syndrome, the inheritance of status, the "exclusivity" of the group, the very principle of the titled position, and other such matters are constantly being criticized in the press, but we still have a long way to go before the situation has changed fundamentally.

E: Your statements seem controversial to me. Other authors—Andreyev, for example—feel that middle management is the main barrier on the road to perestroika. They call it a class.

A: All of this only proves how complicated and ambiguous the situation is. Of course, it is not our job to analyze the anatomy and dynamics of these strata now. This can only be done in special works, which we hope will be published soon. Some have already been published. I only want to say that the actual social structure of our society is still largely a "blank."

E: But we cannot say this about the political structure. Its reform was advocated at the 19th party conference. The functions of party and soviet organs are to be separated. The former will perform the functions of general political and ideological leadership and the party will be democratized and will be completely subject to constitutional and legal provisions.

A: But can this be done in a one-party system? This is just a question and nothing more, but it is a question which came up during televised debates and in the debates at the 19th party conference....

IC: Stop it! This discussion is supposed to be conducted within the framework of socialist principles and it is not supposed to undermine the foundations of socialism.

A: We still think of this as an assault on the foundations of socialism! Why such an extreme reaction? Maybe this is another case of social interests. They say that the situation took shape historically, but must we regard all of the results of history as something positive? Does this not call for some adjustments, or at least discussion?

E: You seem to be unaware of the dangers of anarchy, mob rule, and the subversion of the strength and stability of the socialist system.

A: But there are several political parties in a number of socialist countries, and nothing terrible has happened! The experience of these countries and of social democratic countries indicates that the stability and effectiveness of social systems do not suffer at all.

IC: This is a waste of time. Not one press organ would print this, in spite of all your stipulations.

A: But the discussions in hallways will continue! Is this really better? After all, there are no forbidden topics!

E: What you suggest is unconstitutional.

A: I am not suggesting anything and I do not even intend to suggest anything. I am simply wondering why this matter is not open to discussion. One of the resolutions of the 19th party conference refers to the right "to the free and open discussion of any issue of social significance." Therefore, I want to ask again whether it will be possible to solve several other problems without addressing the problem I mentioned. This is a matter of creating a legal state and of guaranteeing that supreme party and state agencies are not above the law. It is a matter of putting an end to absolute and excessive power. It is a matter of creating a situation in which legislative, executive, and judicial organs will cease to be largely formal entities and in which the old principle of the separation of powers, formulated by Montesquieu, can be implemented. Much is being said about this principle today, but for a long time it was seen in our country as an attribute of bourgeois democracy. It has accumulated centuries of experience, however, and took shape as an effective, although naturally not always adequate, means of guarding against arbitrary rule, tyranny, and the establishment of repressive regimes. Until this principle has been implemented, how can we create reliable mechanisms and barriers to guard against the recurrence of this kind of system? This, after all, is one of the main issues. Ideally, socialist democracy should be a qualitatively new level of democracy, the highest level, but there is a long road between what should be and what is. This road cannot be traveled by those who disregard the fundamentals and principles of legality, humanitarianism, and human rights, which took shape over centuries. All forms of democracy are founded on them, and

no building can be erected without a foundation. What do we mean when we say we have to learn democracy? In addition to everything else, this certainly means the restoration of the foundation. Of course, there should not be any indiscriminate borrowing, but we must admit that any democracy has general human elements of common significance in addition to its class elements and that these general human elements represent mechanisms which took shape over thousands of years and the inalienable values of human civilization. All of this was disregarded too often and for too long, and this led to many tragedies.

E: Let us change the subject and wait until the taboo has been lifted.

A: I just want to expand on something we mentioned in passing. It seems to me that the many years of work by Western researchers should not be ignored in our efforts to fill in the "blanks." I repeat, along with tendentious publications there are serious works on aspects of our past and present which were concealed for a long time. For years people in the West were doing what we should have been doing, and sometimes they did it so well that it does not warrant vulgar "upbraiding." And what about our attitude toward the foreign press! Until recently the publications available to the general public were almost exclusively communist newspapers and magazines or something close to them. In Western countries, however, the public has usually had no trouble getting hold of our publications. Of course, the founders of our state had no way of foreseeing this situation: They assumed that our words would seem frightening to them, but look what happened. The way in which speeches by some foreign politicians are reported is indicative in this respect. Here is the usual format. The headline is followed by our point of view and our opinion of what was said. At best, two or three excerpts from the speech itself are cited if they seem "advantageous." The saddest thing is that we have grown accustomed to this kind of "information" and regard it as "natural" and the state of affairs as normal.

E: I have to agree with much of what you said, but you are still overlooking the importance of dynamics: How things were and how things are today. I am afraid that this position poses an objective threat to the process of change. Some people are making a tremendous effort, but others look down on them and say that everything is bad. Your view is too onesided, although "blessed onesidedness" might be useful in some cases. Anyway, let us move on to the main thing—to the social nature, causes, and effects of the "blank spaces."

Who Benefits?

A: The social nature and causes of this phenomenon cannot be understood outside the historical context. Although it has acquired colossal and probably even unprecedented dimensions in our country, it is far from new in itself.

E: That is certainly true. Silences, prohibitions, and omissions of all types—historical, political, social, religious, cultural, literary, artistic, and domestic—have existed for thousands of years and have been reborn in forms of varying rigidity and on varying—sometimes colossal—scales.

A: This alone proves that there are some kind of universal causes and not merely our own specific circumstances.

E: We are no exception to the rule. All of this is repeated endlessly. Knowledge has been banned and is being banned by various social, intellectual, and religious movements and by various dictatorial regimes. The Christian Inquisition, the notorious "Index of Forbidden Books," and the harsh restrictions the Islamic fundamentalists are imposing even today immediately come to mind. Ideological repression and all sorts of taboos flourish in large sociopolitical movements and in countries where some kind of overtly unprincipled military junta has seized power.

A: This means that we must look for the causes in deep-seated factors which are constantly reproduced, and not in voluntarism or in someone's evil will, frivolous whims, or intolerance. I would say that the "blanks," as one of the essential elements of ideological diktat, come into being either because of a fanatical, sometimes completely unselfish, and even ascetic certainty that one is in possession of the highest truth, the absolute and only truth, the only possible way of "doing good" for one's community, nation, or all humanity, or because of overtly selfish interests. Furthermore, one does not exclude the other, and most of the existing forms are hybrids. The idealism and selfless faith of the founders and supporters of the latest social or ideological "absolute" usually disappear gradually and are replaced by pure interest. The generation of apostles and founding fathers is succeeded by generations of pragmatists and cynics. Sometimes they coexist, but the cynics usually have the advantage in any struggle between them, and this advantage gradually grows stronger as faith disappears. While they are objectively contributing to the subversion of the original dogmas, however, they are more concerned than anyone else about their "immutability" and the preservation of the sacred traditional mythology in the public mind.

E: This kind of abstract perspective makes it possible to find parallels between socialism and systems so far removed from it as to be its opposite.

A: Only if we are speaking of deformed socialism, and not genuine socialism. In some systems blind fanaticism and a hunger for power and privilege play the dominant role. All of this requires, in addition to everything else, the concealment or distortion of the truth and the prohibition or restriction of access to sources and diverging opinions which are regarded as hostile. Knowledge is a powerful force and it is the basis of authority

and control, but as Orwell pointed out, a lack of knowledge or distorted knowledge is also a powerful force when it contributes to self-deception or the deception of others and when it becomes an instrument of mind control and the manipulation of public thinking. Only those, or mainly those, who have voluntarily rejected knowledge or have been isolated from information and from knowledge by force can be turned into submissive tools and be forced to believe unconditionally and act fanatically.

E: There is another old saying that an increase in knowledge is an increase in grief.

A: And not only grief, but also indecision and doubts. These are dangerous because they weaken the person, strip him of his optimism and enthusiasm, and erode his faith. Under the pressure of knowledge and information, the carefully constructed artificial world begins to crack and crumble, and the place of the robot and soldier is taken by a *man*, a dangerous man because he might question the absolute nature of the "only" truth, the "infallibility of the messiah," and the validity of the "cause."

E: We should discuss this matter in specific terms. First we should ask the old question: Who benefits? Who has an interest in the "blank spaces," in a lack of knowledge and information, in silences and omissions, in the misrepresentation of the past and the present, and in the exclusion of many names, ideas, events, books, paintings, and even music from political, social, and cultural tradition? From our conversation it is easy to see what you think about this.

A: It is true that the answer sounds quite banal by present standards. It is the bureaucracy, of course. The phenomenon of "blank spaces" benefits the ruling bureaucratic group because it helps to legitimize and "sanctify" its dominant position by eliminating and concealing anything precluding or questioning this dominion. It is also of benefit because it aids in the cultivation of fanaticism, "one-dimensional" thinking, and unthinking enthusiasm and optimism in the public mind and turns it into a convenient object for manipulation. It is in this sense that the lack of knowledge is a powerful force. The energy of the masses can be directed to attain positive objectives, but in this way it can also be channeled into fantastic and utopian, and sometimes even disastrous, projects. It can be directed, for example, into the channel of paranoid delusions of persecution and can be used against "enemies of the people" or the exaggerated sinister intrigues of external enemies.

E: But there was not much need for exaggeration here....

A: The Stalin regime was distinguished by a Manichaean view of the world, which was divided into absolute light and absolute darkness, absolute good and absolute evil. Anything which was outside the system and did not support it was evil and was part of an absolutely hostile

outside world. This was the reason for the decades of undifferentiated criticism of the West and undifferentiated denial of any criticism of us as "conspiracy," "slander," "sabotage," etc.

E: World history was distorted along with Russian history for the benefit of selfish interests. For decades it was subjected to arbitrary and sometimes absolutely inconceivable distortion and misrepresentation by administrative decree. Some people were turned to icons while others were just as undeservedly portrayed as "fiends from hell." Some events and processes were concealed and others were transformed beyond recognition, and also by illegally obscuring some aspects and exaggerating others. Then the entire picture would suddenly change, and sometimes into its opposite.

A: It was an incredible situation, similar to the one depicted in Orwell's classic novel. Remember how history was subjected to genuine terrorism there. In the country Orwell described, which was something like the "ideal" totalitarian dictatorship, the past was constantly reassessed and revised. And this was not confined to silence or omissions. "Blank spaces" were obviously not enough. Fictitious events, people, words, and actions were substituted for the deletions. History was revised on the orders of the leadership by many people who were engaged specifically in deleting passages from old newspapers and books and adding new ones. This is how action was taken on the basic slogan which is now being cited so often in our country and which is of tremendous significance in an understanding of the nature of the "blanks": "Whoever controls the past controls the future; whoever controls the present controls the past."

E: I think you might be going too far. Was there anything like this in our history? Or is this another case in which the "ideal" is inapplicable to reality?

A: The matter never went as far as deletions and additions. The newspapers and books were simply taken out of circulation. Is this the same thing or not? And what about what you yourself were just saying? Something always disappeared when new editions of history books and textbooks were published, and sometimes the exact opposite was substituted. Just compare the different editions of "Istoriya Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny" [History of the Great Patriotic War]. And what about the changing opinions of tsarist Russia's aggressive policy? When I went to school, for example, Shamil was called a hero and we were expected to learn this fact.

E: Stop it. History has always presented a clear-cut interpretation of Russia's annexation of small nationalities.

A: Can expansion be assessed in simple terms?

IC: Drop this subject. You are constantly digressing.

A: Agreed. We were talking about the causes of the phenomenon in question. The preservation of "monolithic" unity, uniformity, and "social submission" required an unwavering belief in the infallibility of policy, especially foreign policy, because it traditionally served as the "safety valve" for public dissatisfaction. The mechanism for "redirecting" dissatisfaction against real and imaginary enemies has been analyzed repeatedly. In particular, S. Freud regarded it as one of the main sociopsychological mechanisms for the suppression of subordinates and for the perpetuation of their submissive state. The cultivation of a "narcissistic" love for one's own system or country and one's national and cultural traditions in contrast to other countries, societies, cultures, and minorities and the redirection of hatred of the dominant minority against other nationalities were regarded by Freud as means of domination and of achieving an "internal consensus." According to Freud, the exaggeration of the virtues of one's own system and own culture and the accompanying contempt for people outside this system and culture provided illusory compensation for the misery of one's own life and for exploitation, suppression, and repression.

E: What does Freud have to do with it? These things are self-evident! This phenomenon was analyzed in even greater depth by, for instance, the founders of Marxism.

A: But everyone knows that, while few people know that Freud was no stranger to "class analysis" either.... Therefore, the phenomenon of "blank spaces" is due largely to the social interests of the ruling bureaucratic group, which always strives to maintain its sociopolitical status. The creation of "blank spaces" by decree is nothing other than the removal of everything undermining this group's monopoly status and its right to control decision-making in all spheres, or questioning its exclusive rights and privileges, from history, politics, and social life by force. What we are dealing with, therefore, is a typical "class phenomenon" with all of the ensuing consequences. As far back as I can remember, there has been a struggle against bureaucracy and bureaucratism, but it has never produced any results! Is it possible that someone is benefiting from this? Is it possible that some kind of serious social interests are at stake here? Genuine struggle was constantly replaced by the semblance of struggle, formal and half-hearted measures, and verbal warfare, although the latter was of the most ferocious variety. It is clear that this warfare served as an excellent "lightning rod." The bureaucracy was assailed by thunder and lightning and it did not object. In fact, it was more likely to encourage this. Everything was dissected and analyzed, with the exception of its deep-seated social nature. This was inviolable. The bureaucracy turned itself into a "blank space."

E: This is purely schematic, and I would even call it vulgar. Vulgar sociology, to be precise. If we accept what you said about the administrative bureaucracy, does this really mean that you think that each prohibition, silence, omission, and distortion serves "class interests" directly?

A: Of course not. There was a certain atmosphere, and the spirit of overcautiousness and the bureaucrats imbued with this spirit compounded its effects: For each "object of prohibition" that was genuinely "dangerous," there were ten, a hundred, or a thousand completely harmless "objects."

E: But what about personality traits? Are you not tending to ignore them?

A: Probably. Quite often this was all a matter of the frivolous whims and wretched outlook and taste of the people who issued orders and the people who carried them out. The bureaucracy has never been distinguished by subtle reasoning, profound thinking, or "excessive" intellectual and moral sophistication. By conducting policy with an "iron hand" and never doubting for a minute that it had the right and even the obligation to teach subordinates and tell the masses "how they should live," what they should know and not know, and what they should love and hate, the bureaucracy formed a distorted and warped ideological outlook in which the gaping "blanks" were far from the worst feature. Narrow-mindedness, blandness, mediocre tastes, the habit of using cliches and stereotypes, and the denunciation of ingenuity and talent became the norm, although the direct opposite was naturally declared to be the norm. Everything was seen in a double light in this amazing phantasmagoria: Revolutionary slogans and appeals for inquiry, criticism, innovation, and bold thinking were obscured by a compulsory routine, narrow-minded restrictions, sordid inclinations, intolerance for everything new, and the authoritarian cultivation of conservatism. Prohibitions were frequently irrational and inexplicable, but the very existence of the spirit of prohibition and the related excessive caution (it is better to prohibit ten harmless things than to allow one seditious one) were certainly the result of social interests and fears.

Results

E: Well then, it is obvious what you think about the causes and sources of the "blank spaces," and also about the results: the unrestricted domination and manipulation of the masses on one side and "social submission," the habit of following orders unconditionally, and fanaticism on the other.

A: The "blank spaces" are only one of the many elements of the ideological training reinforced by fear and the inertia of fear, and they are far from the most important element. Their results are not that clear-cut. One of the main results is the development of specific personality types, which are, incidentally, prevalent not only "at the bottom" but also "at the top." The same Freud made the extremely accurate observation that prohibitions and restrictions intended for the "lower classes" often become imperative for the "upper classes" as well. As a result of this, ruling groups have had to make use of many of their privileges in secret.

E: Exactly what types are these?

A: In particular, they include the ones which have probably been researched most extensively and have been labeled the "one-dimensional man," the "authoritarian personality," etc.

E: Are you using the terminology of Adorno and Marcuse?

A: The theorists of the "New Left" have frequently been subjected to devastating criticism in our literature, but the works of these theorists contain much that is valuable and valid....

E: But are they applicable to the socialist society?

A: They are applicable in many respects to deformed socialism. Take a look at the personality types I mentioned. Their ability to take a discerning look at existing reality, at the system, and at propaganda cliches has atrophied, they are devoid of originality, they idealize and idolize power, and they are distinguished by universal conformity and conservatism. Their lack of valid points of reference in social criticism causes them to suffer from an exaggerated critical sense of everything outside the bounds of the mores and beliefs with which they were raised. They see the outside world exclusively in a sinister light and see their own situation, however difficult it might be, as the "natural" way of living, the only possible and desirable one, or even as the "highest" order, the best of all possible worlds. Their social and national narcissism is combined with aggression and an inclination to follow the leader in teaching everyone how to do everything. The latter is an organic consequence of their dogmatic "absolutism" and "iron-clad" belief that they are in possession of the only truth, the highest and final truth. After all, if a person has finally been able to answer the sacramental question "what is truth," if he knows the only way to achieve universal happiness, and if he has a unique recipe for the "salvation" of mankind, he has an understandable desire to convert people, most of whom "do not understand," to his own faith. To convert them at any cost, either voluntarily or by force! Others have their own "truths," which they often hold just as sacred, but from the standpoint of the only truth he regards as an axiom, these truths are false, and not only false but also harmful and perhaps even lethal for the nation or for all humanity. This is why they must be forced to accept this "only" truth. After all, it is for their own good! This leads unavoidably to the imperative—anything contributing to the success of the "cause" is good and moral, and any means are permissible in the struggle for the "common good." The kind of individual I am referring to has a "confined" type of personality. For him, nothing exists but the myth which seems to be the only truth and obscures everything else on earth. It is impossible to convince him of anything contradicting his basic dogma. A world conforming to a universal pattern makes him whole and gives him strength, and it is this strength that is one of the main obstacles in the way of perestroika today. These people, and there are still so many of them, have not understood anything and have not learned anything. They are incapable of understanding and learning because they

have already been "taught" once and forever. When their ideological fanaticism collapses, their journey, as we have already said, frequently takes them not to enlightenment, but to a form of cynicism as destructive as their original fanaticism.

E: It seems to me that you are constantly losing sight of dialectics and of the specific nature of truth. Your approach should be dialectical.

A: The terms "dialectics" and "dialectical approach" have been used too often as a cover for demagoguery, "double-talk," and a lack of principle and have served to justify the unjustifiable. They helped in the cultivation of the "blank spaces" and the abrupt shifts in approaches and positions we discussed earlier. For unprincipled rulers, bureaucrats, and obsequious "theorists," dialectics and the idea of the specific nature of truth essentially served as convenient synonyms for the old adage that laws can be bent to fit any purpose. Why, in fact, should the unvarnished truth be approached only in stages? What if the channel is suddenly blocked off when we are only halfway there? In my opinion, all concealment should be renounced without delay and without any profound stipulations.

E: You are forcing an open door! The process is in full swing. Just remember the debates at the 19th party conference and read some newspapers and magazines. Anyway, some concealment will always be necessary.

A: But who will be concealing things from whom? Are you presupposing the eternal existence of an elite ruling group possessing all information and doling out the truth in small doses? And you are talking about "necessary" concealment (and, incidentally, who is to decide when it is "necessary"?), but how many omissions are not "necessary"? Do you think there are no "blank spaces" in our discussion of "blank spaces"? There are more than enough. And I think that they are not "necessary" at all.

E: Give me an example.

A: This is not so easy to do, especially in the presence of our common friend.

IC: And both of you should only be grateful to me for this.

A: I will mention two things anyway. We are still inclined—because some of us want to and some of us have to—to idealize many events, individuals, ideas, and actions dating back to the beginning of the 1920's. There are hints of other points of view in fiction and in some academic works and discussions, but they are extremely timid and fragmentary.

The other thing is that although many years have gone by, do we not still feel responsible for the effects of Stalin's expansionism? This matter is still not open to discussion and a serious sociopolitical problem is still a blank space. It seems to me that the chauvinistic idea

that we can do anything is firmly ensconced in the public mind. Many terms and arguments are used to camouflage it and to give it a highly "noble" and "altruistic" appearance, but this does not change its essence.

IC: You are the one who is camouflaging your ideas and hiding behind diplomatic phrases, but it will not help!

A: I hope it will! Everything I have said has been an open secret for a long time. The astute reader will easily deduce what has been left unsaid. He may not know how to do everything, but he is skilled in this area, just as he is skilled in decoding diplomatic phrases, allusions, hints, and analogies. As for you, Internal Censor, it is my fondest wish never to meet you again in the form in which you were cultivated in us! You are certainly necessary, but there is a world of difference between the servile "internal censorship" to which we have grown so accustomed and the "internal censorship" of a free and truly responsible individual. In fact, if we do not get rid of you, we will never get rid of all the "blank spaces." Of course, this will also require much more. Exactly what? The radical transformation of social and political structures, an uncompromising and irrevocable acknowledgment of the impossibility of a monopoly on the truth, a healthy attitude toward criticism, whatever the source, and the truth—not ritual and not doled out in small doses, but the *whole* truth, the possibility of discussing any issue, even if this is contrary to official precepts and could threaten someone's interests and privileges. Finally, it is time to rid ourselves completely of the conformity and silences which have become part of our ego. It is time we became genuinely free people!

E: Fine rhetoric is certainly appealing, but it is also dangerous. Many of your ideas seem quite radical on the surface, but they are objectively dubious, if not worse.

IC: Relax, no one will allow them to be published.

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Size of Sample Group

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[Article by Andrey Aleksandrovich Davydov, junior scientific associate at the Public Opinion Research Center of the Sociology Institute, USSR Academy of Sciences, and author of the article "Can Social Harmony Be Measured?" in our journal (1988, No 5)]

[Text] When sample sociological studies are being planned, it is always necessary to decide how many people will be surveyed—i.e., to decide the size of the sample group. This is an extremely important decision because a sample group that is too large will require extra expenditures, and one that is too small will have an adverse effect on the quality of results.

The author's conversations with plant sociologists and sociologists from various scientific organizations indicate that the problem of substantiating the size of the sample group is a stumbling-block for many of them, in spite of the existence of significant quantities of specialized literature dealing with sampling techniques in general and the calculation of the proper size of the sample group in particular[1- 6]. There are several reasons. The first is the shortage of this literature in many cities in the USSR, the second is the lack of time for self-education, and the third is the panic aroused by any kind of mathematical formula because most sociologists have a background in the liberal arts. In this connection it would probably be useful to explain the strategy and tactics of substantiating the size of the sample group in this article, so that people in applied sociology can answer one of the most difficult questions connected with sample studies: "How big should the sample group be?"

There is no simple answer because the calculation procedure is a series of endless compromises between the desire for accurate results and the limited nature of resources, between the shortage of time and the shortage of information about the phenomenon to be studied, etc. In general, we could say that the procedure for calculating the size of the sample group is a science and an art, but it can be learned by anyone. To facilitate this learning, three calculation strategies will be examined in this article: the strategies of preliminary calculation, sequential calculation, and a combination of the two. Besides this, some factors influencing sample group size will be discussed (for example, the size of the total group, the variation in responses, assessment accuracy, the nature of the presumed distribution of responses, the research method, the processing procedure, etc.), and the tactics used in finding the correct method in various situations arising in applied sociological research will be explained.

Strategy of Preliminary Calculation of Sample Group Size

The choice of this strategy means that the size of the sample group will be calculated before the research is conducted. In the simplest case, we can make use of the experience accumulated by, for example, the Gallup Institute, which experimented for many years and is now most likely to use a sample group of around 1,500 people. In this connection, it is interesting that an analysis of the data bank of the Sociology Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences (for the 11th Five-Year Plan) testifies that the sample group in the average survey in our country also consists of 1,500 people[7]. Plant sociologists usually use much smaller groups of around 400-600 people. This approach to deciding the size of the sample group is only an approximate guide because it does not take the distinctive features of the survey into account.

Let us move on to the calculation of the size of the random sample group, which allows us to obtain more differentiated results. In this case it is necessary to determine the desired precision of evaluation, the degree of risk of an incorrect response, and the range of response variation. Traditionally, the precision of evaluation has been measured at 5 percent and the degree of risk is 0.95. In other words, if 60 percent of the respondents in a sample survey say they are satisfied with their jobs, the sociologist can say that the proportional number of satisfied people in the total group will range from 55 to 65 percent in 95 percent of all cases, while in 5 percent of the cases the percentage of satisfied people in the total group could be outside this range. If these results are used to disclose general trends, and this is their purpose in most cases, this degree of precision and risk are completely permissible, especially since the survey procedure often does not allow for more precise evaluation. For this reason, only these figures will be used in the rest of the discussion. When these figures are used in a survey calling for yes or no answers—i.e., dichotomous—the size of the sample group should be the following (see Table 1).

Table 1. Correlation of Sample Group Size with Size of Total Group*

Size of total group	500	1,000	2,000	3,000	4,000	5,000	10,000	100,000	Infinite
Size of sample group	222	286	333	350	360	370	385	398	400

* See [8].

The figures in Table 1 warn against a common mistake in applied sociological research. This is the tendency to base the size of the sample group on a fixed percentage of the total group—10 percent, for instance. The table illustrates, however, that 10 percent is too large in some cases and too small in others.

The table has another nuance: The size of the sample group is calculated for the maximum range of responses—50 to 50. This is done when there is no preliminary information about the evaluation range. If this information is available, then the sample group can be of the following size (see Table 2).

Table 2. Correlation of Sample Group Size with Dichotomous Response Distribution*

Response distribution, %	50:50	40:60	30:70	20:80	10:90
Size of sample group	384	369	323	246	139

* See [9].

Up to this point we have been discussing qualitative matters, but how should the size of the sample group be calculated for characteristics such as "age" and "wages"—i.e., quantitative ones? In this case the size of the sample group will be calculated with the aid of the

coefficient of variation (see Table 3), which indicates the percentage of the average deviation from the absolute mean deviation and allows for the comparison of any characteristics in terms of the degree of variation.

Table 3. Correlation of Sample Group Size with Coefficient of Variation*

Coefficient of variation, %	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	100	110	120
Size of sample group	15	61	138	246	384	553	753	984	1,245	1,537	1,860	2,213

* See [10].

Our experience indicates that when the importance of various working conditions—for example, relationships within the work crew, wages, etc.—is rated on a scale of 1 to 5 on the enterprise level, the coefficient of variation for different indicators can range from 27 percent to 62 percent, and when a 7-point scale was used in studies of an oblast in the RSFSR, it ranged from 78 to 113 percent. It is clear that the sample groups needed for different variables will differ in size considerably and could exceed the capabilities of the plant sociologist. In this case the number of points on the scale could be reduced for all variables or just for some with the maximum coefficient of variation, the variables with the highest coefficients could be left out of the study, or the wording of the question could be improved. Our observations have shown that the latter is often an extremely effective means of lowering the coefficient of variation in responses.

Because no one has ever proved that the 7-point scale is always preferable to the 5-point scale, we can use the maximum coefficient of variation recorded in our studies as a basis for saying that the sample group needed to gauge the significance of working conditions should consist of 591 respondents.

In applied sociological research there is the popular opinion that a larger sample group will produce more accurate results, and this leads to excessive increases in the number of respondents. Table 4, which was compiled with a view to the Gallup Institute's experience, illustrates the connection between the size of the sample group and the rate of accuracy in assessments. It indicates that accuracy increases as the size of the sample

group increases, but the increase is negligible past 600 respondents. Because we are satisfied with 5-percent accuracy, a sample group of 600 is acceptable.

Table 4. Correlation of Sample Group Size with Evaluation Precision*

Number of interviews	Evaluation precision, %
100	+/-11
200	+/-8
400	+/-6
600	+/-5
750	+/-4
1,000	+/-4
1,500	+/-3
4,000	+/-2

*See [11].

The reader might wonder why a random sample group of 400 people was originally called the maximum group with a view to the figures in Table 1, while the sample groups actually used consist of 591 or 600 respondents (Table 4). There is no contradiction here because the size of the sample group for Table 1 was calculated with the expectation of the normal distribution of responses. This, however, is not always the case. Table 5 presents some idea of the sharply diverging sizes of sample groups calculated with a view to normal distribution (central limit theorem) and otherwise (Chebyshev theorem).

Table 5. Correlation of Sample Group Size with Expectations of Response Distribution Law*

Coefficient of variation, %	Sample group size required by:	
	Central limit theorem	Chebyshev theorem
10	15	80
20	61	320
30	138	720
40	246	1,280
50	384	2,000
60	553	2,880
100	1,537	8,000

* See [12].

As we can see, when the distribution of responses deviates from the normal pattern, the sample group has to be 5.2 times as large. Therefore, the disparity between theory and practice is due to the fact that the distribution of opinions in a survey can differ slightly from the normal pattern, and the size of the sample group has to be calculated with a view to this fact. In this kind of situation the most effective way of reducing the size of the sample group consists in lowering the coefficient of variation.

The following mistake is frequently made when the size of the sample group is calculated in applied sociological research. After the sociologist has calculated the necessary size of the sample group as a whole in accordance with existing formulas, he goes on to divide the number proportionally among the different subdivisions of the group—for example, among shops, enterprises, rayons, cities, types of families, etc. Then he analyzes the differences between these subdivisions during the data processing phase. It would be more correct, however, to calculate the size of the sample group separately for each subdivision and then to add up the figures. For example, let us assume that a sociologist wants to learn the percentage of workers with a sense of proprietorship in production, and not only for the enterprise as a whole but also for three separate shops. Let us assume that the size of the sample groups for these shops is calculated with a view to the point scale, the number of workers, and the nature of the anticipated distribution of opinions and that the results indicate that 384 people have to be surveyed in the first shop, 222 in the second, and 600 in the third. Then the total sample group will consist of $384+222+600=1,206$ people.

If the plant sociologist has to survey a specific category of workers and knows only that 1 out of every 10 enterprise workers might belong to this category, he calculates the necessary size for this category—139 people, for example—and then multiplies the number by 10. By choosing 1,390 respondents at random, he can expect to find 139 people belonging to the category in question in line with sampling theory. When the size of the sample group

calculated in this manner is too large for the plant sociologist, he must either obtain the information he does not have about this category of workers or use other methods of selection.

When the size of a quota sample group is calculated in applied sociological research, figures are often arbitrarily set at 1,000 people because this is convenient for the calculation of quota rates. Any other round number, however, can be used just as successfully. A more sound approach is the one in which the size of the quota sample group is calculated in the same way as the random sample group, because, as E. Noel demonstrated, there are no significant differences in the evaluation accuracy of these two levels of sample research[13].

Another method of calculating the size of quota sample groups entails the use of the theory of small sample groups[6]. In essence, the approach consists of the following. If the study does not presuppose separate analyses of different groups, the number of possible responses is multiplied by 10 (the minimum statistically valid group size). For example, three variables can be studied: gender—two categories, age—two categories (under 30 and over 30), and job satisfaction—on a scale of 1 to 5. Then the necessary size of the sample group will be equivalent to $2 \times 2 \times 5 \times 10 = 200$ people. If the study does presuppose the analysis of each different group separately, the number of possible responses is multiplied by 25. Then the size of the sample group for the previous example would be $2 \times 2 \times 5 \times 25 = 500$ people. In other words, it is 2.5 times as large. It is clear that as the number of variables and the number of possible responses increase, the sample group calculated in this manner might become disastrously large. There is only one solution—a detailed analytical study of the problem to reduce the number of questions to be asked, in the hope that the most important of them will be revealed during the analysis of the results. If the study is conducted to check several hypotheses, the size of the sample group is calculated for each hypothesis separately, and if several figures are beyond possibility, the size of the group can be reduced by reducing the number of variables and possible responses.

In addition to the approaches listed above, there is the so-called analytical approach[14], which essentially consists in the following. The size of the sample group is calculated with a view to the limitations imposed by the formal requirements of the statistical methods of data analysis. For example, the use of the chi-square coefficient requires at least 10 observations in each cell of the table of contingency, while the satisfaction of Pearson's correlation coefficient, equivalent to 0.20 with probability of 0.95, requires at least 97.

When data is analyzed in an applied sociological study, this usually entails a comparison of the evaluations of different groups—for example, the evaluations of job satisfaction by men and women, etc. In this case, the size of the sample group can be calculated with the aid of the

significant proportional variation (see Table 6). For example, if the evaluations of the two groups to be compared are expected to differ only slightly, significant proportional variation will require an increase in the size of the groups to be compared—i.e., the size of the sample group.

Table 6. Correlation of Sample Group Size with Significant Proportional Variation*

Number of comparable groups	Significant proportional variation, %
50	20
100	14
150	11.5
200	10
300	8
500	6.3
1,000	4.5
5,000	2

* See [14].

The research technique to be employed is also taken into account when the size of the sample group is calculated. In the case of a longitudinal study (surveys of the same people at different times), for example, the sample group calculated according to formulas must be supplemented by a certain figure for the replacement of respondents who have dropped out of the study. It is clear that in this case the number of remaining respondents at the end of the study must be equivalent to the necessary size of the sample group.

The same is true of postal surveys, in which the number of questionnaires returned ranges from 20 to 40 percent when special incentives are not provided, and from 60 to 80 percent when they are [14]. In a poll of experts a sample group rarely consists of more than 30 people, and in a pilot study it usually consists of from 100 to 150 people.

Virtually any survey technique entails the adjustment of data to compensate for careless work by the interviewers, the failure of some people to respond, etc. These adjustments are made so that the distribution of characteristics in the sample group will not differ from the distribution in the total group. The "cut-off" technique is used for this purpose. In other words, the maximum correspondence of characteristics in the sample group and total group is achieved by reducing the size of the sample group [14]. For this reason, when the size of the sample group is calculated, the possible reduction of the group as a result of adjustments must be taken into account.

In this way, we calculate the required size of the sample group. Then, and only then, can we verify the correspondence of the figure to available resources. A common mistake in applied sociological research is the calculation of the size of the sample group on the basis of existing resources or, in an even worse case, the passive

acceptance of all the terms dictated by the client. This is fundamentally wrong for several reasons. In the first place, the calculation of sample group size allows the sociologist to delve more deeply into the essence of the object of study and the specific features of the research technique and gives him grounds to request additional resources or make the right decision on the reduction of the size of the group. If neither is possible, the work performed during the preliminary stage can aid in the planning of a different pattern of research. In the second place, sound calculations demonstrate the professionalism of the sociologist and force the client to treat him with greater respect.

Strategy of Sequential Calculation of Sample Group Size

We have already said that when the size of the sample group is being calculated, we must know the range of possible evaluations and some other parameters, but since these are usually unknown, we have to assume that they will reach the maximum. As a result, the sample group is often much larger than necessary. In cases involving extremely expensive or time-consuming interviews, the strategy of the sequential calculation of the size of the sample group can be recommended. In essence, in this method the size is not calculated in advance but will depend on the results of the research. In the simplest case the study is conducted with a sample group of around 100 people and then the necessary size is calculated on the basis of the data obtained with regard to the range of possible evaluations. If it turns out that this number of respondents is sufficient, the study is concluded. Otherwise, the necessary number of respondents is added to the original group.

If we want to study the relationship between two qualitative variables, such as the age of the respondent and his sense of proprietorship, with the aid of Cramer's rule, the survey can be continued up to the point at which there are at least 10 observations in each cell of the table of contingency, corresponding to the formal requirements of the use of chi-square statistics used for the calculation of the Cramer coefficient of contingency [5].

Now we will examine another way of employing the strategy of sequential calculation. When the number of respondents is increased, the responses obtained are compared to earlier responses and the survey comes to an end when the increase in respondents ceases to make any significant change in results. The degree of variation for the conclusion of the survey can be set arbitrarily at, for example, 1 percent, or with the aid of various statistical criteria. We will illustrate this method with an example from Gallup's experience. At the beginning of his career he experimented with sample groups of different sizes. In 1936 he asked Americans whether they wanted the law on the reconstruction of national industry to be reinstated. The results of the experiment are presented in Table 7. It reveals that the addition of 29,500 respondents to the first group of 500 people

produced a difference of less than 1 percent in the final results. Therefore, the survey could have come to an end after the first 500 respondents had been polled. This example proves that the use of the sequential strategy of sample group size calculation can considerably reduce the number of necessary observations in comparison with preliminary estimates.

Table 7. Correlation of Evaluation Range with Number of Respondents*

Number of respondents	% of respondents against reinstatement
500	54.9
1,000	53.9
5,000	55.4
10,000	55.4
30,000	55.5
;1;2* Calculated according to data in [11].	

The strategy of sequential calculation, however, is productive only when the researcher has a chance to make the necessary calculations while the survey is in progress—for example, with the aid of a computer during a telephone survey. In this case each interviewer feeds responses into his own personal computer. These data are then transmitted to the computer of the research supervisor and are processed. His computer then provides him with information not only about the response frequency for each question but also about the required size of the sample group.

Strategy of Combined Calculation of Sample Group Size

In spite of the obvious advantages of the strategy of sequential calculation, there is the danger that sample groups formed in this manner might be catastrophically large as a result, for example, of dissimilar sequences of observation, the uneven distribution of frequencies in the table of contingency, etc. In this case the combined approach is the most effective method. It is a synthesis of the preliminary and sequential strategies. After calculating sample group size in line with the preliminary strategy, we derive the maximum figures for sequential strategy or, in other words, the sample group size at which the survey based on sequential strategy can be concluded.

Therefore, we have examined the strategy and tactics of substantiating the size of the sample group. It is impossible to make specific recommendations for all cases. It is important to understand the reasoning behind the calculations and to use these as a guide for the organization of effective research.

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Sorokin on Bukharin

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ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 6, Nov-Dec 88
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[Reprint from EKONOMIST, No 3, 1922, of review by Pitirim Sorokin of book "Teoriya istoricheskogo materializma. Populyarnyy uchebnik marksistskoy sotsiologii" [Theory of Historical Materialism. Popular Textbook of Marxist Sociology] by N. Bukharin, Gos. izd., 1922, 383 pages; passages in boldface, italics as published]

[Text] The name of N.I. Bukharin, a prominent politician and statesman of the first years of Soviet rule and a Leninist old-guard Bolshevik, a name which incurred irreparable damage as a result of Stalin's repression in the 1930's, has been returned to the Soviet people. Today his ideological and theoretical legacy is the object of intense study by social scientists. Thoughts about general sociological theory, dialectical logic, and historical materialism occupy a prominent place in his works.

Bukharin's theoretical legacy was examined from an absolutely unexpected vantage point by the sociologists of the 1920's, particularly by prominent non-Marxist sociologist P. Sorokin in the early stage of his career. The review printed below (with the author's punctuation and spelling left unaltered) of N.I. Bukharin's book "Teoriya istoricheskogo materializma" is a reprint from EKONOMIST (1922, No 3, pp 143-148).

The scientific debates between such historical figures as P. Sorokin and N. Bukharin can teach us many things. They provide an answer to an extremely relevant question: How can the person who disagrees in principle with his opponent's ideological position actively object to it while observing the proprieties and keeping his own conclusions and judgments objective in the heat of argument? The socialist plurality of opinions, the bases of which are still being laid, has much in common with the practice of open scientific dialogue that was so widespread during the Leninist phase of the construction of socialism.

Although N. Bukharin's book is subtitled "A Popular Textbook," the contents of the work and the style of narration do not correspond fully to this title. In some places the narrative style is popular and even primitive; along with this, however, we encounter a multitude of quotations and references, and the translation of almost each quotation from a foreign source is accompanied by the foreign text, which is obviously inconsistent with the requirements of popular literature. It would be more accurate to call the book a "systematic exposition of the theory of historical materialism." Its main purpose is to give the devotees of the Marxist religion an integral philosophy of life. In line with this, the introduction and the first chapters deal with topics transcending the bounds of sociology, such as causality and teleology, determinism and indeterminism, materialism and idealism, etc. The discussion of sociology proper begins in

the second half of the third chapter and especially in the fourth chapter. These and subsequent chapters deal with the following topics: dynamism in history, the issue of society, and the balance between the latter and nature on one side and the balance between elements of society on the other; Chapter VII explains the workings of the processes by which the social balance is disrupted and restored and, in connection with this, the mechanics of revolution and the reproduction of social life in general. The last chapter is a study of classes and class struggle. This is a brief account of the contents of the book.

If I wanted to use the argumentative style of criticism characteristic of Citizen Bukharin and others like him and of which there is an overabundance in this book by Bukharin, it would be very easy to "prance" through it, making sarcastic comments about some sections and caustic remarks about isolated sentences. I prefer the "bourgeois-academic tone," however, and I will therefore forgo the "prancing" technique.

The first distinguishing feature of the book by Cit. Bukharin is its literacy (in contrast to the multitude of illiterate Marxist works). The second feature is the skillful consolidation of his material, which is presented concisely in just a few chapters. The third feature is his interesting interpretation of several matters which are frequently ignored by Marxists or discussed in quite primitive terms. The fourth is the overall consistency of most of his statements with the spirit, if not the letter, of Marxism, which has not kept him from updating several theorems and making them sound "bourgeois" and flexible in comparison with the orthodox dogma of Marxism.

All of this makes Cit. Bukharin's book interesting and valuable in some respects. After the works of G.V. Plekhanov, this book is one of the best books in the Russian language presenting a systematic discussion of Marxist sociology by a Marxist.

Of course, none of this can keep me from regarding many of the basic premises of Mr. Bukharin's sociology as unacceptable and untrue.

We will take a look at some of them.

1) Mr. Bukharin is wrong when he says that there is no "pure" social science; all forms of it are of a "class" nature and can be either "bourgeois" or "proletarian," and that "proletarian science is obviously on a higher level than bourgeois science" (pp 7-11).

There are two possibilities: Either we see scientific propositions and science, as a system of the latter, as statements of fact, which are of absolute value to anyone wishing to think in terms of facts (for example, $2 \times 2 = 4$; water is H_2O , etc.), and then the concept of a subjective "class science" is a contradiction in terms, a "wooden iron," and any field of study meaningful only to the "bourgeoisie" or only to the "proletariat" is not a field of

study and cannot be a science and it cannot even aspire to the title and status of a science: consequently, in this case the "proletarian" sociology of Cit. Bukharin, because it is valid only for the "proletariat," should be regarded as scientific nonsense. In other words, if this is Cit. Bukharin's definition of science, he should have been talking about proletarian or bourgeois superstition and nonsense, and not about proletarian and bourgeois science. He does not do this, however, but clutches onto the term "science." He has to pay for this in two ways: 1) with a contradiction in terms, and 2) with self-contradiction. The price is high and it "nullifies" his entire thesis.

If, on the other hand, he denies that universal validity is the main characteristic of scientific propositions, he and his thesis of "class science" are in an equally precarious position. Then he has to prove: 1) that the propositions of the exact sciences are not universally valid—and this would be quite difficult to do; 2) then he eliminates all of the distinctions between the truly objective and the false, between knowledge and superstition, and between science and religion. Then any proposition, even the statement that "devils have tails 10 inches long," becomes a scientific proposition merely because it seems subjectively valid to the believer or group of believers. It is equated with the laws of Newton or Einstein. In this case, of course, we could also speak of proletarian and bourgeois, "Orthodox" and "Buddhist," and "monarchic" and "communist" "sciences," but we could not talk about the differences between misrepresentation and the truth, superstition and knowledge, science and religion, etc. All distinctions would disappear. If Cit. Bukharin were to do this, it would be consistent. But, alas! He does not even display this kind of consistency. He draws sharp distinctions between science and religion and between truth and lies and makes every effort to clear all of the biases out of people's minds and fill them with facts. Cit. Bukharin's inconsistency is certainly not a scientific advantage since "proletarian science" still has not repealed the laws of logic.

If Cit. Bukharin had said that what we know as the "social sciences" largely represent not a set of truly scientific propositions, but "beliefs," "superstitions," and "pseudo-scientific surrogates," I would agree with this, just as I would agree that these surrogates can be bourgeois or proletarian. But he says something else in the first place; this does not mean that these surrogates can be called "proletarian" or "bourgeois" science, and therefore they should be called proletarian or bourgeois nonsense or pseudo-science in the second place; and there is absolutely no reason to deny the existence of "pure science" in the third place.

Finally, even the actual examination of several premises and social sciences tells us that there are hypotheses and conclusions of common interest. Neither the bourgeois nor Cit. Bukharin is likely to dispute the accuracy of such opinions as Gramme's law or the law of supply and demand and the following statements: "The financial

status of the French peasantry and proletariat was extremely low in 1788 and 1789"; "Louis XVI was executed"; "Napoleon lost the Battle of Waterloo"; "When shortages cause more severe hunger in a country, the mortality curve rises and labor productivity declines"; and so on and so forth. There are many such statements in the social sciences. Their existence proves that the "pure social science" is not only a possibility but also a fact. Only the person who goes along with the Hegelian attitude—"So much for the facts"—can deny this.

In short, Cit. Bukharin's thesis appears to be logical and factual nonsense from every standpoint. I will not dwell on Cit. Bukharin's scientific boasting, such as his comment that proletarian science is superior to bourgeois science specifically because we (Bukharin & Co.) were better at predicting recent events than the others. "Which bourgeois scientists foresaw the consequences of the worldwide scuffles? None of them. Which of them predicted the onset of revolution? None of them," he declares haughtily (p 10). But we could ask him why he forgot about all of the bourgeois economists who spoke of this or such people as Le Bon. We could also point out the fact that Marx' main predictions were wrong, that Engels himself admitted several errors (in the introduction to "The Class Struggle in France"), and that, if my memory does not deceive me, Cit. Bukharin's own predictions of an impending worldwide revolution, which he proclaimed so loudly in 1917 and 1918, do not seem to have come true either; I also do not remember him predicting the "New Economic Policy," etc. In his place, I would drop this argument: It cannot work in his favor anymore. 2) Cit. Bukharin then goes on to speak at length about the logical progression of social phenomena, about cause and effect, about determinism and indeterminism, and about materialism and idealism. I will not discuss any of this in detail because there is nothing new here and because Cit. Bukharin has an oversimplified—and quite primitive in some places—view of all of these topics, which were being analyzed before him and before "proletarian science"; he is simply paraphrasing the "bourgeois scholars"—the theorists of materialism, determinism, and logical progression. In this case "proletarian science" is simply repeating the statements of bourgeois scholars through the lips of Cit. Bukharin. This kind of borrowing obliges Cit. Bukharin not to "nag" so much at the "bourgeois rascals" or to act like the hero of Krylov's fable who destroyed the roots of the oak producing the acorns he ate. It appears, however, that Cit. Bukharin's "proletarian ethic" is of a different kind. Oh well, we can let it pass. Let him nag if it makes him happy.

I will point out a few of his mistakes here: a) His definition of the law of cause and effect as "a necessary, constant, and universally observed connection between phenomena" does not seem quite right. The word "necessary" is taken from metaphysics. There is no "necessity" in our experience. It would be more scientific to put it in the realm of "probability." The bourgeois Pearson, Mach, Pareto, and others are much more

scientific than Bukharin in this respect. This mistake leads the author to another: The concept of necessity leads to fatalism, because it is not a matter of degree. Fatalism, however, is something Cit. Bukharin does not want: He rejects it but he does not refute it. Moving the entire matter into the realm of probability would simplify the revelation process and eliminate all of these pseudo-problems. *b)* After correctly defining social phenomena as "the result of the intermeshing of individual wishes, feelings, and actions" (although it would have been better to speak of individual behavior, because "wishes" and "feelings" are the purest psychologism—P.S.), he goes on to make the incorrect statement that "social phenomena...are *contrary* to these wishes" (p 38). The wording he chooses for this opinion clearly contradicts his previous statement. To avoid this, the author should have added "to the wishes of many individuals in the society." *c)* N. Bukharin assumes a monopoly on materialistic thinking (I hope I will be forgiven for using this term). He cannot stand any kind of idealism, subjectivism, or psychologism. Imagine how surprised I was when I saw that his entire book was nothing but psychologism and subjectivism. "Ideas, wishes, feelings" and other psychological "spirits" act as tangible forces or agents in his theory. In short, Cit. Bukharin has not deviated much from "the most bourgeois form of psychologism" in sociology in this work. We must admit that he has not excelled in objectivism or trans-subjectivism: "Bourgeois scientists" (we have N.P. Pavlov and his school, Bekhterov to some degree, and Watson, Bentley, Kenagy, Meyer, Weiss, Perry, and other behaviorists in America) are far ahead of him in this respect and are "more materialistic," "more anti-psychological," and more objective. After something like this it is ridiculous to argue that bourgeois science is "idealistic" and proletarian science is "materialistic." It is obvious that the latter still has to catch up with its rival and "learn its time tables" in this area as well. *d)* Cit. Bukharin's interpretation of dynamism in history also arouses essentially formal objections. His interpretation suggests that the dynamic principle is "always changing" and that the "interrelationship of everything" is a characteristic feature of the "dialectical method." Any schoolboy, however, knows that these are general scientific principles. Cit. Bukharin is lagging behind many bourgeois scientists in this area as well and does not want to know anything about recurrences in history on the one hand, while on the other he portrays the entire historical process as some kind of parade drill in which societies move calmly from one stage to another until they have reached their permanent resting place—the "inevitable" communist paradise the author is preparing for them. This idea has to be called metaphysical. If there were no recurrences in history and if the non-recurrent historical process as a whole did not consist of recurring elements, we would have to give up the attempt to formulate the laws of social life, including the laws of development. The latter are possible only when there are repetitions in a series (for example: 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, etc.). Without this (for example: in the series 1, 7, 3, 25, 8, 42, etc.), no "tendencies" can be formulated. Just as the history of

the earth, or of the solar system, or of the organism might be non-recurrent as a whole but does not preclude the existence of recurring phenomena (for example, the sequence of day and night, the seasons of the year, the reciprocal relationship between volume and pressure, the formation of water from H₂O, etc.), there are many repeated phenomena in the historical process, and this is what makes the disclosure and formulation of natural tendencies possible. As for the "stages of development" and their laws, which allegedly lead to communism, this is an example of metaphysics of the most subjective type, which is characteristic in various forms of not only Cit. Bukharin but also many "bourgeois scholars." I think it is time to get rid of it. The multitude of "laws" of development, from Comte's "three stages" to Bukharin's stages, are sheer nonsense.

4) Now let us move on to the fundamentals of sociology. Cit. Bukharin's definition of *sociology* as the most general of the social sciences is a cliché and does not deserve any further discussion. His definition of *society* as "the broadest system of interaction, embracing all protracted interpersonal relationships" is also a cliché (pp 92, 95).

The tendency to talk in clichés does not keep him from being vague and indefinite (what exactly does he mean by the broadest system? How protracted is protracted? etc.).

What is correct here is that the author regards society as a *real* group and admits that it is distinguished by *interaction*, which was just recently avoided and even ridiculed by the Marxists. What is not correct is that he is looking outside several collective entities or groups for some kind of single "society," distinct from all the rest and not confined merely to its population. I criticized this idea in the second volume of my "Systems." It is either meaningless or leads to the replacement of "society in general" with some kind of specific group or even leads to the theory of self-sufficiency, which was developed in our country by K.M. Takhtarev, a man who is not exactly revered by Cit. Bukharin. These flaws are soon supplemented. In his discussion of the social relationship, Cit. Bukharin sees it in the labor connection, and in connection with this, unexpectedly limits his definition of society by adding the characteristic of the "labor relationship"—i.e., "people working for one another consciously or unconsciously" (pp 93-95). This addition is not something new either. It was developed by the bourgeois Novikov and simply confuses the matter. Can the relationship between two groups, in which one systematically plunders the other by military means, be called a labor connection? If so, then does this not turn the concept of the labor connection into a label applicable to all types of interaction and therefore into a meaningless term which adds nothing to the concept of interaction? If not, as we can see from the context (p 110), then interaction might not be based on labor, and this means that real groups come into being and exist—sometimes for quite a long time—outside this connection, and this means that the social relationship cannot

be reduced to this connection and that, consequently, this important but specific characteristic cannot be called a general characteristic of the society....

5) The most interesting and valuable chapters in Cit. Bukharin's book are the chapters discussing the balance between society and nature and between the elements of the former, and the chapter in which the scholar discusses the violation and restoration of the social balance. I cannot say that this is a new interpretation. We find a more detailed analysis of the same issues in a work by the "bourgeois" Pareto (*"Trattato di sociologia generale,"* vol II, chapter on "The Social Balance").

In spite of the fact that they are not new, these chapters in Bukharin's book can be of some use to the reader. It is true that the existence of the society is made possible primarily by the balance with nature as the social environment, and that the "process of metabolic exchange" between them must be constant for this reason. In this context the processes of production and reproduction are extremely important, but it is completely wrong to conclude that the prime mover of societal processes is the productive force (or technical equipment) of the society, and that it is the main "independent variable" while everything else is something derivative and secondary. In line with Marxist dogma, Cit. Bukharin constructs the following causative chain of "factors": 1) productive forces, 2) the economy or production relations, 3) social psychology, 4) the ideology and spiritual life of society in all of its different forms (pp 131-137, 262-265, 268 et passim). I would have no objections to this chain if it were to be used as a methodological technique and did not exclude other methods. It is quite permissible to view the "productive forces of society" as an "independent variable" and to look for functional or correlative connections in their variation and the variation of other types of social phenomena, but this kind of functional (rather than causative) analysis presupposes the equal effectiveness of other techniques, taking any category of social phenomena (the law, science, religion, etc.) or environmental phenomena as the "independent variable" and viewing other phenomena (including productive forces) as their "functions." The fact that different categories of social phenomena are connected not by a simple cause and effect relationship but by reciprocal interdependence (which Cit. Bukharin does not deny, because he acknowledges the "reciprocal effect" of "superstructures" on the "basis"—p 316 et passim), makes this kind of functional analysis the only correct form of discussion.

Cit. Bukharin, however, does not know enough about the difference between the functional (or reciprocal) and cause and effect (onesided) points of view and insists on the latter. Therefore, his series appears to be a series excluding all other points of view. He has to pay for this kind of outdated monism by committing mortal sins against logic and the facts. I will mention a few of them.

If productive forces are the only prime mover of social change, then what causes them to change? The answer is that "they change under the reciprocal effect of the basis

and all superstructures" (p 316). Is this not tantamount to a denial of the very thesis that this is the only prime mover? The resolution of this problem depends on the researcher: It depends on what he perceives as the "independent variable" in this case—phenomenon *a* (productive forces) or phenomenon *b* ("superstructures")—and what he will regard as "functions." In view of the fact that *b* has a reciprocal effect on *a*, I am equally justified in using it as an "argument" and in regarding the variation of *a* as a "function" when I study its variations. This is as clear as day.

Furthermore, Cit. Bukharin's mistaken cause and effect position also causes him to sin against logic. The essence of the cause and effect relationship is that it is onesided and that the cause and the effect cannot change places. If *a* is the cause of *b*, and *b* is the effect of *a*, the relationship cannot be reciprocal and *b* cannot become the cause of *a*, because in this case we would be dealing not with a cause and effect relationship but with a relationship of interdependence, a functional (and reciprocal) relationship with no cause and effect and with no primary factor and derivatives. Because Cit. Bukharin did not want to give up "monism" and the causative discussion but did not dare to deny the role of "superstructures," he had to seek a solution in...the reciprocal influence of the effect (superstructures) on the cause (productive forces). This means that he "nullifies" the entire causative idea by destroying the thesis that "productive forces" are the prime mover, contradicts himself, and misrepresents the cause and effect relationship. These are quite serious sins.

The matter is not confined to these sins alone.

Cit. Bukharin's thesis implies that all social changes are ultimately the function of a single independent variable—the state of productive forces (*a*). In short, "everything = $f(a)$." It does not take much thought to realize this theorem is absurd. The same *a* (state of productive forces) will not produce the same effect in the society of the Hottentots and Anglo-Saxons, in subtropical and polar countries, among lazy and industrious people, or in societies of criminals and law-abiding people. This means that a role is also played by race (*b*), by the nature of the environment (*c*), by the reflexes of people (*d*), etc. If this is the case, then it is obviously wrong to exclude *b*, or *c*, or *d*, and so forth, and the earlier formula has to be revised: "everything = $f(a, b, c, d, \dots)$ —in other words, historical phenomena must be regarded as the function of many independent variables—i.e., the same pluralism Cit. Bukharin dislikes so much. Furthermore, he also resorts to pluralism, but dogmatically renounces it because of his desire to be a "monist" and consequently contradicts himself over and over again. On page 113, for example, we read: "The state of nature (climate, topography, coastline, etc.) in a given place at a given time cannot fail to influence human society." Later (p 133 et passim) he experiences this himself when his dogma demands that he reduce everything to productive forces.

The doctrine of the social balance indicates that the existence of society requires not only the reproduction of the means of existence but also of people. Otherwise, the society will become extinct. This means that the demographic factor plays a role, but Cit. Bukharin's monism forces him to deny this role and (horrible dictu) to paraphrase Malthus' first law of population (p 135), saying that "the very possibility of population growth depends on the development of productive forces." Is this true? Yes, although the growth of productive forces does not always cause population growth. It seems, however, that the opposite is equally true: Population size and density and the speed of population growth determine the dynamics of productive forces. Is it not obvious that we are dealing here with a situation of interdependence? Consequently, we could take any one of these phenomena—either productive forces or the demographic factor—as the independent variable. It is probably time we learned these elementary facts.

Cit. Bukharin runs into the same problems with the racial factor (incidentally, he is completely wrong in proposing a racial theory dividing people into "historical" and "non-historical" nationalities and not citing a single serious work on the matter—pp 139-142). Here he is more decisive. He boldly denies racial characteristics and says that they change quite easily when the conditions of existence change. I am afraid that biologists and anthropologists (Sergi, Morselli, and the schools of Galton, Pearson, and others) will be amused by this boldness, but Cit. Bukharin can easily refute their criticism by simply calling them "bourgeois." We see the same thing later on, in discussions of other "factors." In one place he regards them as the effects of productive forces, in others he regards them as their causes, constantly transposing cause and effect.

6) The last chapter deals with classes. In view of the fact that the author's views are close to those of S.I. Solntsev, which I criticized in the second volume of "Sistemy sotsiologii" [Sociological Systems], I will not discuss this chapter at length. I will simply say that Cit. Bukharin does not deny other forms of social stratification in addition to classes and even goes so far as to acknowledge social groups, like a chess club, and their influence on the minds of their members (pp 247- 248).

I am afraid that his colleague, Citizen Reisner, will not appreciate this. I presented a general description of the main social groups other than classes in the second volume of my "Systems." It shocked Cit. Reisner so much that he wondered whether I had lost my mind.

I have come to the end of my remarks. They reveal the errors and weaknesses of the work under review. Cit. Bukharin's book is much more intelligent, interesting, and scientific than the usual works on these subjects by Russian Marxist communists. In comparison with the present state of "bourgeois sociology," however, it is

illogical, incorrect, and outdated in many respects. Nevertheless, I welcome it because it will give bourgeois researchers a closer look at the healthy nucleus of the sociological doctrine of Marxism.

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Lenin and Bukharin: Two Views of the Transitional Society

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[Article by Aelita Ivanovna Osadchaya, candidate of historical sciences and senior scientific associate at the CPSU Central Committee Institute of Marxism-Leninism. This is her first contribution to SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA]

[Text] Today, now that a search is under way for the means of renewing our society and now that the restoration of Lenin's concept of socialism is essential, we need a discerning reassessment of our past history. This is not simply a matter of learning lessons from our 70 years of experience. It is equally important to analyze the ideological and theoretical inquiries of social thinkers of the 1920's, because they had a direct effect on methods of socialist construction and, in the final analysis, on the choice made at the end of the 1920's and the beginning of the 1930's. To a considerable extent, they decided the fate of the Leninist heritage. Finally, the debates of that time produced many valuable ideas and approaches. Their consignment to oblivion on the grounds that they were branded anti-Marxist by Stalin and his associates cost our social scientists and our entire population a great deal. This mistake must be corrected.

The first object of public scrutiny was Nikolay Ivanovich Bukharin. Bukharin, one of the most prominent party and government officials and an outstanding thinker, did much to elaborate, publicize, and implement the plans for socialist construction. In addition, he had several conversations with Lenin on the most fundamental aspects of Marxist theory and the strategy and tactics of revolutionary reform. There is no question that a comparison of their views on the fundamental issues of socialism could also contribute much to a deeper understanding of Lenin's ideas and to a study of Bukharin's legacy. In addition to everything else, it would also be interesting because Bukharin was one of the men present at the birth of Soviet sociological thinking. We will briefly take a look at his sociological views, especially since they largely determined the scholar's point of view on socialism.

Bukharin as a Sociologist

At the end of 1921 N.I. Bukharin completed his main sociological work, "Teoriya istoricheskogo materializma. Populyarnyy uchebnik marksistskoy sotsiologii"

[The Theory of Historical Materialism. Popular Textbook of Marxist Sociology] (the book was reissued several times between 1922 and 1929). The article "Dealing with Problems in the Theory of Historical Materialism," published in VESTNIK SOTSIALISTICHESKOY AKADEMII (1923, No III), was directly related to the book. In these works the author systematized his views on the general theoretical aspects of sociology. Bukharin then wrote some lengthy works from the standpoint of the methodology developed in the first two works: "Mirovoye khozyaystvo i imperialism" [The World Economy and Imperialism] (1915, 1918) and "Ekonomika perekhodnogo perioda" [The Economy of the Transition Period] (1920). His report on "Theory and Practice from the Standpoint of Dialectical Materialism" (1932) is one of his later works which can be categorized as sociological.

There was a great need for Marxist works of this kind. The determination of trends in the country's social development in the complex situation of the transition to NEP [New Economic Policy (1921- 1936)] required a sociological approach. The situation was complicated by the sense of regression, of a move back to capitalism. NEP aroused in part of the bourgeois intelligentsia and in some proletarian strata.

V.I. Lenin attached tremendous significance to the analysis of the social prospects of Soviet power. In 1920, for example, his work "Materialism and Empirio-Criticism," in which he specifically criticized A.A. Bogdanov's vulgar sociology, was reissued. This and other works by Ilyich—"The State and Revolution," "Economics and Politics During the Era of Dictatorship by the Proletariat," and "The Infantile Disorder of Left-Wing Communism and the Petty Bourgeoisie"—defined the methodological principles of the investigation and definition of the essence and objectives of the society during the period of transition.

Bukharin's work "Teoriya istoricheskogo materializma," dealing with fundamental problems of social development, became famous immediately. It was studied in the original and in specially prepared summaries (see, for example, [9]). Several of his statements, however, were the target of pointed criticism. The author was accused of an oversimplified approach to the issue of social trends and the failure to examine them from the standpoint of dialectical materialism[10; 11]. Unfortunately, nothing was said about Bukharin's views on society as a social entity and its structure. At that time Marxist thinking was not ready for a detailed analysis of these matters. P. Sorokin analyzed this aspect of Bukharin's ideas—although, of course, from a non-Marxist standpoint—and displayed many of their weak points (see previous article).

Bukharin's book is noteworthy precisely because he regarded historical materialism as theoretical sociology. In passing, we should note that something that was already quite obvious in the 1920's is difficult for many

of today's social scientists to grasp because they are constantly drawing artificial distinctions between sociology and historical materialism.

Sociology, just as history, the author stressed, is a science revealing all of the complexity and integrity of social life. It "asks general questions: What is society? On what does its development or its collapse depend? What is the relationship between different types of social entities (the economy, the law, science, etc.)? What determines their development? What are the historical forms of society? What makes one succeed another? And so on and so forth.... Sociology is the most general (or abstract) of the social sciences. It is frequently introduced under other names: 'the philosophy of history,' 'the theory of the historical process,' and others.... Because sociology reveals the general laws governing human development, it serves as a method for history"[12, p 12]. There is no question that this definition of the subject matter of the science was a significant advance in Marxist sociology of the early 1920's. Nevertheless, it is impossible to ignore two significant flaws in the scientist's position. First, he never completely grasped the relationship between sociology and historical materialism because he substituted mechanistic structural connections for dialectical ones. Second, Bukharin did not attach the necessary significance to concrete research in the disclosure of social trends. In his opinion, it was theoretically possible to avoid these kinds of "trivia"[6, p 349], because they reflected the interests of only secondary class forces.

In general, it is clear that Bukharin was fascinated by "abstract logic"[13, p 54] and by attempts at the mechanistic dissection or division of an object to separate it into components, forms, etc. He denied all remarks to this effect: "The charge of a mechanistic approach is completely false," Bukharin answered his critics. "It is false because modern mechanics cannot be contrasted with dialectics"[14, p 117]. This flaw, however, was not connected with the use of some of the concepts of the natural sciences in the social sciences. It is more likely that this was a result of West European sociology's influence on Bukharin in Bogdanov's interpretation of this science. The following admission from his autobiography is interesting in this connection: "At that time (in 1909—Ed.) I had a certain heretical affection for the empirio-critics and read everything that came out in Russian on this topic"[13, pp 54-55]. His fascination with these ideas cost him something. For example, Bukharin employed the law of balance instead of the basic law of dialectics (the unity and struggle of opposites). The law of balance was supposed to explain the origins of the development of social systems and was worded as the following: "The constant clash of forces, the disintegration and growth of systems, the creation of new ones and their own progression—in other words, a process of the constant violation of the balance, its restoration on another basis, another violation, etc." Lenin once criticized this point of view, specifically saying that it would be more correct to speak of the need for some kind of proportion in the development of social

systems because the theory of balance "opens the door to philosophical vacillation, away from materialism and toward idealism"[6, pp 384-385].

How did Bukharin interpret the main sociological concepts, especially the concept of the human society or societal (social) system? In his opinion these concepts had to be examined in connection with the world economy. Marxist thinking took a greater interest in this topic at the beginning of the 20th century. The development of capitalism had changed the world situation dramatically: It had eliminated ethnic boundaries and had intensified integration processes in world economics, politics, and culture. This was a new stage in the development of world capitalism. All facets of the situation had to be analyzed to reveal its mechanisms and social implications.

What Is Imperialism?

Bukharin was fully aware of the changes in the sociopolitical situation and had already tried to answer the questions it raised in his book "Mirovoye khozyaystvo i imperialism." In his opinion the world economy had taken shape as a result of the pervasive activities of monopolies and financial capital, using the state for their own purposes. He viewed imperialism simply as a function of financial capital or as its foreign policy. In our opinion, this obviously oversimplified interpretation is primarily the result of Bukharin's underestimation of the term "socioeconomic structure." He did not use the term at all, preferring to speak of social forms, the social order, historical structures, etc.

Bukharin believed that the society represented "the broadest system of interaction," embracing all "protracted interpersonal relationships." People worked for one another either consciously or unconsciously. These labor relationships were their "main social connection"—i.e., what Marx called the economic structure of society. The broadest human community, in Bukharin's opinion, was the world economy[12, pp 90-92, 108]. Within various historical societies, the factors forming the system were "labor relationships" or, as he later wrote in the 1930's, "historical forms of social labor"[15, p 15]. The latter could be seen primarily in the prevailing economic forms and forms of spiritual culture.

In terms of structure, the world economy could be divided into two main groups of states. The first were the civilized countries, where the organization of capitalist relations had reached its highest forms and had turned these countries into state-capitalist trusts or national-state trusts. Production anarchy and pre-capitalist and pre-monopolist forms of production relations had been eliminated in these countries[16, pp 66, 74-77]. Although these countries fought with one another, they nevertheless stood together in opposition to the backward countries. The confrontations between the "world city" and "world village" were the main reason for

production anarchy in the world market. Russia was assigned the position of an agrarian backward country with elements of capitalism[7, p 102; 8, pp 45, 107-108].

Bukharin borrowed the term "organizational process" from Bogdanov to explain the development of the ties between and within the different structures of the world economy. The leading role in this process was played by the administrative or "commanding" activity of the bourgeoisie, which established trusts, cartels, and other "organizational forms of capitalism," secured the rearrangement of various "elements" in the sphere of production and distribution, etc. The appearance of a single production mechanism would subordinate all countries and nationalities to capitalism and cause "the convergence of the different geographic points of economic development, the standardization of capitalist relations, and the increasing opposition of the concentrated property of the capitalist class to the world proletariat"[16, p 34].

The scholar had a unique interpretation of the processes of the imperialist era which Lenin explained as the result of increasingly uneven social development during this era. Bukharin theorized that there were different types of capitalism (advanced, developed, and backward) within the world economy. Capitalism in each country had to go through certain stages in a specific sequence: the stages of trade, industrial, financial, and state capitalism. Each stage, furthermore, laid the groundwork for the next[12, pp 71-72].

These were the views lying at the basis of Bukharin's theory of world socialist revolution. If we examine this concept from the socialist standpoint, it is precisely in this fundamental point that it was inferior to Lenin's approach. Lenin regarded imperialism as something more than policy; namely as a specific stage of the capitalist socioeconomic structure[1, p 94]. The superiority of this methodological approach was already apparent in the analysis of processes of internationalization. In Lenin's opinion, there were two decisive factors in the development of the world economy. The first was the elimination of ethnic boundaries and the stronger relationship between various aspects of social life. The creation of a single capitalist trust was theoretically possible in this situation. Bukharin also realized this. On the basis of the facts listed above, he concluded that socialist revolution was inevitable, but only on the global scale. In contrast to Bukharin, Lenin believed that a second aspect of the process was also of fundamental importance: the stronger unity of the international proletarian movement, the growing socialist tendencies within this movement, and the laboring public's increasing awareness that the purpose of struggle was the "defense of the interests of human progression to a new lifestyle devoid of privileges and exploitation"[2, p 119]—i.e., the creation of a new, communist social system. Furthermore, the struggle could be expected to be successful only if the proletariat would act in conjunction with other democratic forces, especially the

national-democratic and peasant movements. Bukharin, on the other hand, denied their revolutionary role during the era of financial capital.

To explain all of the diverse and contradictory features of processes in the world economy, Lenin developed the Marxist concept of the era as a stage in the development of the capitalist structure and a period in world history. He said that the development of different social structures in the world economy, the struggle of social interests (intra-class, class, ethnic, democratic, etc.) and, consequently, the stages of transition from one class to another and from the past to the future had to be examined within the confines of the era[3, p 60]. It was precisely with thorough consideration for the great variety of economic and political conditions, the tremendous disparities in social development, and the growth of contradictions within the world economy[1, pp 94-95] that Lenin arrived at the conclusion that the socialist revolution could and would triumph first in just one or a few countries.

Socialist Prospects

The differences in Bukharin's and Lenin's approaches to social systems and the main (system-forming) relationships and in their understanding of the natural historical nature of their development were the reason for their different interpretations of the essence and distinctive features of the Soviet social system during the period of transition from capitalism to socialism.

The level of the socioeconomic prerequisites in the country at the time of the victory of the socialist revolution, in Lenin's opinion, determined only the forms and speed of socialist reforms[4, pp 78-79]. Their basic principles and guidelines, however, would depend on the laws of formation. These would be reflected primarily through a struggle between the two social structures—the capitalist and the socialist, which was just emerging but already had a powerful political superstructure in the form of a proletarian state. Lenin coined the term "the era of dictatorship by the proletariat" for the theoretical analysis of this confrontation and of contradictions in political and socioeconomic processes.

Bukharin defined Soviet Russia during the transition period as a special order in accordance with his own views on society and its historical forms and then followed Lenin's example in calling it the "era of dictatorship by the proletariat." He meant something different, however, when he used the term. "Slavery," Bukharin wrote, "is one order.... Serfdom is another. Capitalism is a third, and so forth. But communism is the future as well as another special order. The transition to it—the era of dictatorship by the proletariat—is also a special order"[12, pp 70-71]. Therefore, he saw post-October Russia as a separate social form, distinct from capitalism and socialism, with its own special features and laws of development.

What were these features? The main one was the formation of the proletariat as a class capable of governing the new socialist society of the future. "The objective...or function and role of the era of transition," Bukharin explained, "consist precisely in the maturation of the working class as a class producing all of these cultural forces in this period of transition, maturation to the point at which it can govern the society and then dissolve in the communist society"[17, p 35].

We should recall that the scholar regarded labor relationships as the system-forming social connection. Consequently, Bukharin regarded the economic relations of the transition period—the "national economy"—as an economic entity[18, p 80]. State industry, sequentially socialist industry, peasant small-scale production, the enterprises of the new bourgeoisie, and the transitional "types" of economic activity—feudal, pre-feudal, and so forth—were supposed to coexist in Soviet Russia on the basis of collaboration. One of the specific features of the situation in our country, in Bukharin's opinion, was that these forms had supplanted and succeeded one another in world history, but in our society the clan lifestyle, feudalism, the barter economy, petty bourgeois agriculture, cottage industry, and Soviet economic units would coexist. This suggested that the proletarian government would have to find the correct "combination" of these forms and the interests of the classes concerned rather than managing them by means of the elaboration of political platforms taking only the interests of these groups into account.

Bukharin's attempts to lay an analytical basis for the pursuit of a social policy securing the combination of the interests of different social groups, including the bourgeoisie, during the period of the search for methods of socialist construction are noteworthy, but there was one fundamental flaw in his position: His idea of the transition period was based on the pluralism of two—capitalist and socialist—structural systems. This approach was rooted in the theory of balance as interpreted by Bogdanov.

Lenin approached the problem from a different methodological standpoint, relying on the theory of socioeconomic structures. The relative integrity of Soviet Russia as a system was secured during the era of dictatorship by the proletariat by a powerful political superstructure. This certainly did not mean a special social order or structure. Lenin regarded the transition period as a struggle between the first signs of communism on one side and small-scale commercial production and capitalism on the other. The construction of the new society was to be accomplished through the use of transitional economic forms and structures and through their revision and the development of socialist social forms and relations. This laid the analytical foundation for the idea of pluralism on a socialist (using today's terminology) basis, implying a multitude of democratic forms and means of progression toward socialism. This approach admitted the possibility of Soviet Russia's inclusion in

the world capitalist economy on the basis of the system of international division of labor of that time. This inclusion was viewed as the establishment of the humanistic principles characteristic of socialism in international relations. "We," Lenin stressed, "are proposing this program as builders of a world economy of a different design"[5, p 71].

In summation, we can say that many of Bukharin's ideas were compatible with Lenin's views. The main common feature was the realization of the need to seek concrete patterns of development in many different areas but within the confines of a socialist future. In this connection, Bukharin raised several issues that are still relevant in Marxist-Leninist sociology. Many of his hypotheses, however, were not concrete (signifying a synthesis of abstractions) or dialectically strict enough, and for this reason his socioeconomic conclusions were often only speculative or even superficial. Of course, an accurate assessment of Bukharin's sociological theory requires an analysis within the context of the ideological and political situation of the 1920's and early 1930's. This is the only way we can be completely certain that we have taken everything of value and derived the maximum from the scientific inquiries of a remarkable thinker and revolutionary.

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Letters to Editor

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[Selected letters to editor]

[Text]

Whom Will the Inconsistent Follow? (Yu.V. Lepeshkin, Moscow)

Perestroyka is expected to accomplish the qualitative renewal of our life. The party believes that the only productive way of achieving this renewal will entail the maximum democratization of social life on the basis of socialist principles. Virtually any innovation is destined to fail, however, if it has little to do with the interests of people. To what degree is the policy line of democratization being supported by the people? We tried to find a

partial answer to this question by polling young people in rural areas. They are the ones who are expected to put these areas on the road to renewal and put an end to the earlier rural lifestyle. Do they want this? If so, which methods do they prefer? What do they expect—the consolidation of socialism or, to put it plainly, bourgeois liberalization? In essence, we conducted the study to find out about the political culture of these young people in general.

The study was conducted on 20 farms in Moscow and Kirov oblasts. The sample group consisted of 751 people—298 machine operators and drivers, 89 livestock breeders, 64 people in other worker occupations, 134 administrative employees, and 166 respondents from the non-production sphere. In short, the study covered all of the main socioprofessional groups of working youth. The respondents were asked several questions, including the following: "What do you feel would contribute the most to the resolution of the problems facing the country?" They were asked to choose one of the following responses: "The further democratization of society" (first); "The establishment of order through stricter law enforcement" (second); "Undecided" (third). We chose the second alternative response because we believed that other options, such as "the curtailment of democracy" or "the institution of stricter administrative measures," would not aid in the disclosure of opinions because even Nina Andreyeva's supporters do not reject democracy *per se*; they simply interpret it in their own way. It is also unlikely that anyone would choose to openly support the authoritarian system of management. In short, we chose a response more capable, in our opinion, of revealing the number of young people inclined to support "strong authority" and the "establishment of order" by means of stricter rules. The existence of this point of view is a potential threat to the process of democratization and it cannot be ignored.

The distribution of responses was the following: 44.5 percent of the respondents chose the first response, 21.5 percent chose the second, and 31.7 percent chose the third (1.3 percent did not answer the question at all, and 1 percent chose the first two responses). The questionnaire also included a supplementary question: "Do you believe that the development of democracy will strengthen socialism and increase public trust in its ideals?" Again, there were three possible responses: "Yes" (fourth); "No" (fifth); "Undecided" (sixth).

The comparison of these responses was expected to reveal the following groups of respondents: those who support the ongoing process of democratization and believe it is consistent with socialist principles (those who chose the first response in both cases); those who support further democratization but do not share socialist ideals (those who chose the first and fifth responses); those who consistently support "stringent" measures and do not want the further democratization of society (the second and fifth responses); and, finally,

those who are hesitant, dubious, or inconsistent in their support of plans for the future development of society (other combinations of responses).

The results of our survey indicated that 39.8 percent of the young people belong to the first group, 0.5 percent belong to the second, 2.5 percent to the third, and 57.1 percent to the fourth.

We feel that the success of democratization and *perestroika* in rural areas will depend largely on the firmness and consistency of its supporters, who are already many in number and also on the ultimate choice of the members of the fourth and largest group, whose support still must be won.

The End Is Clear, But What About the Means? (E.V. Nechayev, head of sociological research laboratory, Kursk)

We have accomplished a great deal in the last 3 years of sobriety. If statistics can be trusted, within the first year after the law was passed we were able to reduce losses of work time in industry by 34 percent[2], lower the general mortality rate from 10.6 to 9.8 per thousand[3], and reduce the number of people dying of causes directly related to alcoholism from 39,900 to 23,300[4]. We also encounter another figure, however—100,000 lives have been saved[3]. The contradictory nature of these data is precisely the reason I chose to say "if statistics can be trusted." Something else is also confusing: How does the number of losses due to the use of drugs correlate with the previously cited figures—11,000[5]? If we can believe these figures, are we satisfied with them? Of course. We are just as pleased with them as we are pleased with the fact that our streets and public places are more peaceful now. Then why do we still feel anxious? Why are there such striking differences in the content and tone of the two CPSU Central Committee decrees[1] on this matter? And why is it that when the people standing in the "alcohol lines" are interviewed by television reporters, they no longer hide from the camera but act defiant instead? The end was clear from the very beginning—the elimination of alcohol abuse and alcoholism—but the means to the end were never as clear. The May CPSU Central Committee decree requested the State Committee of the USSR for Science and Technology, the USSR Academy of Sciences, the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences, and the USSR Academy of Pedagogical Sciences to "draw up a statewide comprehensive program for the prevention and elimination of alcohol abuse and alcoholism, including the social, economic, demographic, educational, legal, psychological, and medico-biological aspects of the problem"[1, p 472]. This was an admission that the measures envisaged in the decree (the personal example of communists, the struggle against illegal distilling, the increased production of juices, etc.) were clearly inadequate and that a methodology was needed! But where is it? It still does not exist. There is still no unified system of alcohol education for all academic institutions (a responsibility of the

USSR Ministry of Health with the help of the Komsomol Central Committee and the now dissolved Ministry of Higher and Secondary Specialized Education, State Committee for Vocational and Technical Education, and Ministry of Education). It would be simpler, of course, to close the stores and get rid of the illegal stills. In my opinion, the most constructive approach, suggested by V.B. Olshanskiy[6], did not win widespread support. Why not?

Let us take a look at some other statistics. This time I would hesitate to include them among our assets.

In 1984 we produced 1,418,000,000 decaliters of wine and hard liquor, but in 1986 we produced 813,000,000[7]—i.e., 43 percent less. In the first 9 months of 1987 (January-September) sales of wine and hard liquor were already 20 percent below the figure for the same period last year. The reduction was possible. This, in contrast to the compilation of carefully considered programs, was possible. But we should remember one of the main precepts of the physician's creed: Do not injure people! In our efforts to treat a social illness, we are confining ourselves to promises: "We will not yield!" "We will reduce consumption!" "We will institute dry laws!" With our random tactics, we are giving rise to new illnesses.

Sales of sugar have recently increased dramatically. Everyone knows what this means. Furthermore, according to the data of docent G.G. Zaigayev from the Academy of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, the increase in illegally distilled liquor surpasses the decrease in alcohol sales[8]. And this does not include colognes, glues, and other "beverages"! Is this why we drove the vineyards out of business? Is this why we stopped importing wine? The number of schoolchildren and students at vocational and technical institutes who had used drugs at least once doubled between 1986 and 1987 (from 6-8 percent to 12 percent). Obviously, this is not necessarily a result of reduced alcohol sales, but we should make certain of this.

The range of "relationships" between man and alcohol is quite broad both in terms of intensity and in terms of motivation. We, however, are trying to destroy the entire range by shooting at just one fixed point—by reducing sales.

It would be difficult to condemn Pushkin even in our thoughts for enjoying himself when he was among friends or to say that he drank away part of his talent. We will always retain the appealing image of the hussar who not only drank and caroused to excess but also fought courageously in defense of his fatherland and also left us his poetry and memoirs. Marx is also known not to have avoided friendly conversations over a glass of wine. It would be difficult to say that people who exclude hard liquor completely from their lives are more worthy than Pushkin, Denis Davydov, or Karl Marx. This is why the model we construct for a truly effective struggle against alcohol must take this "entropic" tendency into account.

The main thing is that we will overcome the problem not by acknowledging it, but by eliminating the need to resort to alcohol as a pacifier, a source of inspiration, a means of unification, or a measure of character. This can only be done by replacing one need with another, more meaningful need. Why, for example, is alcohol consumption declining in England and the United States in spite of its availability and pervasive advertising? Why are the Brazilians not drinking themselves to death even though their vehicles are fueled by a mixture containing ethyl alcohol?

Alcohol abuse will begin to subside only when everything that is healthy and good in the individual is given maximum support and encouragement.

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Another Report on the "Your Attitudes" Service (S.B. Yeselson and V.R. Lashchev, Perm-Rostov)

An analysis of the many statutes on sociological services like "Your Attitudes," "Signal," "Bridge," and others indicates that their main function consists in organizing and securing the consideration of public opinion in the resolution of various problems at enterprises. A study of the services themselves, however, suggests that most of them are performing completely different functions. A look at the activities of the "Your Attitudes" services at the Perm Motorostroitel Production Association imeni Ya.M. Sverdlov and the Rostov Helicopter Production Association and at the experience of other subdivisions of this type reveals that they are actually performing the following functions. First of all, they function as dispatchers. Questions and suggestions are submitted to the service, and service personnel then forward them to the administrators concerned. This usually happens because people do not know where to go with their problems. The most elementary kind of informational work—for example, bulletin boards to tell people what to do when difficulties arise or information directories for the association or enterprise—would clear up all of these questions. Second, they serve as a buffer. The service is addressed by well-informed people who know who can solve their problems but either do not trust administrators or want extra reinforcement for their own actions. The service then intercedes on behalf of these workers.

This points up one of the real problems of today's enterprise—to whom can workers complain about bureaucratism? Fully 20 percent of all the people who solicit the help of the service in the Rostov Helicopter Production Association have already been refused assistance elsewhere. In this case the service acts as a substitute for the trade union committee or work crew council because it is their function to protect the interests of labor. Third, the service provides directory assistance, answering questions about various aspects of enterprise affairs. The establishment of an informational system for workers would relieve service personnel of these duties. An information center is being set up at the Perm Motorostroitel Association, for example, to inform workers of orders, decrees, directives, plans, decisions, and other informational materials of the ministry, oblast, city, rayon, or association. There is a colossal need for this kind of information. Fourth, the service renders psychological assistance. Service personnel are asked to settle conflicts or advise workers on personal problems. This kind of work requires special training in psychology or psychotherapy and is one of the functions of social development services. Finally, the sociological service measures and analyzes public opinion. The sociologists categorize and analyze all requests and complaints. For some reason, the fact that the opinions of those who address the service do not represent the opinions of all enterprise workers is always overlooked. Not all workers would solicit the help of the service—some because of their general frame of mind and some because they suspect their anonymity will not be preserved.

In short, the "Your Attitudes" service should never be confused with a center for the study of public opinion. There is a real need, however, for centers of this kind at enterprises. Some people already realize this. The Motorostroitel Production Association in Perm, for example, now has a "Your Opinions" service for the study of public opinion and the performance of information services. Information is gathered by means of questionnaires the respondents drop into special mailboxes located in various parts of the association (in addition, the workers in a special sample group are surveyed on specific matters); by means of telephone conversations with service personnel; by means of telephone conversations with an automatic answering machine; by means of personal interviews.

Well-organized studies of the opinions of workers can broaden their effective participation in enterprise management and improve the sociopsychological atmosphere in the work crew.

Ethnic Factors Should Be Taken into Account (V.I. Voronov, Kaliningrad, Moscow Oblast)

After carefully reading the article "The Latest Trends in the USSR Birthrate" in issue No 3 for 1988, I would like to say that the article is of definite interest, but the demographic processes in our country should be examined from the standpoint of nationality rather than territory. The importance of taking ethnic factors into account is being acknowledged by more and more scientists in various fields. We have realized that the analysis of the most

important component of population reproduction—the birthrate—from the standpoint of nationality is more effective and lays a sounder basis for demographic forecasts than simple territorial analyses of the birthrate.

For some reason the authors of the article said nothing about the causes of the latest trends, but they should have. It seems to me that everything is quite simple. Young couples want to get a place of their own as quickly as possible, but they need to have a child for this. After they have their own place to live, everything seems fine and they rarely want a second or third child. Frequently, the whole thing ends in divorce. It is no coincidence, after all, that half of the families in the RSFSR have only one child. This phenomenon, therefore, can hardly be called a new trend.

Furthermore, the RSFSR cannot be regarded as a single demographic monolith. The demographic situation looks even less promising if the examination of the RSFSR does not include the autonomous republics, and the situation seems completely hopeless if the study is confined to the non-chernozem zone. This is why it is obvious that a regional demographic policy must be pursued in our country. Unfortunately, there has been no mention anywhere in literature of the elaboration of this kind of policy, and it has been 30 years since the State Committee of the USSR for Statistics has published any data on natural population dynamics in different oblasts, krais, and autonomous republics.

It Is Not So Simple (V.V. Solodnikov, Ryazan)

I want to say a few things about A.S. Krasovskiy's article "Tenth- Graders' Ideas About a Happy Marriage" (1988, No 3).

The author believes that his survey revealed "a contradiction between the ideas of young people about the necessary qualities of a good spouse and their own behavior" (p 72). The disparity between the person's idea of correct behavior and his actual behavior has been known to social psychologists for a long time and has been termed the "LaPiere paradox"[1], but this is something different. This is a matter of an obvious conflict between two sets of attitudes, which is, generally speaking, completely natural and, in this case, is a sign of the personality changes undergone by upperclassmen, changes which should, in their opinion, take place before they start a family.

Another important statement the author makes is that young men and women should be more "flexible" (p 72). Did it really take a special study to arrive at this conclusion? What is the standard advice given to young people on their wedding day? "Be patient with one another and yield to one another," etc. It is clear, however, that this age-old advice "does not work," and this is attested to by the divorce statistics for young couples. Contemporary scientific data also indicate that it is not so simple.

First of all, the abstract term "flexibility" does not differ in any way from conformity, which has been the subject of experimental research for a long time. In Soviet social psychology the contradiction between conformity and non-conformity is eliminated by means of the concept of the "collectivist self-assertion of the individual"[2], presupposing the group member's ability to withstand group pressure if he is convinced that he is upholding higher social standards and values. In families, there is the common situation of alcohol abuse by the husband. Should the wife "yield" in this case? How "flexible" should she be? What is better for the children—keeping the family together or getting a divorce? The answers are not obvious.

Furthermore, N.G. Aristova found that girls whose parents had been divorced displayed greater determination to preserve their future families than those who had been raised by a mother and father[3] (it is the willingness to make compromises, and not "flexibility," that A.S. Krasovskiy was measuring). Nevertheless, statistics conclusively corroborate the existence of a so-called "inherited propensity for divorce." In other words, people from broken homes are more likely to get divorced than those who lived with both parents. This proves that determination alone is not enough.

Finally, the active promotion of "flexibility" implies that "the family in conflict is a bad family," and this is apparently already firmly entrenched in the public mind, including the young mind. A survey of young divorced couples revealed that the behavior strategy they usually chose in cases of family difficulties was the avoidance of "explanations of their own positions," sometimes to the point of petitioning for the dissolution of the marriage. This is logical because "ostrich behavior" cannot help in resolving the conflicts arising in the process of family development. These conflicts, however, are normal and understandable, and it is only the conflicts between family members in their interaction to resolve problems that can be constructive or destructive (for more detail, see [4]).

Therefore, it is important and necessary not to simply tell young people about the need for "flexibility," but also to teach them effective modes of interaction and the ability to defend their own point of view and respect the other person's point of view, even if it is the opposite of their own. In short, all of us have to learn to live in a democratic atmosphere at home as well as at work and in the society.

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Excerpts from Letters (N.I. Popova, Lyubertsy)

The author of the informative and extremely conclusive article "Beyond Morality, Beyond the Law" (1988, No 3), V.P. Maslov, is mistaken when he says on page 98 that O.E. Mandelshtam's poem about Stalin ("We live, deaf to the land beneath us...") was written in 1934. It was not. It was written in 1933, which makes it an even more interesting landmark in our people's spiritual history. It is also significant that V.P. Maslov is quoting the first version of the poem. There is also a second, which begins: "We live, deaf to the land beneath us/Ten steps away no one hears our speeches./But where there's so much as half a conversation/The Kremlin's mountaineer will get his mention./His fingers are fat as grubs/And the words, final as lead weights, fall from his lips./His cockroach whiskers leer/And his boot tops gleam...." I think that people like O.E. Mandelshtam—as well as N.A. Skrypnik, M.N. Ryutin, S.I. Syrtsov, and V.V. Lominadze even earlier—who openly protested Stalin's policies, upheld the honor of the nation and were the forerunners of today's reassessment of values and restructuring of public thinking and public attitudes.

(V.V. Okhrimenko, Moscow)

I found two mistakes pertaining to communications equipment in A.T. Rybin's memoirs (1988, No 3). On page 90 he says: "There was a small transistor radio on Stalin's desk...." This is highly improbable. It was most likely a tube set. After all, the transistor was invented by American physicists J. Bardeen, W. Brattain, and W. Shockley in 1948 (8 years later, in 1956, they were awarded the Nobel Prize). Later, on page 93, the author mentions a type of telephone—the "smoke phone" [dymofon]. This is clearly a typographical error. The correct word is "house intercom" [domofon].

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From Alienation to Dialogue

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(signed to press 7 Dec 88) pp 146-149

[Article by Vladimir Alekseyevich Grishin, candidate of juridical sciences, senior scientific associate at the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, militia major, and author of a review in SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA (1988, No 1, co-author); Vladimir Semenovich Ovchinskiy, candidate of juridical sciences, assistant department head at the institute, militia major, and one of our permanent contributing authors; and Leonid Aleksandrovich Radzikhovskiy, candidate of psychological sciences, senior scientific associate at the Scientific Research Institute of General and Education Psychology of the USSR Academy of Pedagogical Sciences, and first-time contributor to our journal]

[Text] Yu. Shchekochikhin is known primarily as the author of many articles about the problems of youth, or, according to the common terminology of our day, about "negative social behavior among youth." Although he is not the only writer concerned with this vital issue, in contrast to many of his colleagues he never tries to sensationalize the topic. This is corroborated by a reading of the book "Allo, my vas slyshim.... Iz khroniki nashogo vremeni" [Hello, Can We Help You.... Excerpts from a Chronicle of Our Time] (Moscow, Molodaya gvardiya, 1987), a collection of revised and supplemented editions of the best articles the author has written for newspapers and journals in recent years.

"Love your heroes, or prepare to suffer the gravest consequences," M.A. Bulgakov said. For understandable reasons, it is extremely difficult for Yu. Shchekochikhin to follow this advice. Nevertheless, he is not indifferent to the young people he discusses in his works: He likes many, is horrified by some, and tries to understand all of them, but the main thing is that he never grew tired of them and never lost interest in them.

A person who works with teenagers soon recognizes certain standard forms of behavior in spite of their external diversity—certain common features which make their way, with minor variations, from individual to individual and from group to group. The person is soon exhausted by the disturbing kaleidoscope and by the sense of hopelessness that is soon aroused by the seeming "inscrutability" of the youngsters and their amazing bluntness, their cynicism, their calculating manner, and their cruel treatment of everyone and everything around them. Every person who works with difficult youngsters has experienced this kind of spiritual exhaustion. The only difference is that some are able to surmount it while others are not....

What are the social and sociopsychological causes of the unhealthy behavior of some young people? Shchekochikhin is right when he says that it is possible to fumble around in the dark for a long time, "adding and subtracting factors, as if on a calculator: minus school, plus the street; minus the police, plus wine; minus father, plus the drunken neighbor who sets a bad example...." (p 22). This is a futile undertaking. A person must take hold of the root; otherwise he will continue floating along the surface from incident to incident.

For a long time our society felt that remnants of the past were among the main causes of crime. Obviously, the role of this factor cannot be denied completely, but the main cause still must be sought in the serious flaws in the economy, which give rise to social injustice, imbalances in distribution, and inequality in the positions of various social groups. An analysis of the dynamics of crime in the postwar period reveals an extremely interesting connection. Prior to the middle of the 1960's, when there was a relatively stable decline in the crime rate[1], there were positive advances in all spheres of social life, but

after 1967—i.e., as soon as the first interruptions occurred in economic reform—the problem became increasingly acute[2, p 49].

Yu. Shchekochikhin was one of the first to sound the alarm. It is true that in those "pre-perestroika" years, when the news media assured us daily that the rate of juvenile delinquency in our country was constantly declining and that we did not and could not have any more prostitution or drug addiction in our society, many wondered whether the author might be exaggerating and drawing general conclusions from isolated and abnormal cases. Now the real state of affairs is known to more than just the experts: In the last two decades crime among youth has increased 1.5-fold, and juvenile crime has doubled. We now have more than 130,000 drug addicts (known and registered), and 62 percent of them are under the age of 30[2, pp 55-57].

The lack of opportunity to satisfy one's own needs legally, not to mention the needs of one's family, and to achieve a solid social position and independence in the workplace gives rise to passivity, infantile behavior, and a consumer mentality and are forcing some young people to make their living in illegal ways. Economic and social irresponsibility, however, is not something new and is not the sole cause of social corrosion. It could be compared to the kind of powder that has to be lit by an ideological match. This is why the main cause of the corrosion of the young mind is ideological and is reflected in the crisis of our society's traditional values.

What caused this crisis? First of all, it is comparatively easy to endure economic difficulties or to not feel dissatisfied with a low social status if these are perceived as the norm. This is completely understandable in extreme situations (the war and the postwar confusion) or when there is the hope of rapid and real change (from communal dwellings to separate apartments at the beginning of the 1960's). On the one hand, at that time economic success (just as a high social status) was not considered to be prestigious by the majority of the society and, on the other, under the conditions of overall economic recovery each individual had the prospect of a better life and self-sufficiency. This is the reason for what seems to be a "paradox" in social thinking but is essentially quite understandable: In the 1960's the standard of living even in the cities, not to mention rural areas, was generally lower than in the 1980's, but many who have compared the two periods have subjectively assigned preference to the former. The fact is that the valid hope of a better life existed at that time, but during the years of stagnation this hope was not present in broad segments of the population.

The phenomenon of moral duplicity or, to put it more simply, the lies that were acknowledged and accepted by all, also inflicted colossal damage on the system of social values, especially among youth. The consequences of this duplicity have not been studied yet. After all, until recently it was impossible to even suggest that lies were being reproduced in our social consciousness. Under

these conditions, many officially declared values were simply rejected by youth. This is referred to specifically in an honest and frank discussion by Yu. Shchek-ochikhin.

The most interesting feature of the author's conversations with youngsters who had become speculators was their absolute belief that they were morally justified. "In other words, you are saying that only the laziness of your friends kept them from becoming your partners. Do you see no other reason?"

"That is what I believe. I see no other reason...."

"Do you think there are people with a more interesting life than yours?"

"No, I do not think so."

"You mean you are completely satisfied with your life?"

"Yes, completely" (pp 127-128).

This is probably not bravado. It is probably the kind of frankness that might be lacking in a restaurant director or corrupt official with exactly the same views....

The teenage businessmen are guided largely by the rules of the black market. This is difficult to believe, but conversations with them and studies of them testify that the concepts of "assistance," "mutual aid," and even "friendship" are measured, so to speak, in terms of monetary value, and this eventually causes the young person to lose sight of all of the common human values.

This, however, is not all there is to the spiritual problems in the black market, which is part of the so-called shadow economy. Supply and demand, competition, and market conditions in this sphere are more sensitive to the influence of popular trends, and not only in the case of clothing and other goods, but also in the case of standards of behavior, forms of consumption, and spiritual values.

The intensity of their exchange and, consequently, their popularity among youth depend specifically on their popularity abroad, the shortage of relevant information, and the non-acceptance of official structures.

The fact that this sphere is outside the formalized system of relations suggests that there is shadow cultural exchange in addition to the shadow economy. Without a thorough and complete study of this phenomenon, it is impossible to explain many of the processes occurring among youth.

There are established prices for videocassettes of different types (pornography, horror movies, mini-series, etc.), phonograph records, posters of popular rock groups, the paraphernalia of various informal associations, etc. It is within the sphere of shadow cultural exchange that the standards of behavior and spiritual values imported from abroad accumulate and spread throughout the youth culture. For a long time this was

promoted by the state's dogmatic attitudes (usually prohibitive) in the cultural sphere, which aroused feelings of protest in the young and resulted in the emulation of Western models (which were often far from the best examples).

The educational system "did its bit" in promoting this kind of behavior by ignoring some of the important features of adolescence: the speed of spiritual processes, the intensity of self-expression, and the rigid conformity to popular trends. The dreary curriculum, the authoritarian style of teaching, and the overemphasis on the natural sciences and mathematics at the expense of liberal arts all contributed to the loss of interest in proposed spiritual models and the search for new values.

We have no reference work on "Youth in the USSR," but the book "Allo, my vas slyshim..." could serve as a unique guide to informal associations of young people. It discusses the hippies, the pacifists, the soccer fanatics, motorcycle gangs, punks, "new wave" groups, the "break- dancers," "heavy metal" fans, the "poppers," the "high-lifers," the "skateboarders," the "communards," the "repairmen," theatrical "firms," street "gangs," the "Nazis," groups dabbling in Eastern religions, the KSP, the fans of entertainment idols (the "Pugachists" and "Rotarists"), the "Bonapartists," the "anarchists," the "monarchists," and the LLAS (the Leningrad Station League, for the uninitiated—the details can be found in Shchekochikhin's book, pp 188-193). He does not simply list these associations. He reports his conversations with leaders and members and describes their lifestyle, their rituals, their symbols, and their slang. Of course, this is not a traditional sociological study, but the reader will probably gain a better understanding of a previously unknown world than he could get from a strictly scientific treatise.

The informal associations have forced us to give up our stereotypical view of youth as some kind of homogeneous group yielding easily to any kind of directed influence on the part of numerous "educators" on all levels. During the "quiet years" of economic and ideological stagnation the structure of society grew more complex and divided into heterogeneous social groups. This process could not fail to affect youth. Diverse and more or less large informal associations with their own interests and passions, their own heroes and idols, and their own views on life rose to the surface.

There is no question that most of the informal associations responsible for social initiatives (political, economic, culturological, and creative) have their positive side (in spite of the maximalism of youth). On the other hand, the groups whose behavior and values seem at first to be aimed directly against the socialist society and to be the product of an exclusive youth subculture are more complex. It is true that the hippies, rockers, punks, and the epitome of anti-values and anti-behavior—the "Nazi" groups (one of these groups in Kiev is even the subject of a documentary film)—have their counterparts in the West, but it is our opinion that the Western

influence is much weaker in this case than the influence of the social consciousness these groups "reject." The externally Western (actually pseudo-Western) forms have been filled with a domestic content. Take, for example, the hippies. They accepted all of the ideological trappings of the Western group—pacifism, the desire for simplicity, the preaching of love, and so forth and so on. The imported costume, however, is splitting at the seams.

Here is a minor but indicative detail. The compulsory uniform of the hippie—jeans—cost up to 200 rubles in our country until just recently, and it was almost impossible to find them. Among the Western hippies this is evidence of simplicity, but among the Soviet ones it is a symbol of high prestige and elitism. The borrowed ideological precepts also seem paradoxical when anti-authoritarian values and views are proclaimed in an authoritarian manner. The tolerance and love the hippies feel obligated to preach are frequently only an excuse for the irate criticism of their social surroundings for the absence of these qualities. In this way, intolerance, a lack of discernment, highly pretentious behavior, and rigid stereotypes—i.e., all of the patterns of public thinking and action the hippies oppose—permeated their own ideology from within and now constitute its basis.

The members of the informal associations in our country are truly children of their time, and their thinking is influenced considerably by the thinking of the "adult world." This is particularly apparent when they begin rejecting the values of the society which gave birth to them. It is the present form of these associations, and not their existence in principle, that is a product of the ideology of stagnation, with its moral duplicity, authoritarian thinking, and erosion of many major human values.

Of course, the advice regarding the need to give up the "enemy image" in communication with the members of informal associations and to avoid an obsession with prohibition does not mean that this complex and contradictory world should be viewed through rose-colored glasses. "Today," Yu. Shchekochikhin writes, "we can see two tendencies of particular interest in the youth movement. One is the tendency to unite in informal groups and the other is connected with organized crime. Their parallel existence at this time means that the 'heavy metallists,' the 'break-dancers,' and the 'rockers' are not criminal groups per se, but if these two tendencies should suddenly merge, there could be trouble" (p 261).

Unfortunately, this warning is already coming true. Law enforcement agencies are seriously worried about the unlawful activities of informal associations formed on a territorial basis and upholding the traditions and conventions of the crime world (see, for example, [3]). These groups are quite large and well-organized and have strong leaders. Regrettably, the term "youth gang," which was connected exclusively with the West in our

minds until just recently, is fully applicable to them. The same can be said of the "youth underground," which is usually entered by means of alcohol, drugs, mind-altering and toxic substances, violence, and brutality.

The social situation in our country is complicated. On the one hand, now that a real struggle is being waged against the commercial Mafia, public opinion is changing slowly but surely. What many people accepted (and many even respected) yesterday is beginning to arouse the feelings it should arouse today—condemnation and revulsion. On the other hand, the ruthless elimination of the "equality in poverty" mentality and the development of cooperatives and individual labor are enhancing the prestige of money and material goods. This is not objectionable in itself, but there is no question that various criminal elements, political opportunists, and extremists will take advantage of this and will "recruit" young people to serve their own interests. This is why it is so important not to cut the thread connecting the adult world with youth, including the members of informal associations, so that they will know that people are paying attention to them, want to understand them, and are ready and willing to come to their aid. There is only one possible road: the road from alienation to dialogue, and Yu. Shchekochikhin's book promotes trust in the validity of this road.

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